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# COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

## THE SOCIAL WELFARE LIBRARY

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THE SOCIAL WELFARE LIBRARY

COMMUNITY  
ORGANIZATION

BY  
JOSEPH KINMONT HART

AUTHOR OF  
DEMOCRACY IN EDUCATION

New York  
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY  
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## PREFACE

THIS book is the outgrowth of ten years of work in educational and social lines in Western States, together with six months' experience with the War Camp Community Service in intensive study of the problems of community life and organization under reconstruction conditions. The backgrounds of the discussion may be found in the educational and sociological literature of the recent past and present; in the actual work of social construction and reconstruction now going on in the world; and in the community programs of many individuals, groups, associations, and communities.

It is an effort to approach our social problems from the standpoint of the community as a whole. We are attempting to discover some of the laws, biological, psychological, and social, within which human association goes on and in terms of which more or less satisfactory communities have been built up. We are attempting to develop means by which community thinking of a higher order may be brought to bear on the problems of the community in order that our democracy may have the fullest possible use of all its latent resources of enthusiasm, intelligence, and good will. We are attempting to point out the larger community ways in which volunteer energy and co-operation may be made to bear fruit in programs of health,

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## PREFACE

happiness, and social understanding. We are attempting to work out natural social motivations that will bring the common masses of people together in firmer bonds of mutual understanding and helpfulness in order that our democracy may become real, substantial, and humane.

The field here outlined is still largely open country. This is not a final guide book, it is a sketch of certain high points from which the whole country has been more or less dimly descried. May it stimulate many others to exploration in the same field!

I am greatly indebted to a host of friends and students for inspiration to undertake this task, and particularly to the members of the "Social Service Publishing Company," for providing the leisure that has made the work possible.

I am indebted to innumerable individuals and groups who have enabled me to come into intimate and concrete contact with the realities of community life in many parts of the country.

I am indebted to Mr. Ray F. Carter and Mr. Tam Deering of Seattle for many helpful suggestions; and to my secretary, Miss Adelaide Morey, for continuous helpfulness in the selection of materials and for stimulating criticism.

My thanks are also due to the editor of the series, Dr. Devine, and to Miss Lilian Brandt and Mr. H. S. Braucher, for illuminating criticisms upon the completed manuscript.

J. K. H.

## INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITOR

DURING the past ten years social workers have been at school in technique. Processes of diagnosis and of specialized treatment have been persistently pressed upon their attention. Such broad facts of our common economic life as had been effectively presented in Professor Patten's *New Basis of Civilization* have been allowed to sink into a secondary place, when not altogether ignored. The training schools for social workers have not unnaturally emphasized the technical aspects of investigation and treatment; and special periodicals devoted to one or another department of social practice have further favored this tendency.

Within limits this is a necessary and beneficial development. Knowledge of procedure which has proved to be successful, mastery of technique, critical analysis of experience, familiarity with case records, are essential in social work as in every vocation. The danger is that we may become so absorbed in the particular manner in which a group of chosen individuals are to be treated—in their reactions, favorable and unfavorable—as to lose altogether the larger view of the conditions under which they live, the social forces which are operating upon them independently of our intervention, the motives which do in reality determine their general course of action. Similar over-specialization may occur in those forms of social

## INTRODUCTION

work which are concerned with group interests or the common welfare as distinct from family case work. Community organization, for example, may develop a technique in which selected problems are followed to their most intricate ramifications in calm disregard of entire lack of interest in those problems by any existing community of human beings.

In either case this tendency may be fostered by excessive sensitiveness to the good opinion of those individuals who at the time are regarded as authorities in the field in question. An actual dread of general popularity, coupled with an intense desire for the approval of one or more "experts," a mutual admiration guild based on proficiency in a special form of service, an intellectual aristocracy which substitutes inner satisfaction for objective tests of social utility, are the logical outcome of an over-elaboration of "technique," when not controlled by the observations and criticisms of economists, by the dicta of common sense, by the facts of our common social life as plain people see and interpret them.

A social agency created, let us say, to care for neglected children, or to furnish facilities for wholesome recreation, has constantly to ask, not only, What are the most approved methods of child care? What rare and interesting obstacle has a playground leader uncovered? but also, Are children on the whole less neglected as a result of the activities of the agency? Is the leisure time of the community more profitably

## INTRODUCTION

employed, and by what test of profit? Are the problems on which attention is so minutely concentrated the fundamental, the urgently pressing ones? Case records are useful for instruction, but they may contain little information about the deeper needs even of those with whom they deal, and none at all about the needs of their neighbors.

The Social Welfare Library, of which this is the initial volume, will attempt to contribute to the interests of those who are engaged in what is broadly called "social work," including not only that directed toward the relief and rehabilitation of individuals and families but that which is undertaken for the community as a whole. The Editor's desire is that the studies which appear in this Library shall do something to supply the deficiency to which attention has been called; that they shall contribute to social thinking rather than to technique, while not undervaluing the latter; that they shall add to the general knowledge of the social conditions in the midst of which social work is done rather than re-analyze processes already sufficiently established; that they shall aid in a human appreciation of the difficulties caused by sickness, poverty, and maladjustment, rather than make converts to some one way of meeting these difficulties.

With this aim in view, the present discussion of community organization by Professor Hart is confidently recommended to the favorable attention of all

## INTRODUCTION

social workers and of the general public. It is not propaganda, open or covert. It is not designed to inflame the emotions over some one aspect of the problem. It is a thoughtful and sincere presentation of the larger problem itself—a demonstration of the importance of a sense of community, a sympathetic examination of the current plans for deepening and giving expression to that sense, a suggestion as to how current experience and thinking may be audited and applied in a democratic spirit. It is written for those who are directly engaged in community service in any form, and for the larger number who have become uneasy over the absence of community spirit and who know that without it all devices for promoting the common welfare are worse than useless.

EDWARD T. DEVINE.

August 3, 1920.



# CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I BACKGROUNDS . . . . .	3
II THE PRESENT SITUATION . . . . .	22
III THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIS OF COM- MUNITY . . . . .	50
IV THE FUNCTION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES	62
V THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL . . . . .	76
VI SOME IMPORTANT TASKS . . . . .	91
VII TYPES OF PRELIMINARY EFFORT . . . . .	104
VIII OBSTRUCTIONS . . . . .	129
IX DEVELOPING COMMUNITY DELIBERATION	141
X THE INCLUSIVE PROGRAM . . . . .	158
XI FROM DELIBERATION TO ACTION . . . . .	179
XII KEEPING THE PROGRAM HUMAN . . . . .	194
XIII THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP . . . . .	206
APPENDIX . . . . .	218
INDEX . . . . .	226



# COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

## CHAPTER I

### BACKGROUNDS

HUMAN beings are not separate and independent grains in the midst of drifting social sands. They are complex centers of instincts, impulses, appetites and desires, which impel to all sorts of entangling contacts. They are not simple and distinct atoms in the neighborhood of other simple and distinct atoms, but centers of complicated and ever-changing (not always growing) relationships. The "individual" as such does not exist. We live and move and have our actual being, whether we will or no, in the mazes of social contacts and relationships with our fellows.

Human beings are, therefore, centers of a variety of needs. Five of these may be considered major, and out of these have grown our five major social institutions. First, as infants and children, we need nurture and care, and this need has given rise to the institution of the family. Second, as centers of ideal aspirations and unsatisfied longings, we need some broad outlook upon the meanings of life and destiny, and this has given rise to the institutions of religion. Third, we need provision for our physical wants and the

chance to impress ourselves upon the world of things in constructive fashion, and this has given rise to the institutions of industry. Fourth, we need the opportunity of sharing and enjoying, in some more or less just fashion, the various goods of the world, and since this calls for order and restraint it has given rise to the institution of the state. And, finally, we need to know, and to extend our capacity to know, continuously, and this has given rise to the institution of the school. (Of course we have many minor needs which have given rise to many sorts of minor instrumentalities besides.)

But specialized institutions, although they have developed out of common human needs, divide the community among themselves, each attempting to satisfy the needs of individuals and the community in its own particularized way. The great modern city community is not an undifferentiated family or industry or government or religion or school. These distinctive institutions tend to divide the community. They develop their own particular partisanships and champions; and they compete more or less openly for the attention and loyalties of the people. The result is that individuals live by fragments and human life becomes a sort of mosaic patchwork instead of a unified experience. More than this: our large cities tend to break up into segregated districts—industrial quarters, residential sections, church neighborhoods, etc. The government is centralized at the city hall and police station. And education is shut up from the world inside school

buildings whose windows are so high that the children cannot see what is going on out in the city.

Children are born into the complications of this social world, this world wrought of many aspiring—sometimes co-operative, often antagonistic—fragments. Some of these fragments are native to the community soil, the products of long development. Some of them are of later growth, the contributions of immigrant peoples or other innovating influences.

Some of these children early lose themselves or are lost in one of these struggling groups, and grow up without ever making institutional contacts of a wider and more effective sort. They never learn any real sort of partisanship, except perhaps a sort of primitive, wolfish following of the clan. They never become aware that there is anything ideal in the world that is big enough to be worth fighting for. They fall into a groove of the city's life and spend their years irresponsibly. They never achieve a share in the complex life that goes on all about them. They are not criminals; they are simply the city's ignorant undertow.

Others, in large numbers, grow up to become completely institutionalized in the conventional industrial, political, social, and religious fashions, and to spend their lives in a round of group relationships, privileges, and in a narrow way, responsibilities. These make up the great bulk of the city's population—respectable, unimaginative people with no large interest in anything save the welfare of the group with which their own welfare is identified.

A very few, under contemporary conditions, having keen imaginations and vigorous sympathies, grow up through all levels of institutional relationships and achieve a more or less vivid and true conception of the physical and human conditions in the midst of which they live. These few grasp something of their own intimate relationship to these conditions; they see something of the significance of their local groups to the larger life of the nation; and they may even be able to envisage the nation as a member of an eventual world-league of communities. Many are called to this vision, but few there be that find it.

Now the existence of these many fragmentary elements, with their many varying objections and interests, and their many narrow and often exclusive loyalties, leaves many crevices in the life of the city into which unattached individuals may easily fall, or through which they may drop out of sight. Some of these crevices are disease, crime, poverty, isolation, defeated hopes, and the like. The number of those who do fall into them is socially appalling.

How can we account for this unsatisfying character of community life, if institutions were developed to serve human needs? And how explain this carelessness of individuals and groups, if the individual is really a center of social relationships? The answer is found in the story of the development of our communities.

The colonists who poured from the Atlantic seaboard into the wilderness of the West, after the

so-called "French and Indian War," and especially after the Revolutionary War, carried with them an intense pride in their individual independence and self-sufficiency—a pride which was the lineal descendant of the "separatist" and "non-conformist" convictions of their European forbears. They carried their individualistic tendencies often to the extreme; they wanted neighbors, but they did not want their neighbors to be too near. The story of the frontiersman who "had to move on" when he heard that a neighbor had settled five miles down the trail illustrates the point.

This pioneering life selected these qualities of individualistic self-sufficiency and wrought them into the blood of succeeding generations and into the doctrines and traditions of the nation; until the picture that we have of the early pioneer is of one standing on his own farm and saying to all comers: "This is a free country. This is my farm, and I can do as I please with my property. I can run my business as I please!" And because he stood on his own rights and met his problems in his own independent way, the continent was rapidly conquered and developed.

But recent decades have seen multitudes of people trained in this pioneering way moving into the cities, where they must live in close touch with one another. Under these city conditions some of the old pioneering lessons must be unlearned. In the farm days if the farmer wanted to keep a pig in his back yard, or even in the "parlor," that was his own business—his and the pig's. His neighbors were so far away that, though

they might talk, they had no real ground on which to object, even had they been inclined to interfere. But if as a city resident, cherishing his old pioneer customs, he wants to keep a pig in his back yard, his neighbor claims the right to have something to say about the matter. The doctrine, "this is my own property and I can do as I please with it" narrows down until it disappears, at least in certain directions. That which was good old American doctrine in the pioneer days on the farm turns out to be no longer good doctrine in the city. Health authorities, police authorities, moral squads, and many other sorts of "impertinent interferers" insist on calling around to help the independent pioneer adjust his old habits to the new conditions of city life.

In fact, just as the Anglo-Saxon pioneer in America showed himself to be the true descendant of the older European pioneers not by doing the things he had previously done in Europe, but by doing the things that needed to be done under the changed conditions of living in the wilderness, so the modern city dweller will show himself to be the true descendant of the American pioneers by doing what needs to be done in the city. And the thing that needs to be done is not to stand on the inviolability of traditional individual rights, but so to readjust habit and custom as to make possible a good life for all in the city. But this is a hard lesson, and few there be that learn it.

There is another phase of historical development which demands a word. The life of the race began in



small communities which lay perhaps at the crossing of two primitive trails. In such small communities, living was very simple and modern social institutions were as yet undifferentiated. The community was everything. There was no separate government or industry or religion or education. Even separate families did not exist. The whole community was the family, the government, the industry, the religious order, the school. The community was just a large family which governed itself, fed and clothed itself, worshipped in its own way, and educated its children by giving them the chance to grow up in the midst of the common life. (Of course, there were complications a-plenty in all this, but the community group was simple and all could know each other.)

Now in the course of some thousands of years, the little community at the crossing of the trails has become the great city at the crossing of many trails. In the city people do not know one another. Frequently they even make efforts to keep from knowing one another. The city has become too unwieldy to go on as one common group, and the people are too ignorant of one another. The needs of the people, stimulated by all sorts of contacts, have developed in many directions, and special instrumentalities for answering those needs have grown up and become differentiated and distinct. These are our social institutions.

These illustrations from history show us two definite types of defect in our modern communities: the over-individualistic, somewhat boastful sort of per-

son, who insists upon standing upon certain ancient "rights," even though multitudes may thereby be crowded below the levels of decent living; and the stagnant, over-developed institution, which, though it is the direct product of natural historic processes, has largely become dislocated from its original function of service to the community along some useful social line, and devotes far too much of its time to the building up of its own prestige, and so comes either to be an obstruction to community development or, passing up the whole task, turns the welfare of the community over to chance or accident,—to *laissez faire*. So the old-time integrity of the primitive community has been destroyed by competitions among institutions and among their over-individualistic champions; some fragmentary group and some lesser loyalty have taken the place of this community. Both good and evil have grown out of these changes.

Yet in spite of the competition of these institutions and their champions among themselves and with the original community, always there emerges the need of a community background for our living. We really have a sixth major need, the need of community. Men cannot live forever in fragments of the world; we need a whole world, a fatherland, however shadowy it may be. Hence, in every age, in the absence of real community, some particular phase of the community has undertaken to make itself the central organizing factor in providing for this need. Always these efforts have spent themselves in attempting to make the part do

the work of the whole. Always some other part has been excluded. The larger task of bringing all human beings into the community life has remained to the coming of democracy.

In the course of history this sense of the need of community has gathered around at least three different elements. One of these is property. Under this tendency, the real community is supposed to be made up of those individuals who have had sufficient force to make themselves possessors of property. At times, this has been one of the qualifications of the voter. Any one who could not accumulate a little property did not count, and therefore should not be counted. In the Middle Ages members of the community held their property in a future world,—and that fact seriously interfered with any program of community development in this world. At present, over-emphasis upon this element constitutes one of the main obstacles to the humanizing of our community life. Property is indeed fundamental to the full sense of personality for most of us, as the individual who can impress himself upon the world through his sheer personality is very rare. But the struggle for the possession of property or power has taken upon itself the form of an old group warfare, and by interpreting itself as a “war of the classes” largely denies the possibility of community.

The working out of this concept and its organization into political forms would result in an utter individualism. Some hold that this is the true and final “order of nature” and that, by and large, under such a pro-

gram every individual would achieve the measure of success to which he was rightly entitled, measuring success of course by the property accumulated. The successful individual would prove his right to survive; the unsuccessful would prove his unfitness. However tragic the case might be for the individual; and however much society might in its kindness, by charity, palliate his sufferings, his ultimate elimination would make for the real good of the race.

This is sometimes called the "American doctrine." Obviously, it is related to that extreme pioneering individualism of the nineteenth century, which did indeed make for the quick conquest of the wilderness, and which had much to commend it in the days when free land was plentiful; but we may well question whether it is still good American doctrine now that free land is no more.

A second of these organizing community concepts is that of the political state, whose symbol of strength is the military. This concept is all too easily identified with property rights; and democracy seems increasingly suspicious of the ultimate value of the concept and increasingly critical of the form and character of the state. In the midst of the great war, the political state, at any rate in America, experienced a considerable increase in prestige, becoming, after a fashion of feeling, our real community. Property rights seemed for a moment less blatant; labor unions subordinated themselves to the common welfare; and all except a few racial and social irreconcilables out on the fringe

of things seemed to be able to achieve a sort of membership.

But the state as the community began to fade into the background as soon as the war was over. The interests and attentions of the people have for the most part turned to more immediate objectives. Property "rights" have become oppressively obnoxious, until as "profiteering" they are threatened with utter elimination. "Government by injunction," revived again, has alienated the affections of millions of workers. In recent industrial conferences, the elected representatives of the people, i. e., Congress, have been completely ignored and extra-legal bodies have attempted to do what the state is obviously unable to do. All this raises the question as to the place of the political state in the future of our democratic civilization. As an institution depending upon force for its existence, it must face the very practical question whether it can *force* the loyalties of all the people. Certainly no community can ever hope to build itself permanently on or by means of force. If the state is to become the community of our needs, it must learn other means of winning the loyalties of the people.

The third of these organizing concepts has had a shorter history than either of the others; but in recent times it has developed a peculiar strength. The economic union, the "labor union," under some one of its several forms, claims now to be the true representative of humanity, and therefore the proper center around which to organize the future community. If numbers

are to count, or the larger humanness of the motive, then this conception comes very much closer to the needs of the world. But insofar as the program of the labor union necessarily works out in terms of a "class struggle" into intolerance of all other interests and groups, it denies community, and is undoubtedly not the ultimate center of community organization.

It is apparent, then, that no one of these three is fully satisfactory to-day as the ultimate expression of human need. All will continue to exist, but the world needs something more. There are too many people who do not belong to any one of them! The world holds many men and women to-day who are without property or a country or a union or a community. The spectacle of boat-loads of irreconcilables ranging the high seas seeking in all directions for landing places is tragic evidence of the partial failure of our past efforts at community building. Not only is this—as in the primitive case of Cain—a punishment greater than these individuals can bear, but it is rapidly becoming a burden greater than the established community can bear.

These discontented ones, whether individuals, groups, or nations, cannot be summarily excluded from humanity. We may legislate them out, and declare them "beyond the pale," but nature will be slow to accept our decree. Carlyle's story of the beggar woman of mediæval England may become our story. This woman went from door to door through the village begging for food, but everywhere the superior beings

turned from her in disgust as if she were not of their race. But she had the final word, for, though she died in the ditch outside the village, she gave an epidemic of smallpox to the whole community. They would have nothing to do with her, but she had much to do with them!

And so, because human life is very real, and grows as all other organic things grow—in response to the stimulations that nourish and support it, we need to make sure that we are developing round about our growing individuals and in the midst of our whole civilization adequate wholeness of environment—i. e., a healthful community organization. Human life needs to be surrounded by something more inclusive and sound than property rights or political force or economic self-interest (though the significance of these is not to be ignored). It needs the wholeness of life of a varied human group, active, rich in healthful emotions, intelligent. Fragmentary environments inevitably nourish fragmentary individuals; and while there may be occasional exceptions, wholeness of life can be assured only in wholeness of community. And why? Because at the center of individual and group character and personality is habit; and habit grows by what it feeds upon—that is to say, it is developed by the accidents of the world round about. But we do not do well to leave the destiny of the individual and the group to the mercy of environmental accidents; individual and group growth may not safely be left to the play of circumstance.

The human nervous system is infinitely complicated, and it hungers inexpressibly for the widest ranges of stimulation. The average environment for most of us in the larger cities is unsatisfying. The range of socially healthful stimulations is narrow, and traditionally determined, if determined at all; and multitudes of young people are driven out to the precarious search for additional excitements, good or bad. The cry "Nothing interesting ever goes on in our community!" is the cry of the hungry nervous system everywhere. In former times these unsatisfied desires were set down to the credit of the total depravity of the individual; but modern psychology sees them in a truer light, recognizing in them the pledge of whatever may be new in the true and the beautiful and the good of the civilization of the future. Hence modern social work turns ever more and more to the task of making a healthful community life that shall afford adequate stimulation to all this struggling, hungry desire of the individual. In the normal and healthful expression of this desire lie the hopes of the nobler civilization of the future. In its suppression, or in its perverted manifestations, lie promises of endless misery, vice, crime, insanity, disease, and all the long catalogue of human social evils. The healthful growth of our democratic civilization is dependent upon the development of this more completely healthful social environment,—the organized community.

There is, however, a subtle danger here. The community is not a definite and concrete group which all



may see and immediately apprehend. It is rather an informing concept, a social ideal. Hence it exists at present mainly in the social imagination of individuals. Outside the individual it may be little more than a phrase,—easily mouthed and easily lost. Hence, if anyone should give up his loyalty to some concrete institution of the community for the sake of this ideal, and then should lose the sense of the reality of this community (as easily he might), he would be lost indeed. He would be thus a man without a country, without objective for his loyalties. It is better to be an ardent churchman of the narrowest sort than to be a milk and water sort of non-religionist; better to be a narrow nationalist than a pallid, ghostly mouther of words about an internationalism that takes no hold on conduct. It takes a big person to be a super-institutionalist, a real internationalist. For that reason we need not wonder that strong institutionalists usually regard the advocates of community as being, to use Graham Wallas's phrase, "bloodless traitors"; or that strong nationalists think of internationalists as the worst enemies of mankind. If a phrase should release men from a loyalty, however small, that has some significance, into a reputed larger loyalty that turns out to be nothingness, that phrase may well be regarded as a menace to civilization.

There is, then, a verbal statement of community which would deny the values of our common institutions and would seek to escape from them. This we need to avoid. There is another conception that would

identify the real values of the community with some one—any one—of these fragmentary institutions. This also we need to avoid. We need to save all the race's achievements in the way of institutions, interests, and activities, without becoming lost in any one of them; and we need to surround these achievements with something of the immediate sociability and congeniality of the old, primitive group, with its natural desires and instinctive satisfactions.

The sociability of the primitive community was possible because that group was small. A great city cannot develop the same immediate congeniality or social feeling. But multitudes of people roam the streets of the modern city, work in its industries, throng its transportation systems, haunt its dance halls and other places of amusement, huddle in its tenements—all hoping for human satisfactions, of the old instinctive and satisfying sort. They find these satisfactions in varying degrees and with uncertain outcomes. The modern city is not consciously organized to *destroy* its citizens. That would be bad business. But it is so organized as to exploit them, especially the young, to cheapen and degrade them, often to feed them on stones when they ask for bread, and sometimes to entangle them beyond escape. The city questions the validity of most of our instinctive desires, and so condemns many of them to suppression or repression, or to a sordid and illicit expression. The normal human instincts are given short shrift in modern industry. The longings for normal social contacts are used to ensnare the unsophisti-

cated. Sex instincts are banned, suppressed, misinterpreted and perverted. Leadership all too often finds its only outlet in vicious and criminal directions. And gambling, often with stakes not honestly earned, becomes one of the city's chief avenues of adventure. No lasting and worthy civilization can be built of communities that develop far in these directions.

The modern community could become more intelligent with reference to these great needs of the common life. Congenial groups are not impossible, even in the midst of millions. Far-reaching provision could be made for the satisfactions of all the normal aspects of our instinctive life if we were fully convinced of their advantageousness and necessity. And the modern city could be made a really human community if we could just get our critical faculties and our constructive social imaginations focused upon the problem.

Forgetting our primitive human needs, it is easy to turn the development of the community over to those strong, exploiting individuals who have no particular sense of social values, and whose only interest is in taking "all the traffic will bear." Attempting to escape from this intolerable outcome, we undertake to organize the community in such mechanical ways that everyone's activities are completely circumscribed by fixed regulations. This was the ambition and the fatal mistake of Germany in the old days.

Is there no escape from this dilemma? Must we admit that our communities must forever choose between thoughtlessness and complete regimentation?

Democracy and the scientific spirit alike demand a social order that shall be intelligent and still be free: a social order in which all strong and capable personalities will find adequate employment; in which all the sciences and social technologies can be continuously brought into use; and in which at the same time adequate democratic opportunity will be increasingly assured the masses of the people to choose their own manner of life and obedience.

These are the tasks that confront the statesmen, the educators, the social philosophers and idealists, the social workers of the age, and indeed all good citizens who believe in democracy and have any love for their kind. The fate of democracy is wrapped up in the future of community life. And the future of our community life depends upon the programs of community organization which our social inventiveness is able to develop. Democracy awaits the revelation of these broader community programs.

All too long these social problems have been regarded as the tasks of "social workers." But the problems of the community can never rightly be regarded as the private tasks of anyone. The democratic community cannot so lightly escape its responsibilities.

For a community is *not* a mere aggregation of individuals. And the problems of a community are not just the sum of the problems of individuals. A community is not a—"gregation" at all. Its members have passed beyond the stage of getting together—in many

respects—and just are together, in wide ranges of interest, activity and hope bound up with one another beyond untangling. The tangle of problems arising must be solved in the community or not at all. And the only wisdom that is inclusive enough to solve them in democratic fashion is the wisdom of the whole people, when that has been released, mustered, disciplined, and set to work upon the tasks. The salvation of the democratic community is in the released wisdom and co-operative enterprise of all the members of the community.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PRESENT SITUATION

AN old civilization came to its breaking point in 1914, and to its complete breakdown in 1918. That old civilization is gone in all save some indefinite fragments, and "not all the king's horses or all the king's men" can ever put it together again in the old ways. This does not mean, however, that America is doomed to failure. Americans made American institutions in the beginning, and at need they can make others. It does mean that in common with the sordid and shiftless institutions of the world, American institutions failed to provide adequately for the inner life. In the face of danger men and women alike showed in this war period as high courage and moral enthusiasm as in any generation of the past. But moral courage is a function of the biological stock, rather than of acquired character. Therefore, the sordid and shiftless nature of our civilization before the war had not really touched the quality of the stock. The surprise that the whole world expressed when American men proved as courageous as men of other nations shows clearly that there was a general feeling that American institutions had deteriorated since the brave days of old,

and that along with them, American character had suffered some corresponding disintegration. But the war seems to have proved our native mettle, and therefore to have proved that the glory of America is more in her stock than in her institutions.

In the realm of idealism our showing must be considered rather equivocal. We proved ourselves equal to the call to high endeavor as against a foreign menace, but we have not shown ourselves equally able to meet the insidious foes within our own community life. We have been victimized by profiteers, browbeaten by patrioteers, and frightened into intolerance by rabid agitators, until we have, either through fear or through a deliberate bourbonism, legally smothered many of the old ideals of free people. Our reactionary leadership is devoted to "security, sanity, safety" and to a sort of "Americanism" which has been defined as "the right of every man to make himself a millionaire if he can turn the trick." We have been scared by strange noises, and frightened by shadows. The brave idealisms of the Declaration of Independence and of the Bill of Rights are subject now to the interpretation of political expediency and petty officialdom.

We must face reality. We must begin with our actual world life, as it appears in our communities. The adjustment of individuals, groups, and nations to one another was not satisfactory in 1914. Their relations were in fact unendurable, and this unendurable quality had become so irritating that it flamed up in the hot

passions of war. Whether we will or no, we must face the problem of working out new adjustments of individuals, groups, and nations, more in accordance with the democratic developments of human nature. Probably the greatest treason to human well-being possible at the present time is the doctrine that all these long-suppressed energies must be, to the greatest possible extent, once more pressed back into the old institutional molds.

Some would have us believe that this can be done—that these world unrests are primarily the result of superficial agitation and the futile longing to attain the unattainable. But the sincere thinking of the world seems to agree that they are rather the results of the release of long-suppressed energies. Human instincts buried for centuries under repressive institutions—political, industrial, educational, religious—have had the chance to escape, and the world is now both suffering and enjoying the expression of these largely unsuspected areas of energy.

We are seeing to-day as never before the possibilities of individual life; and we may well question the effectiveness of our old community life as it appeared in individual experience. We can find illuminating commentaries upon various aspects of this problem in the results of the tests applied by military authorities in the examination of our soldiers under the selective service act.

The physical tests applied showed that some 30 per



cent or more of our young men were physically unfit for service in the army. This does not mean that 30 per cent were altogether socially ineffective, but that an appalling proportion of our young men were physically below par. No nation can call itself intelligent that so lightly ignores the great problem of individual and national health and vitality. The reports of the public health service in all its branches are filled with illustrations of this lack of attention to the problems of health and vitality. We have thought that our American rural life produced healthy and effective children, but recent surveys of health conditions in rural counties show an average of more than one defect to each individual school child. These defects range of course all the way from relatively unimportant ones to the most serious. Yet on the whole before the war our local communities everywhere were blissfully ignorant of these conditions.

The educational tests applied in the army were new and more practical than any similarly applied before. For example, the test for literacy was twofold: each man was asked to read a simple paragraph from a newspaper and explain its meaning, and to write a short news note home to his folks. If he failed to get the meaning of what he read, or if he was unable to write a sensible note, he was listed as illiterate. On the basis of these tests about 33 1-3 per cent of the men were so classed. It is obvious that the census reports on literacy have been absurdly unreliable.

It may be presumed that similar results would have been secured if these tests had been applied to the young women of the country.

If we ask the reason for these outcomes of our community life we must go back for our answer to the character of our pre-war institutions. We must inquire into the community status of certain of the great functions of life, and of the institutions through which these functions secured their social expression. The world is still shaking with tremors of the old war-time quakings, and will long continue to do so. Our inquiry leads us into some of the outstanding characteristics of the breakdown we have witnessed, and to the probable modes of our escape from these old conditions. Straight thinking—a very difficult task under any circumstances—is indispensable now. How shall we achieve this straight thinking? How shall we reach the inclusive outlook that we need?

Three attitudes of mind are noticeable in these days. Some, holding firmly in their closed minds answers learned from tradition, made sacred by old partisan loyalties and reinforced by subtle fears, fail to see the real problems of the present and call intolerantly for the suppression of all thinking. Others, priding themselves on what they call their "open-mindedness," seek in an *empty-minded* sort of way for all sorts of interesting bits of information—as a sponge gathers up drops of water lying about—and hope that out of this indiscriminate hodge-podge of "data" some illuminating

principle of reorganization will miraculously issue. A few, having the tolerant patience and persistence of the scientist, seem willing to approach the situation tentatively, with hypotheses of possible solution, and to try endlessly to find the clue to the mazes of contemporary unrest. The hope of the future of our civilization is with such as these last mentioned. Following their methods, we must dig deeper into the actualities of present community life, as revealed by the war, and so come upon the more fundamental details of our problem.

To understand the actual status of the community we must consider the status of its various institutions and interests. Two questions arise in connection with each such institution or interest: first, what is its service to individual and community at present? Second, to what extent does this service foresee and make provision for the more completely democratic community of the future?

In considering industry we must ask not merely whether the world is being adequately fed and housed, but whether the instincts and habits of workmanship are being preserved and perpetuated. For obviously it would be a tragedy if any particular generation, in the process of its own feeding and housing, should destroy the race's capacity for work or its desire to work. And there is evidence which suggests that in some measure that is happening today.\*

\* Carlton: *The Industrial Situation*.

In considering the church it is necessary to see that not only must certain religious needs of present groups and individuals be met, but the ideal aspirations of future generations must be conserved. And there is evidence which suggests that the futility of many present religious activities may be responsible eventually for the discrediting of all religious interests.

In considering the school we must ask not merely whether children are taking on certain conventional information, but whether the genuine intellectual life of the community is being fostered and enriched. And there are those who insist that the present school regime is slowly destroying all originality and initiative on the part of children for the sake of securing fixed modes of thinking and conformity to traditional opinions.

In considering the state, it is necessary to observe not merely whether men and women outwardly conform to certain forms of order, but whether in their intimate relationships in the small and large community life a finer and more loyal citizenship is developing, and whether children are growing up to take their places in the positive social order. And there is evidence which suggests that many are receiving a training that makes them despise responsibility and hope to escape from their share in the social order.

In considering the home we must consider not merely whether the community is filled with children and old primitive instincts are glossed over with a conventional

propriety, but we must make sure that these fundamental energies and instincts are organizing themselves into an ever richer and finer community life, through which children can grow up to be good and still be natural.

*The Status of Work*—Hobson, the English economist, tells us that there are three effective motivations underlying human labor: First, the creative impulse; second, the impulse of service; third, the desire of gain.\* From the standpoint of individual and social welfare, the first of these is the most important. But our conventional opinion is that the desire for gain is the only “manly” motive. The first is regarded as too poetical for this rough world; and the second seems effeminate. The result is that men must express themselves in a more or less skulking way in these two directions, and apologize for being creative or interested in service.

Present developments in the industrial world, however, seem to indicate that the desire for pay no longer satisfies the worker. Increased wages have not proved sufficient to hold the worker to his job. Increases in pay he must have, of course, at least to meet the present rise in prices. But recent strikes on the part of men who have had wages well above a minimum level indicate that they have not been striking merely for more pay, but for a more complete share in the control of industry.

\*Hobson: *Democracy After the War*, p. 30f.

That is to say, the motive of gain is not an adequate basis upon which to build the structure of industry to-day. The mutual interdependence of individuals and groups in our greatly divided systems of production makes an economic conscience necessary. All groups must feel the responsibility of an interdependent service to one another. A striking group of railway workers may paralyze the industry of a nation; but the plan to induce them to return to work by bribing them with more pay, leaving them still the creatures of work conditions over which they have no control, will not long solve the problem. If they are responsible for the welfare of other groups remote from their own task, they must not be put in the impossible position of being held responsible for the welfare of those groups while they have no adequate control over their own industrial destiny.

Since the only interest the worker is allowed to have in the industrial situation at present is interest in his pay, he must find outlet for his other instincts in activities incidental to the main industrial process.\* Having no property interest in his job he seeks to assure his tenure by organization on the one hand, and on the other by prolonging the industrial process through the practice of sabotage. Sabotage even becomes artistic. Also work naturally slows down because the stimulus is too remote to release adequate energy for the task.†

\* Daniel Bloomfield: *Employment Management*, p. 9. Hocking: *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, Ch. 25. Ross: *Social Psychology*, Ch. 7.

† Tressal: *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropist*.

A gradual disintegration of old work habits and of old natural loyalties follows, and with this a disintegration of the older types of workmanship.

The results are: first, that the world is not being adequately fed or clothed or housed, since whole nations as well as individuals are existing below the level of normal subsistence. Second, the future of work is very insecure. If gain is the only "manly" motive to labor, then an important question arises, "Why should men work when they have money in their pockets?" If the reply is, "Because the world needs service"—then the reply must be generalized, and service must be made a basic motive in all the organization of industry. This would be a great step in advance. But the true basis of industry will never be achieved until once again the basic instincts of workmanship are recognized as primary elements in human nature, and are given a real place in the motivations of all our industrial enterprises. Until that time comes industry will remain in a precarious condition.\*

*The Status of Government.* Traditional political theories assume that the state is naturally the most inclusive social institution and that, whatever other group loyalties the individual may develop, his ultimate and final loyalty must always be to the state. This theory, however, disregards fundamental elements in both history and psychology. Men have not always been loyal first of all to the state. Religious

\*Gantt: *Organization for Work*. Money: *The Future of Work*. Goldmark: *Fatigue*.

institutions, social classes, and other groups have not infrequently formed the nucleus of threatened or overt rebellion against the state. Practically, the state is simply one of a number of social institutions competing for the loyalties of the people.

In this competition the state has not always acted wisely. In former times, when the masses of the people were ignorant and superstitiously subordinate to authority, statesmen learned that the basis of the state is force; hence ever since, generally speaking, states have scorned to attempt to approve themselves to the native loyalties of the people, and have been inclined to attempt to force those loyalties. In this effort the state has had three extraordinary advantages: first, it has had control of sources of arbitrary income through taxation; second, it has had the power of censorship over the means of public information; and third, it has controlled the military and police forces. It has been able, therefore, to suppress active disloyalty, and to punish outbreaks against authority. The universal theory of statesmanship is that the state should be a sort of sublimated policeman. Few statesmen seem to be able to imagine any more democratic attitude.

But the growth of intelligence and of democratic aspirations has tended to destroy the foundations of this old autocratic conception among the people. At the present time states everywhere are face to face with the practical fact of the revolt of large groups



against arbitrary authority. In recent years various authorities within our national and state governments have laid down the proposition that they would not treat with any group of working people while they were on strike. The striking workers must first submit and return to their positions. Under such a principle as this, however, public officials have been put in the ridiculous position of being told that whether they recognized the striker or not was of no particular importance. Arbitrary authority dissolves itself when its threats go too far.

A democratic state seems impossible on the basis of these autocratic administrative attitudes. It is quite likely that we shall either have to return to a completely autocratic political structure in which the outer loyalties of the people are held together by force, or else we shall have to go ahead to a completely democratic political order in which the loyalties of the people are securely centered in the state because the state is the most dependable instrument of the people in their struggle for better conditions. No state can long exist that does not know whether it is trying to be democratic or whether it prefers to be autocratic—and few states to-day know which they are determined to be.\*

*The Status of Education*—In the light of the best democratic theory education has two main functions:

\*Hocking: *op. cit.*, Ch. 28. Laski: *The Theory of Sovereignty*.

first, it must help communities and individuals to know,—that is, to become acquainted with the world's existent knowledge in usable forms; second, it must continuously seek to extend the ranges of human knowledge and the application of these wider developments to the solution of the human problems. But this democratic theory of education has had no very wide fulfillment. Ostensibly we have had universal education; but our schools have been hackneyed, pedantic, narrow, unsocial; they have not generally attempted to extend knowledge to the whole community, and to every individual in usable form. The conception of use has been on the whole foreign to our schools. Indeed, the conception of an intelligent community has not been wholly acceptable to the dominant group.

As for the second function, the extension of the intellectual life of the community has been feared rather than hoped for. We have passed through, in the last century, several distinct fears: the fear of science, the fear of evolution, the fear of the critical interpretation of the Bible and religion, and the fear that the social sciences would undermine the foundations of social order. The war did indeed help us to realize the value of the physical sciences in the prosecution of war. But it is not at all certain that we have secured a higher standing for the social sciences—or for the spirit of science generally. The task of making science, i. e. critical thinking, an acceptable and

integral part of community life and progress lies almost wholly before us.

The doctrine of heroic endeavor for the truth, the more complete good, as exhibited by scientists long dead is praised,—but not for application to-day. There is such a thing as knowing too much for the good of the social order. Martin Tupper and Samuel Smiles have been our true philosophers of education. Leadership in moral and social efforts must be safe and sane. It is even charged by some that education in America is committed to a program of Prussianizing the schools, to the end that a small number of the stronger men and women who can be trusted to “be good” will be selected for training for administrative positions while all the rest will be discouraged as rapidly as possible, until they drop back into the ranks and lose their ambitions, and so cease to be potentially dangerous—through having an education that is too strong for their sense of proportion.

The Prussianizing effort made in many states before the war (but not so popular now) to segregate trade schools from the liberal schools and to shunt most of the working-class children into the former, is the most extreme illustration of this determination to control education in the interest of the status quo.

But the reactionary plan of the legislature of 1920 by which the whole educational program of New York State was to be subordinated to political expediency is a very striking illustration of public fear of free

intelligence. Democracy has little reason for assuming that autocracy will easily surrender its perquisites—even in the field of education.\*

*The Status of the Family*—The family is, historically, a variable compromise between the social demands upon men and women for a sufficiently stable system to provide necessary care and nurture for children and the more or less lawless and exacting demands of sex instinct. This institution has had a wide variety of forms, ranging through many types of polygamy, but tending more and more in modern civilization toward an absolute monogamy. The family has been subject in all ages to economic and social pressures and has been reconstructed from age to age to meet these pressures. But little by little through the Christian centuries, the monogamic form has taken upon itself the character of an absolute institution. In the church marriage has been one of the sacraments, and divorce has been practically prohibited.

Hence the family tends to be looked upon as an institution subject in no way to the reconstructive criticisms of social conditions. It has become a final institution tending to absolute form and escaping from the realm of social reconstruction into the realm of absolute metaphysics. Yet, in spite of this the family is under the severest pressure from many points of view to-day.

\* Dewey: *Education and Democracy*. Hart: *Democracy in Education*.

Marriage exists for three fundamental reasons: first, to assure the rearing of children under organized social control; second to protect society against unintelligent and lawless expression of the sex instinct while assuring individuals those satisfactions which are rooted in the sex characteristics of the race; third, to protect the moral integrity and personality of men and women in their sex relationships.

When young men and women grew up together in the local neighborhood, played together, worked together, went to school and to church together and shared together all the common social interests of the community, they came to know each other sufficiently well perhaps to be able to make fairly wise choices in the matter of marriage. And since it was altogether likely that they would settle down in the same local community and live their common life under the same general conditions and stimulations, it was practically sure that whatever moral freedom and personal development the community might provide would come to them as surely in the marriage relation as under any other conditions. To be sure, there was an occasional tragedy, due not infrequently to the limited size of the group within which choice was possible, thus forcing uncongenial natures, in order to be married at all, into impossible connections. In the main, however, that homogeneous community life found in the institution of marriage fairly adequate provision for the care of childhood, for the organization of the nor-

mal satisfactions of sex, and for the moral freedom of men and women.

The modern industrial community offers an entirely different sort of problem. Too often young men and women have no adequate chance to know each other in any complete sense before they are married. They may meet each other from the ends of the earth, see each other only under exceptional conditions, choose each other under the stress of any sort of motive, even the most momentary or the most sordid. Even if they had known each other well before marriage, the modern city deals with the man and the woman differently; and after marriage they may well find their interests running in variant directions. The man's life is surrounded by all the stimulations, excitements, and allurements of the city, its business, its industry. Or he may be called to long journeys which may, without any intent on his part, set up divergent lines of interest, releasing fundamental instinctive desires from which he finds it hard to escape. At the same time the wife, if she stays at the work of the home, may be surrounded by the most petty stimulations, in which she may find little or no satisfaction of her instincts. As a result she may develop an even narrower outlook upon life. Children may save her from pettier concerns: but not infrequently suppressed desire will have its revenge, and lead to questionable teaching about the nature of the world, so that the children will grow up with distorted views of life.

On the other hand, if the woman escapes from this environment, if she goes out to work, achieves economic independence and something of the man's broader range of stimulation, she runs the risk of complete alienation of emotions from the conventionality of the home; while the family itself is in danger of complete disintegration.

When two individuals are thus bound together, the result may be disastrous for one or both of them—and for society as a whole, if they are compelled to submit to the ultimate terms of the contract. The difficulty lies in determining wherein the higher good may be found. Divorce may be the most desirable solution of the difficulty. Certainly only a particularly stupid society, that is to say, a society which was so frightened by the thought of change that it did not care to consider any exceptions to its traditional principles, would insist upon keeping together a man and woman whose natures were so mutually uncongenial that their whole lives were thereby continuously hurt. Of course, if there were children the situation would require extremely careful handling.

At any rate, modern industrial civilization faces the task of re-thinking the ultimate foundations of family life. Economic insecurity is at present so prevalent that young women as well as young men seek to assure themselves that they can be self-supporting at need. This introduces a large element of risk into the marriage relationship. It raises the whole question of the

moral freedom and personal integrity of the woman in the case and makes the marriage contract much more definitely a contract between two equals. For this reason society may find it necessary eventually to modify the terms of the contract under which they think they agree to live their lives. Certainly no one can at the present time consider carefully the ratio of divorces to marriage in our average American city (in some instances reaching 25 per cent) and contend that the marriage institution is an unquestioned success.

Some sort of family we must have of course if we are to have any sort of community. But it must be a family which, while providing for and protecting the children, providing for and regulating the conditions under which normal instinctive satisfactions of life may be secured, at the same time protects and provides for the moral freedom and the personal integrity of both the woman and the man.\*

But all these considerations are so closely interwoven with the general structure of our society that it is likely they must all be solved together.

*The Status of Religion*—One of the definite outcomes of the war was a universal criticism of organized religion. In the first place, the Christian churches of Europe and America had held a more or less vague theory that Christianity would be able to save the world from any further devastating wars. But 1914 disillusioned the world of this hope; Christianity was

\* Ellwood: *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Ch. 4-8. Burch & Patterson: *American Social Problems*, Ch. 22.



no more able to save the world from war than was Socialism.

Second, the war having been precipitated, the religious forces of the belligerent groups organized for the purpose of making the conflict a little less barbarous, at least so it was claimed on the side of the Western Allies. But not alone in Germany did the ministers of religion come to be preachers of the doctrine of hate. In England and America the most primitive and passionate hatreds were expressed by ministers. Not this alone, but the chief representative of organized religious activity in the battle area came out of the war with a great burden of discredit, whether rightly or wrongly earned.

In the third place, since the war the voice of the church has scarcely been heard in protest against the dominance of force in the settlement of the political and economic questions of the world. The statesmen who were instrumental in precipitating the war, and who remain to-day in charge of the great task of reconstruction, are almost wholly committed to the doctrine that the world is to be saved by force. They would bring in the Kingdom of Heaven by violence. And there is scarcely a Christian leader in the western world brave enough to challenge this program or intelligent enough to suggest a new one based on the fundamental Christian principles. So neither by its attitude before, during, or since the war does the Christian church seem to have enhanced in any way its prestige.

The problem as it appears in England is set forth as follows by a leader of the English church: "The next general election will put in a Labor Government, and the Labor Government will introduce a bill for the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of England. This bill will be moved by no hostility to religion, and every possible consideration will be shown the clergy. But the church will fight it in every parish, and they will be beaten, and still further discredited. Then they will make martyrs out of themselves, and compel the government to enact a more drastic bill which will bring organized religion to its ultimate ruin in England."

In America the situation has some signs of hopefulness.\* In the great Protestant denominations, in the Catholic and Jewish fellowships, and in the personnel of the Federal Council of Churches, there are some few far-seeing leaders whose essential vision is a great religion of democracy. These leaders are responsible for some significant pronouncements on the present industrial, political, and social situation. If these modern creeds could make themselves felt in the characters and conduct of the adherents of these fellowships, America would experience a profound spiritual revolution. The fact is, however, that these doctrines are at present little more than exhibits of the hopefulness and good intentions of a few leaders. The religious forces of America need to escape from their shells in

\* Ward: *Christianity and the New Social Order*.

church edifices, to become acquainted with the great fundamentals of democracy as expressed in the social sciences and the labor programs of the day. And the church needs to put its tremendous ranges of moral energy back of these programs until democracy becomes a practical program in every community of the nation.

But this transformation is so closely knit up with the whole social problem of our time that it cannot be understood apart from that problem. Religion cannot go ahead and leave industry behind. The status of the church is inextricably bound up with the status of industry.

*The Status of Leisure*—Nothing shows the trend of development of our civilization more concretely than the facts of the redistribution of leisure.\* Once in history all the leisure belonged to one group while all other groups could claim no leisure whatever as a right. This fact impressed itself even upon education. The liberal education of the past was an education fitted to the *liber*, that is the free man, the man who never intended to work. Over against this we find not a vocational education, but a servile education, the education of the *servus*, or slave. History might be told in the story of the struggle of the servile and working groups to achieve some adequate share in the leisure of life. That movement has made rapid progress in recent decades and seems

\* Lee: Play in Education.

determined to find its outcome in the definite establishment of a working day within which in any particular industry the individual can be most productive. All other time will be leisure time.

But we have not yet reached that solution. A statement made by Jane Addams some years ago sets the problem of the present. Young people, she says, worn out by long hours of uninteresting toil in factories, must spend their earnings in purchasing cheap recreation in the evenings and on holidays so that they shall be sufficiently renewed in their energies to enable them to return to their work. A vicious round of uninteresting industry and sordid amusement devours them.

Leisure time has been necessary to the development of the arts and the creation of beauty. And even in the midst of the sordid commercialized amusements and recreations of our modern cities, beauty is still an evident motive. By the very nature of their being, young people demand some share in the beauty of the world. Work as organized in modern factories presents few chances for the expression of our instinctive lives. It is unreal, mechanical, meaningless, routine. We have all had the feeling that the job we were working at had lost its significance, bringing no real satisfactions. Thousands of young people in our cities are in that situation, and are struggling in every possible desperate direction to find some real satisfaction.

This is most seriously true as it appears in the rela-

tionship of the sexes. The one lasting and permanent thing in the world is human instinct, and the most exacting human instinct is that of sex. We are not here so much concerned with the personal fact of sex relationships as with the long story of the human generations. This inaudible call of the long generations takes hold upon boys and girls and makes them seek for chances to know each other, and for the realization of every possible touch of beauty, of fundamental fellowship, and love. This instinctive expression is not primarily personal; it is the vital fact in the life of the race, the call of the untold generations of men. And in our larger communities we have dealt with it not intelligently, as if it were important in the long story of humanity, but commercially, as if it were something to be endlessly exploited for profit. And so we have filled leisure time with sordid amusements, exploiting the deepest instincts, and degrading natural beauty to the level of vulgar pictures and blatant music.

Our natural capacity for play has largely been lost through the pressures of industry, the commercialization of amusement and recreation, and the specialization of games such as baseball and football. We take our play vicariously, and pay for it out of our work-day wages. The thrills of excitement we enjoy are our heritage from an ancestry that did not live its life vicariously, but actively, precariously.

The substitution of passive amusement of a morbidly

over-stimulating sort for the old-time active participation in play and recreation leaves the modern nervous system unsatisfied, and the demand for expression repressed and dull. Baseball crazes have tended to destroy play in three ways: First, by helping the community forget its older folk games—the old group games of country-side memory; second, by attempting to teach baseball before boys have the neutral development to stand the strains of *team* games—so that among such boys the game generally develops into a wrangle; third, by pretty largely eliminating the girls from all participation in play. The older games included both boys and girls without sex discrimination, solely on the basis of ability to play.

The future of the more normal democratic community is bound up with a more intelligent understanding of the significance of leisure time, the spirit of play, and the conservation of those essentially educational and humanizing games which the race has developed in its long history, but which we are now in danger of losing under the false demand that everything shall be made to pay.

*Groups That Do Not Belong*—Every community in modern, complex society has always had its “hangers-on”—individuals, families, or groups. The community has, as we have seen, always tended to organize itself so as to leave some on the outside. These may be defective or inefficient individuals or groups; or they may be individuals or groups who

are unassimilable for some particular racial, cultural lingual, economic, or psychological reason. These may be merely queer, or they may be a dangerous menace.

One of the unforeseen results of the war has been the tremendous increase in the number of these excluded groups. This is partly due to the fact that certain racial and cultural groups did perhaps offer a distinct menace to national security in war time. This became so grave, and propaganda with reference to it so exciting, that a state of terror arose in many parts of the country, breaking out into actual terrorism. Officers of the law even were not above counseling: "If you have any reason to suspect your neighbor of coolness toward the nation, do not wait to investigate; shoot him up first, and investigate afterwards!"

Since the war this intolerance of particular groups has established itself in the form of closed standards of membership which, while expressed in general terms, are, like any standard, subject to particular interpretations in local communities over the country. In some places "100-per cent Americanism" includes all those virile and vigorous elements which have at any time helped in the making of America and which must be saved if our American communities are not to perish of stagnation, while in other localities these standards are so narrowly interpreted as to bring under suspicion anyone who is not lined up with some accepted political party or social, business, or fraternal organ-

ization of a peculiarly conservative type. The plight of some of these groups is particularly distressing. Narrow-minded bureaucrats, public officials trying to make political capital out of unworthy persecutions, and petty despots in local communities all over the country, vie with each other for supremacy in ignorant and brutal repression.

If we add to these groups emphasized by war-time conditions those older economic groups that have long been victims of industrial exploitation, and all the array of defective, delinquent, criminal, diseased, poverty-stricken, and outcast groups that long have lived upon the fringes of our communities—preying upon the more healthy life—we shall be able to present to ourselves this phase of the serious problem which the community organization of the future faces.

Here, then, are large numbers who “do not belong.” This in itself shows the task of the future of community. There can be no community until these are either eliminated from the community *milieu*, or are included within the community. No community can exist with such a fringe of individuals or groups neither inside nor outside. They are, from the standpoint of the community’s health, like a foreign body in the system; they must be understood and dealt with intelligently or they will destroy the community.

Now and again national leaders like Jane Addams have argued eloquently for the understanding of this situation, and its intelligent handling. The problem



goes to the roots of community; and it will never be solved until we are ready to attack the whole problem of community. It is one with all the other social problems that we face; its solution is involved in the solution of these other problems, that is, in the development of the reality of community.

## CHAPTER III

### THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIS OF COMMUNITY

THIS task of community organization involves the development of a social order inclusive enough, rich enough, varied enough, stimulating enough to reach every normal human being; to transform all our common social institutions into instruments of service, and to compete with all lesser elements for the loyalty and support of the individual. The individual must be "on the inside." What are the bases of such a community in the motivations of the individual? What in his own nature will hold him to this community, and at the same time give to his life the conditions of normal development?

The primitive basis of community life was tradition and custom, which when taken on effectively by the new individual became habit. Such a community is the most stable imaginable, as long as conditions remain unchanged. The community of custom exists in the individual as a structure of habits. Until the middle of the nineteenth century society was both by theory and practice committed to a program of inertia; the conception of a created, finished, stationary universe came to us out of the Orient, where practically all

activity was unpleasant and where a curse had been pronounced upon work. This conception carried over into the aristocratic social orders of Europe, and maintained itself through all the Middle Ages. It was wrought into the structure of the political life, industry, the social order, religion, and education. It was sanctified by the theology of the time, and bolstered up by the fears of anarchy and the terrors of the migrating barbarian hosts.

But this theory could not handle the element of impulse and instinct in human life save on the basis of the doctrine of total depravity and the necessity of repression. The Middle Ages found its greatest subject of learned disputation in the conflict between habit and impulse, i. e., between fixed institutions and the innovating spirit. This problem aroused an age-long discussion as to the legitimacy of aspirations and ideals which spring out of new conditions of living, and which therefore call in question old institutional attitudes. This discussion took on at times the most fantastic forms, forms which have been the occasion of ridicule by the ignorant ever since. But it is certain that there is no more important question in human society to-day than that of the relationship between old habit and new initiative.

Then in the nineteenth century the doctrine of evolution destroyed the theoretical foundations of that old system except for the constitutional and isolated traditionalists. From this time on, theoretically, the world

and human life are in constant movement, going either forward or backward with every change in the conditions of living. But this is another hard lesson to learn, and few there be that learn it.

For most practical purposes life still runs on in the accustomed grooves of habit, and will continue to do so. Even our American democracy has not widely learned that social health means continuous progress and reconstruction. The sense of the finality of our institutions still hangs like a mediæval shadow over all our democratic landscape. The suggestion of change irritates men instinctively. Old institutions and even old abuses have achieved actual substance, and intelligence and aspiration are forever on the defensive.

But the world has been severely shaken in its old habits and customs and it seems certain that no social order can ever again hope to hold its members in control by surrounding them with any such hard "cake of custom." Individuals everywhere are breaking through: the feelings of repression and suppression are dissipating, and individuals are being released into the chaos of broken habits. This has often happened in the past. Always it has aroused the fears of the fearful—lest the whole universe should revert to chaos. Always it has called for a more adequate interpretation of the world, a reorganization of psychology and social theory in the light of the new facts, and a reconstruction of all institutional relationships on the basis of this more adequate theory.

If habit and custom cannot be depended upon, what shall take their place in the maintenance of a stable community life? Such a question must find its preliminary answer in the experience of the race. When the old habits and customs broke down in Greece and a new basis of social order was needed, what substitute could be found to bind the individual back again into the common life of the group?

Socrates thought naively enough that intelligence could take the place of habit. But this was such monstrous doctrine that he was put to death for corrupting the youth of Athens. Plato undertook to carry out his suggestion more at length, but succeeded only in substituting a somewhat more elaborate program of habit for the old habit that was broken down. And because in the breakdown of habit certain native impulses had been released and certain fears of the undisciplined masses of men had arisen, Plato, holding that the most effective motivation in the lives of the common masses of men was appetite, thought that the only way they could be kept in control was through the existence of a trained military group. For appetite is afraid of nothing but the soldier and the policeman. Fear of the military became the basic element in Plato's plan for the control of the masses of men.

During the Middle Ages religious terrors were invoked to give added force to these controls, and the fear of hell helped to keep various social classes in their proper places. For many centuries the world was

ruled in this way. To a large extent the development of law among Anglo-Saxon peoples was based on the reputed psychological principle that fear and terror are the most effective deterrents to crime.

But it is evident that fear can be overdone. Fear may even back-fire. The propaganda of fear may be carried too far, and the fear-inculcating minority may themselves become afraid. This seems to have happened in Germany, and to have hastened the collapse of German resistance at the close of the war.

From another point of view, fear may produce just the opposite of the effect intended. "*Schrecklichkeit*" was overworked in war-time, until the opponents of Germany lost their fear of fear. "Americans do not fear," we said in war-time, meaning that we do not fear Germans. It remains to be seen whether we fear our own past, our own institutions, our own oppressive officials. But it seems certain that in these days of increasing critical intelligence, no government can long endure on the basis of fear. Thunders no longer drop from the skies at the call of conservatives, political or religious. So while some old habit remains, and some old fear, not enough of either is left to serve as the foundation of a stable social order.

Another widely accepted theoretical basis of secure social order was set forth in the early decades of the nineteenth century in the writings of the so-called utilitarians. Bentham, by identifying pleasure with hap-

piness and pain with unpleasantness, was able to argue that pleasure and pain represent the most universal human motives and that, therefore, these can be the basis of a secure political order. He believed, and his own and later psychology taught and attempted to prove, that men act primarily for the purpose of securing or enhancing pleasures or avoiding pain.

But here again the parts are very easily reversed. Pleasure is not identical with happiness and pain may be very far removed from the unpleasant. Pleasure surfeits quickly, and becomes disagreeable; pain refines and purifies—at least sometimes. Men do not lightly choose the way of pleasure. In all times of stress and crisis they tend to choose the harder way; and in their very sufferings and even death find exquisite happiness. A state or community built on the supposition that men are ruled by their pleasures would not last. There is at present no way of determining whether any particular man would choose the way of pleasure or the way of pain. And determining that matter for one individual would probably throw only incidental light on the conduct of any other individual. Community cannot ignore these motives; but neither can it build securely upon them.

Another group of theorists finds the secure basis of social order and community in the principle of Good Will, of Sympathy and of Love. For these the "Brotherhood of Man" seems to represent not only the ulti-

mate ideal, but a very possible ideal. They feel in it a very definite, even final appeal: "Beyond all nations is humanity!"

There is a certain instinctive quality here, a sort of "consciousness of kind." All types of internationalist groups have been declaring this doctrine for many decades; many had even gone so far as to hold that these international bonds of "good will" would be sufficient to prevent wars in the future; but the experiences of the past five years have denied that hope, at least for the present and under forms of organization developed to date.

The fact is that this so-called "consciousness of kind" has been modified by many sorts of traversing prejudices: tribal, clannish, national, cultural; prejudices of sex, color, race, social caste, and the like, until sympathy seems all but lost under the accumulative antipathies of the ages. Our prejudices are too strong for our loves in too many instances. Our fears paralyze our good wills. Our public opinion is too fully controlled by old prejudicial influences to be trusted,—and even when sympathy seems called for we cannot tell whether we are being deceived or not. Sophistication and disillusionment make us wary. The doctrine of love is frowned upon by certain types of workers who would substitute statistics for sympathy and a case-record for good will. Professional mendicants, etc., lend support to the contention that sympathy does more harm than good in the modern city. A community based



entirely on good will or sympathy or love could probably not long endure. As the British Labor Party says : "The Labor Party has no belief in any of the problems of the world being solved by good will alone. Good will without knowledge is warmth without light."

Habit will be always with us. Some will always seek to creep into the grooves of social habit and shuttle back and forth in a fixed routine. It was never more possible than to-day for this to happen. And all will occasionally long for some secure retreat. But community organization involves the continuous re-direction of one and another aspect of social habit into lines of new growth and more complete development.

Fear is permanent in human nature. Some of us will always be subject to fear, perhaps, and all of us sometimes, though the incidence of fear upon conduct grows less year by year, save in those moments when some great crisis looms upon us. But community organization involves the gradual elimination of the more deadly and degrading fears of the past, such as the fears of poverty, starvation, limitless punishments, hell, and the like.

Pleasure and pain we shall always know, and happiness will ever be one of the haunting hopes of the race. But we shall be less and less guided by these feelings in our mature conduct. They will be the by-products of our living and the indexes of our capacity to live effectively, not the actual guides of living. Community organization will involve the development of a

social order which will select and intensify the nobler pleasures; leave some adequate room for the pains that refine and purify our pleasures; and some real opportunity, if not for the actual pursuit, at least for the enjoyment of the happiness that may come as the result of living.

Good will, sympathy, love, and even hate, we shall have with us always: love of the good, of the humane, of the nobly fine; hate of the evils, the diseases, the ignoble natures, and the vested wrongs of our common life. Community organization must provide adequate room for the holier loves and the nobler hates of our liberated human nature.

But until our living rises above the mere level of this emotional life and of the life of habit likewise, the world will not be wholly human; and the world's greatest need is the truly human community. Habit is primarily a function of neural mechanism in the spinal cord: a common illustration of habit is found in "stubbornness," when, as we say, we "get our backs up," that is, when the spinal cord takes control of our conduct. Emotion, on its physiological side, is a function of the ductless glands of the body. As we raise the controls of our conduct to the level of the higher nerve centers, the brain and cerebral cortex, we shall rise above these old, stubborn customs, these old, unintelligent, balking habits; and above the thrills of emotion with which the secretions of the ductless glands infuse our blood. We shall come, slowly but surely, to the

clearer outlooks of intelligence and critical understanding. We need a community controlled by the brain of the race, not by its spinal cord or its ductless glands. The secure basis of the democratic community of the future will be found in this critical understanding which will include understanding of habit and emotion and all the conditions of our common living.

But this is difficult to secure. Men love their old habits and customs, even while they suffer from them; and they enjoy the experience of emotions which are dissipative of energy if not destructive; while they find intelligence sometimes cold and inhuman or at least cool and calculating. Spurning all habit, intellect may, in its unwisdom, attempt to discredit and even to destroy the past. Rising above all emotion, it may deny the commonest human responsibilities, and all the play of feeling and instinct with their fundamental satisfactions.

Community organization will be a function of this finer social intelligence, but this intelligence must be kept genuinely human. This means that the bearer of it, the individual, must himself become a real community. A time-honored theory of the individual assumes that he comes into the world ready-made. All his experiences are external to him, and all his accomplishments are hung on him like gifts upon a Christmas tree. All the experiences of life remain external to his real nature, and at the end he sloughs them off and returns to the heaven of pure spirits.

A more recent theory assumes his continuity with the processes of growth and development in the world. He is wrought of many lines of ancestry, and many strata of racial experience; he is primitively a bundle of conflicting instincts, impulses, feelings, and desires. His experiences are real and internal, and all the experiences of life which count with him are real and internal. His great task through the plastic years is to organize a unity of feeling, purpose, and life-program out of these conflicting interests. He enters into the life of the community in all its varied interests in this process, and he becomes as much of a community within himself as the social order and the traditional controls about him permit him to become. He builds up a structure of community habit within himself; he grows into the common emotional experiences of the group. In this way he could be led to take upon himself the goods and the evils of his group; to see the problems of the community as his problems: its health as his health; its diseases as his diseases; its enemies as his enemies; its defeats as his defeats; its friends as his friends; its victories as his victories; its gods as his gods.

In the fully integrated smaller community of the primitive past special ceremonials helped to make the adolescent experiences of children, especially the boys, particularly significant in the development of this sense of community. In historic times the Greek festival in which the young man gave over his youth and took

upon himself the responsibilities of adult life afforded a like opportunity. In the presence of all the people he took the Ephebic Oath, in which he vowed lasting fealty to the community, both alone and with many, and swore that he would transmit the community to future generations fairer and better than he found it.

If the individual is really to become a full member of a community he must become something of a community within himself. He must have the habits and customs of the community and something of its truest emotions, its hopes and fears, its loves and hates, its wider interests and its lasting responsibilities. Thus he will become not only a real member of the community, but the community itself will live and be secure in him: in his habits the guarantee of its continuity and stability, in his innovating impulses the guarantee of its vital criticism, and in his growing intelligence the guarantee of its continuous reconstruction.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FUNCTION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE community, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, "is not so much a definite and concrete group which all may see and immediately apprehend. It is rather an informing concept, a social ideal. Hence, it exists at present mainly in the social imagination of individuals. Outside the individual it may be little more than a phrase—easily mouthed and easily lost."

Community cannot exist in the casual feelings and temporary opinions of individuals to-day. The primitive community could exist in the immediate experience of its members. Certain modern cities have grown through the development and merging of many little village communities. In these mergings crooked streets have had to be straightened; divergent streets have had to be made to meet; various levels of traffic have had to be brought to a uniform grade; and village minds, village manners, customs and standards, have had to be slowly reconstructed to meet the needs of the cosmopolitan area. This has required vigorous criticism, city planning, and a reconstructive program of life generally. Generalizing such a development we get the organized sciences, social and engineering,

which, examining every particular item of the problem, work out from all the data the fairly permanent and stable elements of an organized program which can be made the basis of the community on this larger scale.

In this sense political science hopes to take the place of mere political tradition in the guidance of the larger community; economic science would take the place of economic tradition and common practices in the organization of the industry and business of the community; social ethics would come in to reorganize the customary moralities of the villages; and a broad educational program would take the place of the primitive schooling of the village. The hope of *community*, local, national and international, is the world's greatest hope, and in the furtherance of this hope social intelligence is justified in attempting to break down, not ruthlessly and ignorantly, but carefully, thoughtfully and yet persistently, all intervening obstructions. This is the practical significance of the social sciences: they must point the way by which society may achieve this larger social organization. The possibility of this is but dimly emerging into our social imaginations. Its actual realization is still far in the future, perhaps. Eventually it will express itself in a wide range of social ideals, and in fairly specific but growing standards of social achievement, as we shall see later. Here we are considering the significance of the social sciences in the task of organizing the community.

All science rests ultimately, whether consciously or

not, on some fundamental philosophic foundation. Ignoring all incidental variations, three main philosophic points of view exist, upon one of which, or upon some unintelligent mingling of which, every social or physical science rests itself. Two of these points of view assume the existence of a complete and structurally unchangeable world; the third assumes the reality of evolution, not only in its physical sense, but in that more real sense which assumes that in all social, intellectual, and moral lines the universe is still capable of producing new patterns. The first two of these systems are those commonly called idealism and realism; the third is commonly called pragmatism.

Idealism assumes a universal structure of ideas, or truth, which, like some mighty blueprint of the universe, forms the original sufficient and unchanging pattern within which creation moves. Here is that great structure of scientific law and moral principle within which the stars and planets, plants and animals, and man and his institutions all alike develop. It includes also that "divine far-off event toward which the whole creation moves." This may be a very noble conception; but, however noble, it is absolute and limited and sets definite barriers to the development of humanity and to the growth of man's aspirations. As such it has ceased to satisfy human need.

Realism, on the other hand, asserts the actual existence of the physical structure of the universe. It assumes the identity of atoms or other units of matter,



and asserts the indestructibility of these physical existences. This is then that great structure of the physical universe within which stars and planets, plants and animals, man and his institutions develop. An essential item in this system reduces morality to psychology, and psychology to behavior, and behavior to physiology, and physiology becomes part of the physical structure of the world. Man loses his significance as a moral being in this system. All his aspirations and institutions become assimilated to physical processes. As one writer has facetiously described its effect on psychology, "Under the realistic influence psychology lost its soul some thirty years ago, and recently it has almost succeeded in losing its mind." This realistic conception of the universe has certain great values in redeeming man from his over-emotional emphasis upon the nature of life. But, however dignified, it is again an absolute system; hence, limited in its outlook and insufficient to meet the aspirations of human life.

The third theory, pragmatism, assumes the reality of human experience, and asserts the reality of the evolutionary emergence of new levels of experience and new patterns of being. It finds in old habit, custom, tradition and institution those solid structures of which realism makes so much, and which are capable of forming a permanent basis of habit, a permanent universe. It finds in innovation, impulse, and invention the hint of unrealized ideas which seem so much worth while that they carry the suggestion of pre-existence. It finds

in the conflict between old habit and innovating suggestion the possibility of the emergence of new levels of experience which will deny the finality of both old habit and uncriticized idea. In this process of reconstruction, emerges the new pattern which shall take the place of the old modes of living. According to this statement of the nature of the world, the universe is infinitely creative, making inexhaustible room for the satisfaction of human aspiration, the realization of new forms of human association, and the building of endlessly new and necessary social orders. The essential theory of this book is pragmatic.

This view of the matter implies that the democratic community toward which we look is not now in existence. It does not now exist anywhere save perhaps in the longings and aspirations and purposes of the few who love democracy more than their own ease.

This is, of course, a fact of life. For example, in 1786 there was nowhere any such entity as the United States of America. In the course of the summer 1787 the plan of such an entity gradually formed itself in the thinking of a group of statesmen. Before the end of 1787 that plan was formally completed; but it required another year to make it actual in the world of institutions and a century to give it substantial standing among the nations of the world. This is the historic fact; new institutions do emerge out of the aspirations, hopes, longings, and intentions of men. What was not in existence comes into existence; and becomes

potent among the energies and forces of the world.

This is the fact, but we do not care to face that fact or admit it, for it seems to put us into a theoretically defenseless position. Nothing, however, is to be gained for democracy by ignoring the origin of democracy's new institutions. As a matter of simple fact, institutions do develop out of the germs of feeling, aspiration, intention, idea; hence, theoretically pragmatism represents a true view of the nature of our social order, with its old institutions which are only partially satisfactory; with endless new needs continuously appearing; with its continuous inventiveness shaping new institutions to meet these new needs. Men's faith must escape from the mere past and take hold upon the unformed future. That which is unsatisfactory in present social organization must be scientifically analyzed for the purpose of determining how much of it can be discarded and of laying the foundations of new systems, molding new orders nearer to our needs and to our heart's desires.

This involves the use in all social developments of that wonderful tool which has been so fruitful in all the realm of physical inventiveness—the hypothesis. In order that we may see more clearly just what this tool is we may note the alternatives of conduct open to a community in any time of stress. Even the most besotted community may without any intention of its own come upon the evil day of uneasiness: what shall it do then? In general four possible lines of conduct

are open. First, it may fall back upon some ancient theory of community organization. Second, it may merely rest upon conditions and drift with circumstances. Third, it may set up some absolute picture of a future in which all social questions are completely solved. Fourth, it may take a somewhat opportunist view of the future and set up hypotheses of possible organizations to be tested out in the current of events and to be accepted if found useful. The first of these is illustrated by the doctrines of President Wilson in his theory of "The New Freedom," in which he would go back to the simpler social conditions of the days of Jefferson and re-establish American community life in terms of a social order that has passed away. The second is of the nature of *laissez faire* and represents the philosophy that "whatever is, is right." The third is represented by an extreme Marxian socialism, which would set up an inevitable goal toward which civilization moves past all escape.

The fourth represents the scientific point of view, and the pragmatic mood; it assumes that man's intelligence must play around about and upon all his problems day by day and year by year as long as the world stands. But it assumes also that into the maze of the future men must ever project hypothetic solutions and programs which may or may not come true. It is not so important that men's guesses should always come true; it is of the very essence of human intelligence that men should evermore have a chance to guess.

That is what the makers of our American Constitution did, and because they guessed usably they stand high in our esteem. But that is also what the makers of the Articles of Confederation did; and because their guess was not so conclusive their names are not widely known. Human beings do not largely care for certainty. Oliver Cromwell said: "He who knows not whither he is going goes farthest." Democracy may never dare lose the feeling that it is a great experiment, knowing not whither it is going, but none the less bravely going on, trusting the intelligence of tomorrow to meet the problems of to-morrow as the intelligence of the past met the problems of the past.

The use of the hypothesis releases us from control by the past, with all its narrowing limitations, into the freedom of the future with all its promise for the realization of human good. Of course such a mode of procedure demands the use of every critical faculty for the safeguarding of the community against unfounded and impossible vagaries; but no fearfulness on the part of vested interests may rightly be permitted to destroy the community's faith in its own undetermined future. Every community needs to be continually working at the more complete statement of its own more adequate hypothesis. This hypothesis of the ideal community should be free to break radically with all old modes of living, just as, let us say, steam transportation broke with old modes of transportation, or as instantaneous systems of communication broke

with ancient, slower means. Such an hypothesis will, of course, be related to old conditions, facts, and attitudes; but it will distinctly recognize the indisputable fact that no stable social order can rest upon conditions, facts or attitudes that are severely questioned. Calling a disintegrating cement good, will not make it good; calling a disintegrating social order good, will not make it good.

Any hypothesis of the future ideal community therefore will necessarily relate itself to the unquestioned elements in the present social order. Leaving these secure bases it will work its way through the mazes of social question with the help of every item of social intelligence securable. This intelligence will be provided by such developments as psychology, economics, political science, sociology, ethics, and the like. Through the working out of these elements the form of the more ideal community of the future will gradually emerge in the social imagination of interested men and women. It will be like a finer breed of plant, sought for and selected for its beauty, its strength, its general excellence. It is essential that they who have in charge the growth of this finer social organism shall have substantially sound understanding of the soils in which it will grow, and of the nurturing materials that it needs in its growth. They who have to do with the redirection of the social order—educators, statesmen, thinkers, scientists and the like—must draw their warrant to be so engaged in a democracy not from the fact

that they have attended many funerals in the past, but from the fact that they have looked with joy on the dawn of many new days. They must be able to see human nature not from the standpoint of a complacent pessimism and cynical unbelief, but from the standpoint of an insight into the still unexplored areas of human hope.

They will see in psychology not a cynical proof of the impossibility of human aspiration, but a dramatic presentation of the lines within which human aspiration may legitimately arise and may confidently hope to achieve itself. They will see in political science not the brutal and sordid proof that human beings are happiest when they are being manipulated to the profit of a few; but that human nature is happiest when it finds itself serving, expressing, growing, without thought of the outcome. They will find in economics not the old, dismal proof that man is primarily a digestion-machine to be kept in order by being always kept full, but rather a social being who, having satisfied himself with some of the good things of the earth, is ready to share in all adventures for the still higher goods of life.

The possibility of the service of social theory in the development of community might be demonstrated in any one of the social sciences. But a single illustration will be sufficient.

Social "science" might be any one of three things: it might be a justification, more or less carefully and

plausibly worked out, of established social structure and methods; it might be a descriptive analysis of that structure and method without any particular attempt at evaluation; it might be a constructive analysis weighing the various elements and organizing them according to some theory of progress.

Political economy has been all three of these. in the early mercantilist days the "economist" worked out his theories of "the balance of trade" on the basis of and as justification for commerce and commercial treaties already in existence. Breaking sharply with this position as a tool of government policies, Adam Smith made a thorough-going study of economic processes, sharply separated from any motive to interfere with those processes. He said, in effect, to the government: "Your petty laws of favoritism and restriction are useless and worse than useless. The economic structure is governed by great 'natural' laws with which you are unwisely tampering."

Yet the third step, to the constructive, intelligent handling of these "laws," was slow in coming. The gulf so necessarily set up between science and action came by a curious turn to be the tool of conservatism. In turn the conservative tells the reformer as he seeks for forward-looking organization and legislation: "You are merely tampering unwisely with inexorable natural law." Such statements were probably not always believed by their spokesmen, but they exerted a strong restraining pressure on the development of a



constructive, evaluating social science, which should describe fearlessly, and proceed also fearlessly to show on the basis of that description the points at which readjustment must be made.

The main difficulty probably arises from the interpretation of the word law. The older sciences, physical and social alike, used the term with the connotation that law was divine enactment against which it were blasphemy even to protest. "Facts" have also at times been used in this same absolute sense; upholders of the *status quo* have continually warned liberalists to beware how they trifled with facts. Now a fact may be never so real a thing and still be subject to a variety of treatments. A solid precipice on the mountainside may be an undesirable thing into which to bump one's head; none the less, a rope securely fastened to the top of the precipice may make it possible to escape from a low order of existence to one much higher and finer. So a fact may be dangerous if just bumped into; but used as a solid reality to pull one's self up by or to build upon, it may serve not to limit life but to give it new scope and outlook.

For example, there is a law of supply and demand, just as there is a law of gravitation. But the fact that there is a law of gravitation does not mean that every human being will eventually fall and break his leg. In like fashion, the fact that there is a law of supply and demand does not mean that if there are "naturally" four jobs and five men wanting them one must inevit-

ably starve to death. The old adage "Necessity is the mother of invention" can quite as readily be inverted and made to read "Invention is the mother of necessity." That is to say, supply may be more than the answer to demand. Since human nature is still only partially explored, supply may even be the cause of the appearance of new demands.

Hence, in the closing years of the nineteenth century and in these two decades of the twentieth century, all the social sciences have definitely been turned in the forward-looking, positive direction. Instead of relying upon old interpretations of history and psychology upon which a dismal structure of defeat must inevitably arise, human nature has been subjected to a continuous re-investigation and re-interpretation for the purpose of finding out facts and principles which can be used in the support of a positive program of progress. Psychology has become a search for the materials of understanding and control of the human organism, with a view to providing the various social sciences with substantial foundations in real human nature. The old doctrine that fear is at the basis of human conduct and that starvation is the one motive from which all individuals take their cue has disappeared and we know now that men will gladly go to their deaths for adventure, for noble ideals, for great social purpose, for any number of types of spiritual achievement. Any social system or economic system that ignores the heroic quality in human conduct is doomed to failure. Eventually our political sagacity

will grow big enough to enable us to use for civic purposes the whole great mass of heroisms which working men of the world exhibit in their mass actions and which are now all too frequently turned bitterly aside from inclusion in our civic resources.

On the side of ethics the old doctrines that men are either good or bad, and that every moral choice involves a clear-cut distinction are both giving way in these more analytic days to the understanding that every one of us is a pretty complicated mixture of motives and that every moral situation involves elements that no human wisdom can fully allocate to either the good or the bad side. So that ethics to-day is largely trying to escape from the old, futile, metaphysical job of classifying individuals and situations and so finishing up the ethical problem once for all. Instead of this, the wisest of ethical leaders are to-day concerned with the greater task, the alluring task, of learning how to bring together in ever larger numbers and with ever greater degree of intelligence and energy those good men and women who will devote themselves to the age-long task of making a good world.

Rooted in the social instincts of the individual and the primitive group, the hopes of ultimate community are secure. The development of the full growth of community waits upon the development of the more complete social sciences of the future and their adequate application to the tasks of making a completely human world.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

AMERICAN idealism rose to high levels in war-time and expressed itself in eloquent measures in the state papers of President Wilson. No more remarkable phenomenon has been known in recent centuries than the profound effect of his idealism on the oppressed peoples of the earth. He made their problems America's problems, and he gave to them the inspiration of sharing America's ancient idealism. Reactionary tendencies since the war have seemed to repudiate those aspirations, but democracy will never find its complete fulfillment until it returns to them and makes them a part of its fundamental program.

What were some of those aspirations?

"We wish nothing for ourselves that we are not ready to demand for all mankind,—fair dealing, justice, the freedom to live and be secure against organized wrong."

"We fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our heart,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by

such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

"A full recognition of the right of those who work to participate in some organic way in every decision which affects their welfare or the part they are to play in industry."

"There are many things still to do at home, to clarify our own politics and give new vitality to the industrial processes of our own life, and we shall do them as time and opportunity serve; but we realize that the greatest things that remain to be done must be done with the whole world for stage, and in co-operation with the wide and universal forces of mankind; and we are making our spirits ready for those things. They will follow in the immediate wake of the war and will set civilization up again. . . . There can be no turning back."\*

Apologists for old conditions and ancient wrongs insist that "such words as these did the world infinite injury, because they awakened hopes that can never be realized." But this is part of that folly, partly intentional, partly pathetic, and wholly tragic, by which the energies of the world are blocked in their efforts to achieve a truly humane social order. Upholders of these old-time institutions and social organizations base their opposition to change on the traditional theory that human nature is unchangeable: "As long as human

\*See "Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson," *passim*.

nature remains what it is," they say, "the world will go on as it always has gone on." This doctrine has sufficient support in the fatalisms of religion and ethics and common experience to make most people accept it as final.

But it has its real and final, though unsuspected, support in our deep wishes and desires. It helps to maintain our ancient privileges, our vested ignorances; and it tends to gloss over our social indolence. Once we blamed a personal devil for the wrong that is in the world. To this we added the doctrine of total depravity,—“In Adam’s fall we sinned all,”—to give the doctrine of evil a more permanent hold on human nature. Evolutionary studies tend to discredit personal devils and total depravities, but leave larger room for this new excuse—“human nature.”

This is, however, a quite definite misinterpretation of human nature. In the first place, there is no one human nature; there are as many different human natures as there are individuals. Human nature ranges all the way from the well-known scribes who devoured widows’ houses, and made long prayers in the synagogue, to the widow who gave her all to the poor; it ranges all the way from the character of Judas to the character of Jesus. This is a simple historic fact which he who runs may read.

In the second place, modern psychology no longer accepts any simple statement of human nature. In view of modern investigations each human being is an amaz-

ing complication of interminable characteristics.\* Human personality is not an entity that just is: it is a growing achievement, and may become integrated to some high and worthy purpose or dissipated to ignoble and destructive ends. In spite of the fact that psychology shows this tremendous complication of human personality, it is opening surer ways to the control of conduct and the development of a real art of living. And though evil possibilities mix in every nature, the way to a generously human community life becomes continuously more clear. Education, if it could be permitted to use intelligently the growing knowledge that we have of the possibilities of human nature, could assure us a vigorously democratic civilization led by a broad social intelligence just as surely as the prussianizing pedagogy of two generations assured Germany a submissive citizenship that both physically and mentally was dominated by authority.

All organization of growing social life involves something of manipulation. There never has been a group that grew up "naturally." No set of habits or customs has ever represented *ultimate human nature*. Every civilization, including every modern one, has had its folkways, its arbitrary leaderships, its practical psychologists, who manipulated it to their own interest. People have always been the victims of catch phrases and "question-begging epithets." Bacon pointed out three hundred years ago how human thinking is habitu-

\*Trotter: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

Wallas: *The Great Society*, Ch. 2 and Chs. 5 and 6.

ally determined by what he called "the Idols of the Mind." In modern times we have seen the development of such a movement as the "psychology of salesmanship," in which salesmen are given just enough insight into practical psychology to be able to play upon some gross motive, vanity, cupidity or fear, and so to manipulate customers. In all ages religion has been called upon to sanction misrepresentation of human nature, and public opinion has supported gross inhumanities, such as slavery, in the name of religion and civilization. Words have exercised fatal influence over the lives of men: loyalty, solidarity, patriotism, treason, cowardice, slacking,—the books are full of the long lists of epithets by which society has been controlled.

In all these historic illustrations and in the present social situation we face nowhere ultimate human nature. We face only existent conditions, growing out of a more or less plausible history, and depending upon indolence and habit to maintain them. Pope sanctified them in their impudent claims to finality in his celebrated falsehood, "Whatever is, is right." History proves nothing excepting that certain things are, and that while they may have served fairly well in their own time, they are themselves not final, but usurpers of the positions of other institutional forms which previously existed. And just as those previous existences passed away to make room for these, so these can be rightfully called in question to determine their fitness



to survive. For a democratic social order must soon or late definitely experience what Ferguson calls the "revolution absolute,"—that is, it must give over determining its program from the past and undertake to determine it by establishing desirable standards of achievement for the future, in accordance with the most real and generous aspirations of the present.

Such standards must be established through all the ranges of our community life: health, housing, industry, family life, child welfare, citizenship, justice, education and public opinion, recreation, and morality.

With regard to health, a community program will include all the preventive factors: municipal sanitation, railway sanitation, measures to prevent the spread of the venereal diseases, of tuberculosis, of malaria, and of the lesser contagious diseases. It will see that the water we drink, the milk we give our children, the foods we eat, all contribute to health and not disease. It will guard not only against industrial accidents, but against any industrial condition which threatens the maximum health and social effectiveness of the worker. It will see that our rural communities do not remain in ignorance of the great advances in hygiene which have been made by modern medicine and sanitation. It will see that accurate vital statistics are kept and that the intelligence of the community and of each individual member of the community is increasingly alert, well-informed, and able to build strong, vigorous life.\*

\* See Annual Report Public Health Service 1919.

A community housing problem will involve more than a minimum of light, air and sanitation. It will be concerned also with the zoning of the city, the transportation, lighting, and beautification of the city, with the elimination of speculative land values, with the acquiring of the benefits of ownership for wage earners without interfering with the mobility of labor, with the elimination of waste in the construction of houses, with the stimulation of the sense of beauty and architectural value throughout all our building.\*

Community standards in industry will make it evident that some form of national minimum which shall insure "to every member of the community in good times and bad alike all the requisites of healthy life and worthy citizenship" is absolutely essential. It will seem also evident with such viewpoint that there must be "a genuinely scientific reorganization of a nation's industry, no longer deflected by individual profiteering, . . . and the adoption in particular services and occupations of those systems and methods of administration and control that may be found in practice the best to promote, not profiteering but the public interest."†

One difficulty meets us at this point: if the capitalistic wage system of organizing industry remains, the statement of standards will take a particular direc-

\* See *The Housing Problem in War and Peace* (1918), published by the Journal of the American Institute of Architects, Washington.

† British Labor Party Program.

tion; if, as seems likely, some more adequately human organization of industry prevails, such standards will take some other direction. But in either case, certain minimum essentials can be foreseen. The working day must provide maximum productivity without destroying the worker's capacity to perform adequately his other functions as a citizen and human being (certainly not to exceed a 44 hour week; and eventually probably a six hour day). All competent members of the community must participate both in the actual work of the community and in the wealth it produces. This, together with adequate community care for dependents and incompetents, means the abolition of poverty. Every form of "child labor" must be guarded against, without at the same time depriving children of the chance to share in work activities and to learn to work. Industrial controls must be so reorganized as to liberate the constructive intelligence and inventiveness of the workers, both as to industrial processes and as to the control of industry. Industry must also be reorganized for the elimination of all waste, both physical and social, to the end that production shall be made as economical as possible, the economies so resulting to be shared democratically by all members of the industry.\*

The standard of family life in a community pro-

\* Labor groups are sometimes charged with wanting control of industry before they are prepared to accept responsibility for the permanence of industrial operations. But fairness compels the admission that responsibility can be developed only by sharing in control.

gram will center, perhaps, about the children, their rearing, education, and development along normal human lines. This will mean financial security of the family, the sharing of the joint income among all the members according to wise appraisal of the needs of each, and a strong inspiring common affection within the group. And it will demand the prevention by education, public opinion, and law of unfit marriages,—marriages tending to the spread of disease, vice, crime, incompetence, and insanity. It will also demand frank and open recognition of the desirability of ending marriage relationships under certain conditions,—not only under those now generally recognized, but also when unescapable personal incompatibilities make the above standards of home life unattainable.

Child welfare standards lie at the heart of the aspirations of a growing developing community. They are an essential factor in all community problems; and must hold a high place in all community decisions. The standards commonly known as “child welfare,” dealing with the variety of needs, physical, intellectual, moral, of the growing child, have now been worked out in great detail. But too often they are known only to a very small proportion of the community. They must become a recognized community interest.\*

Standards of citizenship tended before the war to become formalized; and discussion of them often

\* Report of the Washington Child Welfare Conference (1919).

develops into a question of duties *versus* rights. It is evident that the community must emphasize *both* of these aspects; and no authority is so well fitted for the proper evaluation of these two aspects of citizenship as is the intelligent community. We are recognizing to-day that "papers" do not make an immigrant a citizen; nor does voting always make a native American a citizen in matters which are essential to community; citizenship means active, intelligent, devoted, membership in the community, and it can be produced only by the community.\*

Justice is an old Anglo-Saxon ideal; it is an old Roman ideal; it is as old perhaps as civilization. But its reality depends upon the constant reinterpretation of that term from age to age. It has a certain essential character: freedom of all before the law and equality of all before the law: "Every subject of the Commonwealth . . . ought to obtain justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it; completely and without any denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws."† But the attainment of this ideal through the multifarious complexities of our modern life will not be possible without the definite attention of the community.‡

In the preparation of the future citizenship the community is vitally concerned, and its standards of edu-

\* Weeks: *Psychology of Citizenship* (McClurg, 1917).

† Constitution of Massachusetts, Pt. 1, Art. IX.

‡ Smith: *Justice and the Poor*.

cation must be constructive. Community demands that education be socialized and vocationalized, making room for the initiative and resourcefulness of all children. A wide variety of vocations awaits the children; a wide variety of native interests exists in every child. They must be helped to prepare according to their native bent, for intelligent participation in trade, industry, or the professions. Education must be extended to include definite instruction for all up to at least the eighteenth year. Educational opportunity must be equalized as between social classes and groups, as between the sexes, as between rural and urban communities, and as between rich and poor districts and states. Health and physical training, being fundamental to that personal and social efficiency which can make a stable social order, must be made equal with every other school subject in standing.

We must secure a reorganization of the methods of teaching to redeem them from their academic dryness and make them more adequate both psychologically and sociologically to the conditions under which boys and girls must live. Defective and delinquent children must have the benefit of the most complete scientific diagnosis, prescription, and care; normal children must have every opportunity to explore their native interests in order to find out what they are best fitted to do and be; extraordinary children must not be destroyed by the mechanism of the school. To accomplish these results the internal structure of schools

must be made over. Educational administration must become democratic. Teachers and pupils must have some share in the control of education. The new teacher must be more mature without being academic, better educated without being pedantic, more broadly interested without being superficial, and more professionally minded without being narrow. Such teachers must take definite responsibility for the problems of the school. If democracy really intends to take its problems seriously, the program of education must rise to the level of securing this sort of teacher.

Education must no longer be limited to childhood and adolescence. A democracy lives in the growing intelligence of its adult citizenship. Citizenship, in the broadest sense of the term, must be made a part of the educational program. This will include the teaching of English to foreigners, the significance of American institutions to all groups, and the interpretation of trends of economic and political thinking to all members of the community. In a democratic community education must continue as long as life lasts.\*

One of the most serious failures of many of our present communities is the failure to conserve the play and recreational life. Human beings live largely in their sense of emotional well-being; and this is mostly kept normal by a natural participation in social and recreational activities. One of the most fundamental

\*Cf. Publications of the National Educational Association on "The Present Emergency in Education."

necessities is the working out of a broad system of standards of community use of off-time: recognition of the need for playground facilities for the children; of the necessity for social gatherings, amusement, play, and all expressions of healthy social instinct for the young people and for the older people of the community; an established place in the community for a complete all-the-year-round program of social life and recreation for all the people of the community, not monotonous and fixed once for all, but year by year being vitalized by the recreational inventiveness of the community; recognition of the importance of special occasions, civic celebrations, and the like,—not for exploitation, but for spontaneous pleasure,—for taking the “eternal grind” out of life; the selection of a superintendent of recreation, adequately trained and with broad outlook upon the whole social situation; and the organization of some sort of broad recreational board to promote community occasions in which the whole community gathers and enhances its own collective emotion and sense of the worth of the community.

The organization of the community toward which we look must make provision for the protection of the leisure of the people against all sordid encroachments whether of business or of narrow tradition. The demand for beauty must likewise be protected against all exploitation because the future of the race is bound up with the conservation of the beauty of life. With the increase of leisure in the common life will come



a tremendous community responsibility for providing adequate means in every sane and helpful direction for the play, recreation, and amusement of the people.\*

Community standards of morality will demand of the members of the community, in addition to the older sense of individual responsibility, a genuine appreciation of the conditions under which they live and a willingness to assume some share of the responsibility for the perpetuation or the cure of those conditions.†

In common usage the term "standard of living" has primarily reference to economic factors, though in its broader application it is to be noted that economic resources are used to pay for all those other more or less intangible goods which make human life worthy and dignified. The standards set forth in this chapter represent the elements that go to the making of such a broad standard of living. Human life grows too valuable to be wasted in war, or in the accidents and diseases of industry or by preventable diseases of infancy, or through bad housing or ignorant disregard of sanitation and hygiene. The standard of living by which human life shall be defended is "the direct product of good inheritance, healthy infancy, protected and sufficiently prolonged childhood consecrated to education in its broadest sense, youth spent in the upbuilding of sound character, rational organization of the occupations into which the young enter at the

\* Lee: *Play in Education*.

† Dewey and Tufts: *Ethics*.

threshold of maturity, and attention to the conditions under which the wealth of the world is produced and distributed.”\*

“If war or industrial depression or irregular employment or famine or pestilence or epidemic or demoralizing poor relief or the luxurious indulgence of vice breaks down the standard of life, this is for civilization its one real disaster, retrievable, it may be, by long and painful effort, but very probably not in the same nation or community. Such a disaster is not easily retrieved. Earthquake or flood or fire or defeat in arms may be but a slight disaster in the large perspective of history, but any force which reaches the inner standards of the people, their ideas as to what manner of life they should lead, has a cumulative and icalculable effect on all their future welfare.”†

\* Devine: *The Normal Life*, p. 158.

† Devine: *op. cit.* p. 157.

## CHAPTER VI

### SOME IMPORTANT TASKS

IN the preceding chapters we have seen something of the backgrounds of institution and attitude which condition the development of a community program. We have seen how that program is rooted in individual life and need in these complex times, and how it is called for by the developing social intelligence of the age. We have caught some glimpse of the standards of achievement which such a program hopes to reach. We have now to see further what large specific tasks of reconstruction will confront this community spirit as it emerges into actuality and takes charge of the destiny of our communities.

Old attitudes, indolent and slipshod, have left in our communities many social defects for which the only excuse we can offer is that we have no adequate knowledge or methods of procedure for their cure. These defects and problems, some of them shocking in their careless contempt for human well-being and happiness, exist because, as we say, we know no way of curing them. Here and there a devoted individual or a conscientious group spends unmeasured time and energy in tinkering at the job. It is too much as if a

physician sought to heal an organic ill by some sort of local palliative. Such work is indeed not to be lightly esteemed, but its chief value seems to be to show its own ineffectiveness and to throw us completely back upon the general proposition that community ills must be cured by community remedies, even though those remedies should be so radical as to go to the very root of community life and organization.

Our communities are well acquainted with these failures, lacks, and general insufficiencies. It may be stated dogmatically that very few individuals under present social conditions achieve a vigorous, positive and abundant life. Inadequate interpretations of life, especially on moral and religious grounds; fragmentary forms of institutions, nurturing fragmentary forms of living; inadequate perceptions of the facts of life, stimulating perverted expressions of normal energy; false, specious, insufficient ideals of individual and group relationships, fostering narrow and prejudicial types of social living; uncriticized and inadequate theories of human happiness, tending to limit the ranges within which legitimate human expression may proceed: all these elements in our common living show us the extent to which our communities fail to rise to the levels of even our practical ideals. They also show the great areas of utterly unwarranted individual, group, and community suffering through the perpetuation of maladjustments of all sorts which are accepted either because we are too indolent to call

them in question, or because our theory of the world assumes that they are a natural part of human living.

This latter explanation has no longer any legitimate reason for existence. There was a time when men accepted yellow fever as of the very nature of human existence, not to be questioned by the trusting religious mind. That time is gone. No one to-day assumes that it is blasphemous to put yellow fever out of existence, and with it that scandalous mosquito whose chief service to the world has been the carrying of fever germs. Doubtless that mosquito has a perfect right to live; if so, let it reform its ways! If not, let it perish in its sins! In the same fashion we may say that those human beings and those social institutions which fatten upon the defects and the miseries of life have a perfect right to live, but not by the continuance of their present modes of living. The community has exactly the same right to call in question their legitimacy as it has to call in question the right of the mosquito that carries the fever germ.

The most comprehensive task of the community spirit therefore is that of applying determined standards of human well-being and excellence to all the conditions of living and to the outcomes of our present forms of living. This application will show the extent to which our living fails to reach the level of assumed ideals, and this will set for us the great tasks of the community of the future. We may note that these community defects or shortcomings can be set

forth under two general groupings. First, in all our communities there are certain defects that we may call *functional*; by this is meant shortcomings in life and service of a general sort wherein the community fails to provide adequately for the well-being of its constituent members. The second of these defects may be called *structural*—meaning by this, shortcomings, overlappings, exaggerations, and lacks of various kinds in specific institutions of the community.

Considering what we have called functional defects, we may assume a contemporary suggestion that there are three such types of evil in our community life: first, there are the physical defects which limit human life through the shortcomings of the physical world in which we live, including our own bodies. These are our diseases, undernourishments, lack of vitality, bad living conditions, inadequate sanitation, and the like. Second, there are certain psychological defects, or evils of character, such as ignorance, undisciplined impulse, unbridled will, and all those other elements in human nature which tend to defeat the working out of a completely human progress. Third, there are certain social defects,—“evils of power,”—which are the effect of the groupings of peoples in communities. These are such as poverty, tyranny, and the general degradation of individuals and groups through the unequal distribution of ability and power. These three types of functional defect run through all our community living and social organization. They make up

the bulk of what is commonly known as "human nature" and they seem to stand large in the way of any social progress. But our purpose will be not to see them as ultimate obstacles to social progress but as problems to be solved on the way to a more adequate community life. It may be that they will not all ever be wholly solved; but so long as any part of such problem remains it should remain as a challenge to the intelligence of the community, not as an excuse for community indolence.

Considering what we have called structural defects, we may well ask such questions as these: As to the home, was it a sort of rural isolation that gave strength to this institution in the old days? Does the loss of that isolation mean inevitable weakening of the home? Or does it make necessary those large readjustments which all institutions are undergoing in their transition to the more complicated life of the city?

As to business and industry, we seem lost to-day in an incessant circle of price increases and wage increases which solve nothing, but which seem merely to add endlessly to economic unrest. Is there no escape from this incessant circling? Cannot industry be organized in such a way that the distribution of the consumable goods of the world shall be more adequately performed and something of the endless industrial unrest be solved?

As to our churches, we stand at the crossroads, it

would almost seem. Religion once served to soothe the angry hungers of the poor, while they thought that the inequalities of this earth would be made up to them in a better land. The day of that sort of palliative seems gone forever. Either religion must signify something of essential good in the life that now is, or else it must make room in the energies of men for something that will so signify. Can religion measure up to this essential and justifiable demand?

As to our education: in an age when as never before the world has need of growing insight and larger outlook, how can that school be justified which merely repeats the unquestioned platitudes of the past? The war was won for the western Allies largely because large constructive and inventive intelligence played through every phase of physical, chemical, and medical science, inventing new means of warfare and new modes of saving broken men from death, in order that they might fight once more. In this very process old social structures were shaken to their foundations as they had not been shaken in centuries. In the organization of new social structures either old unintelligent habit or undisciplined impulse or critical intelligence must serve as leader. Who can doubt which one of these three should so serve? But where in any school does critical intelligence bravely claim the right so to lead as over against old unintelligent habit or mere undisciplined impulse? Is there any hope that our centers of learning will dare to become centers of



critical intelligence, bravely facing the tasks of social inventiveness thrown up by the institutional shocks of the war?

As to the state, civic control, local, national, and international, is more thoroughly unsure than ever before in many centuries. Old forms of autocratic government have practically failed. Political unrest is a universal phenomenon of the present. Democratic aspiration springs up everywhere in the most unexpected corners of the earth. Democracy cannot be wrought out, President Wilson declares, on any narrow national foundation. The whole earth must be its stage, and all the men and women of the earth must have a share in the great play. Some say that this has awakened aspirations in many backward peoples beyond the possibility of realization. Others insist that there can be no essentially human aspirations beyond the means of realization. These claim that this age is merely determined to make a world in which human beings will be able to realize a worthy life. Governmental control based on the theory that the majority have a right to rule has involved many inconsistencies and unfairnesses. Minorities have been unintelligently and ruthlessly suppressed, and even in America so-called constitutional rights have been denied beyond the ability of anyone to justify in democratic terms. Can the state hope to survive in the midst of the almost universal criticism leveled against it to-day? Or, if it survives, must it not inevitably

take upon itself very different form and perhaps modified functions? At any rate, these are some of the larger problems which the larger community intelligence of the future will be called upon definitely to grapple with. They may not be left to occasional individuals or disinterested small groups. The community as a whole must concern itself with these problems if the democratic community is to survive.

Beyond these more general descriptions of the great task that confronts the community spirit we may pause a moment to consider some of the specific problems which this same spirit will take over from its pioneering individual social workers and its socially-minded groups. Such a catalogue as can here be set forth will seem to many a social worker little less than humorous, by reason of the fact that each of these problems has been made the basis of a large literature and carries within itself many a heroic story and a record of great social effort. There is no intention, however, to minimize the importance of any social work done in the past or the large significance of any one of these problems. The intention is merely to show the setting of all these problems in the light of the larger community intention and to give to social pioneers the assurance that from this time forward they need not work in isolation at their tasks, since the community as a whole is now profoundly concerned that their work shall succeed.

No social problem can be really solved in isolation

from other social problems or in isolation from the life of the community as a whole. Unemployment is not important merely because certain individuals are out of work; rather it is evidence that the industrial system of the whole community, perhaps of the whole world, is out of joint in some way. Poverty is not merely due to the indolence or meanness of particular individuals; it is again a social disease, which can never be wholly cured by local treatment of individuals. Doubtless there are ineffective individuals; doubtless there are defectives who alone never could be other than poor. But as long as able men and women who might make large contributions to the world are largely defeated in those contributions by reason of their poverty, poverty cannot be cured by lecturing the poor or by charity.

Industrial unrest, degrading types of work, disintegration of work habits, and the like, are vital phenomena expressive of disintegrating conditions in the whole structure of society, conditions which can be cured only as they are seen to be integral in the present organization of the world and are dealt with in terms of those organic changes which eliminate their causes and substitute positive elements in their place.

The problems of women in industry and of child labor are not merely problems of erratic individuals who against the advice of their friends and physicians insist upon making a little extra pin money. Child labor especially is a problem lying at the very heart of

the whole modern social situation. Children must have a chance to work; but at the same time they must be protected from exploitation even if that calls for all the police power of the state. Nothing but the control of a thoroughly enlightened community can ever adequately handle such questions.

The problems of so-called "white slavery," of marriage and divorce, of the home and family life, and of eugenics, are all integral in the general problem of economic independence and self-respecting moral intelligence. The problems of defective and delinquent children, of poverty and pauperism, of crime and punishment for crime, also are not functions of particular individuals, since it is well known, for example, that prisons as frequently make criminals as they reform them.

The problems of the intermingling of races are not to be stated or solved in the personal likes and dislikes of particular individuals but in the statesmanship of the world, and in the working out of the great fundamental economic readjustments by which particular people may achieve their own self-respecting economic independence. It may even be that such problems are functions of that deeper biology and psychology which are still so mysterious to us to-day.

The point to all this is that while each one of these separate problems must undoubtedly remain the particular interest of some socially minded individual or group and must still build up its own larger literature,

the hope of the solution of the problem by itself seems fallacious. The social worker in that particular field needs to become one of a staff of community workers who all together engage in the great job of curing the ills of the community, each working at his particular task in the light of a common understanding sympathy and program.

Too long these "social problems" have been regarded as the tasks of "social workers." Poverty, charity, defect, and the like, are not the private problems of anyone; we must see them now distinctly as tasks of the community.

Indeed the very meaning of community itself may be at the root of the matter. We confuse our terms: a mere aggregation of people is not a community. It may be a fortuitous concourse called together by a temporary motive. Even a congregation is not a community. That may be a more permanently motivated group meeting occasionally. As stated above, a community is not a "gregation" at all; it is something that has passed beyond the stage of getting together and just is together, permanently, in a wide range of interests, common activities, and profound hopes. The process by which aggregations of persons develop into permanent human communities holds the largest part of the story by which men have achieved civilization.

Now our American life is in all stages of development between the mere aggregation and the real community. Many of our neighborhoods, especially in

the cities, are mere aggregations. Only here and there over the country at large has the old wandering, pioneering spirit of independent individualism been overcome and the instinctive neighborliness of common life taken its place. The strength of America in the century of expansion was this pioneering individualism. So long as men lived on farms or in small scattered villages the pioneer was a tower of strength. But in the cities he becomes a belated obstacle to the achievement of community solidarity, without which the city becomes a ghastly struggle for existence in which the weak are ruthlessly destroyed by impersonal forces over which no one admits he has any control. The strength of the strong is exaggerated, the weakness of the weak is over emphasized, the poverty of the poor becomes his destruction, and all because an old theory of life declared that nothing must be put in the way of the individual.

In the long run, therefore, the big task of community leadership and organization is the task of community education. The whole structure of our education must be made over—in motive, in spirit, in atmosphere, and in projected outcome—until the old blatant individualism passes away and in its place comes the new sense of individual responsibility for the common good, which is the foundation of community. But this demands the development of an education that shall go far beyond the years of childhood and that shall range far beyond the curricula of the

schools. The education needed for this great task must understand that all the people, whatever their age, are being educated to something or other as long as they live; and that there is no fact or idea or theory, physical, historical, or social, in all the ranges of the world, that should be excluded from the intelligence of the community.

## CHAPTER VII

### TYPES OF PRELIMINARY EFFORT

THE ideal of a normal community must include an infinite variety of details; it is not some finally attainable social order, but an endless series of efforts at a more adequate adjustment of many details. Each of our institutions has had grave ups and downs in the course of history; they will have other more or less grave reconstructions in the future. Even the most conservative accepts the need of some occasional patching of the fabric, while the more radical, as their name implies, would go to the root of the matter. But every new adjustment is likely to produce new over-balances, new maladjustments, new evils.

These necessities for continuous readjustment become more or less obvious to us all, and nearly every one, certainly every considerable group in the community, has some sort of social program. But a social program is never self-realizing; hence, each presupposes some sort of social method or technique. The result is that there are at least as many different sorts of competing social methods as programs.

Most of these programs of community reconstruction are pious hopes, the projection of feelings of fear,



though all of them, perhaps, have some measure of social intelligence in them. They are not new, except in detail. Utopian aspirations are probably as old as the race itself. But as the thoughts of men have widened these programs have become inclusive of ever broader human goods. And as the methods of the social sciences have become more authentic the details of these programs have become more concrete.

Methods of social work are of three general types; they involve work with: (a) individuals; (b) groups; (c) the community as a whole.

The rationale of these three types of method may be found in the historic conceptions of "salvation." For example, there is an atomistic conception of society which assumes that social progress is primarily a function of individual change. The community will be saved by the saving of the individuals who compose it.

There is another theory that society will be "saved" by a special group,—in certain old writings "remnants," "chosen peoples," and the like. This is closely akin to a modern social theory that a certain group or class in the community is particularly responsible for the welfare of the community. John Locke says, for example, that if the gentlemen of England are properly educated they will quickly bring all the rest of the community into line. And all through the ages religious groups as well as many other kinds of groups have considered themselves the "salt of the earth."

Hence a distinctive type of social method directs its energies to the organization of these saving groups.

With the third type the whole community is the object of social effort. There is a feeling that neither by snatching individuals "as brands from the burning" nor by the development of special saving groups can society as a whole be adequately defended. Those who hold this view feel that a program inclusive of every individual and group, and every legitimate interest within the individual or group life, must be the basis of all social effort.

Now it is obvious that there is substantial merit in each of these points of view, and that only a narrow, institutionalized struggle for prestige can justify specific emphasis upon any one of them to the exclusion of the others. To be sure, habit is strong in us, and special techniques develop in themselves domineering qualities, and with the best of intentions in the world any one of us may become servile to any mode of work. Hence, it is necessary to survey them all and while critically estimating their significance for comprehensive social progress, work out a plan of procedure which will make sure that no well-intentioned effort shall be thwarted through badly directed methods.

Likewise it is evident that any program that has held or holds the interest of any considerable group must have some merit. Many such programs have been proposed, but most of them are tainted with a

certain absolutism of form, and democracy cannot make progress by absolute steps. Its programs must be hypothetic and subject to criticism and reconstruction. The full meaning of this will dawn upon us slowly. Perhaps some contrasts will help to establish the point. In this chapter we shall consider certain programs, most of which bear the taint of absolutism and finality. These programs are useful and helpful in so far as they forecast a fairer, finer future. They are hindrances in so far as they insist upon the absolute character of that future.

Out of the wide variety of points of view three types of program of a more conservative character may be mentioned:

*Laissez Faire*—The program of community salvation by "letting well enough alone."

*Individualism*—The program of community salvation by individual progress.

*"Business Common Sense"*—The program of community salvation by concentration on the production of wealth.

"*Laissez Faire*" insists that all restrictive measures in social policy are bad because they disturb the natural course of events. Regulation is unwise because it forces men's actions into artificial lines, whereas it would be much better to let them follow natural lines. Men have the natural right to carry on their economic affairs as they choose, and they have found in practice that interference and regulation produce evil

rather than good. Hence there should be no supervision by the government over matters of labor, wages, hours, industry, commerce, agriculture, or other elements of production, distribution, exchange or consumption. Government should have but three functions, viz., to protect the nation from external attack, to protect individuals from injustice or violence at the hands of other individuals, and to carry on educational and other institutions of a general utility.\*

Individualism holds that men have some responsibility for their own welfare, but that responsibility is of the individual, by the individual, and for the individual. The best social progress will come from that "enlightened selfishness" which makes each individual supremely concerned about his own affairs. For the welfare of the state is assured in the welfare of each individual. The basis of this individualism is in what Samuel Smiles called "self help." This is the root of all genuine growth in individuals, and when it is exhibited universally in the members of a community or a state it constitutes the only permanent and dependable basis of national strength and well-being.† Such a doctrine certainly carries us into healthier social areas than the doctrine of *laissez faire*; but it still leaves us far behind the advanced position which social thinking and community responsibility is taking to-day.

\* Cheney: Industrial and Social History of England, p. 224 ff.

† Smiles: Self-Help, p. 1-2.

"Business common sense" holds that the welfare of the community is obviously determined by the production of wealth, hence every obstacle to the largest possible production of wealth must be removed. Employers of labor must be freed from all molestation in the management of their business; they must be assured of the right to determine the amount and quality of production, the systems of distribution, and the use of methods and systems of payment of wages which are just and equitable.

Wages must not be dictated by persons or organizations not directly concerned in the contract. Strikes are indefensible, and all questions of conditions of labor must be adjusted by methods that will preserve the rights of both parties. Workers have the right to organize, but such organizations have no right to interfere with the perfect liberty of contract as between employers and employees. There must be no discrimination as to membership in the union, and all questions of discharge of workers must be left absolutely to the employment management.

The salvation of our social order according to this view lies in the turning over of the complete control of all the processes of production and distribution of wealth to these managers of industry. They identify this program with an ancient "American doctrine." It unquestionably does hark back to the old pioneering days when each employee met personally his employer in the small industries of the time, and

bargained man to man for wages. But it is antiquated doctrine in these days of great industry, when the employer can no longer know his employees personally.\*

These social programs admit certain gaps in the welfare of the community. Many of these are due to the existence of individuals who are defective, mentally, physically, or morally, and who, under any sort of social program, must be taken into separate account. But other gaps are caused by the failure of some individuals to accept their responsibility. Hence, even under such programs "social work" is necessary. But each particular item of the work is a case by itself. Hence social method takes the form of "case work" predominantly.

*Case Work*—Modern social work has largely devoted itself to the care of individuals, either singly or in family groups. Following the best standards, "case workers" have sought to know their "cases" fully and specifically; to consider them in relation to their history, family connections, economic relationships, and the like; and to prescribe for them in the light of the best available knowledge. It is often charged that these prescriptions have been of the nature of local palliatives, such as charitable relief of a temporary sort. Such relief has had at times a ponderous quality that has made it almost inhuman.

\* Reconstruction Programs—Weeks, p. 38.  
Tressal: Ragged Trousered Philanthropists.

As social problems have developed and social intelligence has grown "case work" has undergone severe criticism and reconstruction. Under any form of social order case work in the sense of interest in individuals and groups must exist. But it is not by itself sufficient. Those most interested in this method are concerned to-day to make it a vital and integral part of the general program of social betterment, and to rescue it from a former reputation as being the method by which general industrial brutality glossed over its own evils. In this movement case work is coming to be more definitely educational in purpose, more concerned with mental and moral adjustments of individuals or family groups, and more ready to turn over the socially preventable forms of maladjustment to educational and legislative agencies.

Not far removed from these individualistic programs is the religious doctrine of the so-called evangelical churches which holds that the community can be saved only by the conversion of individuals. They would substitute for the natural community, a new community made up of "brands snatched from the burning." The true community is, therefore, just this "communion of the saints." This program does not contemplate the permeation of the natural community by the spirit of brotherhood so much as the setting up of the religious structure as the community. "Man himself is still the greatest element in his own problem. How is he to be made new? We are back once

more at the beginning and the last word is the first: ye must be born again."\* That is to say, conversion of the individual is the method by which this new community is to be gradually built up.†

Passing now to a somewhat less traditional conception of social welfare, we come to the program of liberalism,—or the salvation of the community by mending the flaws in the structure. Liberals generally contend that the prevailing order of society is essentially sound and that its achievements are essentially just and beneficial, but they admit that there are certain flaws lurking in the social situation which must be mended. These flaws are not indicative of organic ill in the social order. They are accidental, and therefore capable of being cured without any extreme reorganization. The past twenty-five years have seen real progress. Some of the main abuses of the old economic order have been cured. Collective bargaining has advanced; women and children have been protected; safety and sanitation in work places secured; industrial insurance legislation has been enacted; and in general the rights and claims of labor have been recognized.

Other evils which still exist will be cured in a

\* Spear: *The New Opportunity of the Church*, p. 31.

† It is true that the Protestant denominations have worked out well-developed programs of social legislation, whose ultimate result would be the re-making of our present natural community. There is a certain logical conflict between the traditional method of the churches and this new social program. Catholics and Jews have also given expression to these same social ideas.



variety of ways, among them being the development of co-partnerships and co-operative societies. These developments will be very slow, but that has been true of all enduring improvements. Hence, liberalism depends most completely upon the development of education, particularly the education of the children. In fact it is quite likely that the significance of education as a means of social reform has been overdone by liberals.

The doctrine that society can be remade through the education of the children is a favorite doctrine of democracy, and while it holds certain elements of truth, it is primarily an expression of social indolence. All that we hope for in society we are willing to put off until the next generation, if it involves any degree of sacrifice on our own part; but the various evils of society which are dear to ourselves we can scarcely think of giving up in this generation. This doctrine goes so far at times as to suggest that we teach children to be honest, industrious, thrifty, self-sacrificing, in the midst of a social order that holds such virtues to be evidences of weakness. In other words, we are trying to cure with a little schoolish talk what we are maintaining as an integral part of our community life.

The doctrine that the social order will be saved by the next generation, that is, by little children, is the lineal descendant of that old pharisaic attitude which was described by the great Teacher in his charge against the Pharisees, "Ye bind burdens heavy to be borne upon the backs of little children, but ye will not

yourselves so much as touch them with the tips of your fingers." The fact is that the education of children will have only incidental influence on the general social situation until such time as the school is recognized as an institution of progress rather than of mere conservation, and teachers come to have a more vital relationship to the actual social world in which they themselves live.

It is doubtful whether the education of children can ever get far ahead of the education of the community as a whole. In fact it seems obvious that though the technique of school room procedure is very complete the actual outcome of school education is very unsatisfactory because so much of what goes on in school is irrelevant to the life of the community. It is as if a flour mill were to spend much time grinding out some indigestible substance like wood pulp: the technique of the performance might be admirable, the outcome imposing, but the amount of nourishment furnished to the community would be negligible. Hence it is likely that before our schools can get much farther a more thoroughgoing social understanding must pervade the community, permitting such readjustment of the schools to life as will guarantee the actual relevance of their performance.

However, adult education, as the British report of 1918 insists, cannot be considered apart from those social and industrial conditions which determine in large measure the actual life and outlook of men and

women. "The quality of an educational system must always depend to a large extent upon the economic framework of the society in which it is placed," says this report.\* Hence, any program of adult education must not blink the fact that it may develop into a definite movement toward community reorganization.

But at present certain obstacles block the way to any complete program of education for the adult worker. The hours of labor are too long; overtime work saps the energies; changes of shift disarrange hours of leisure; night work tends to "unnatural" routines. Many types of work are so monotonous that the worker must devote all his leisure to recuperation. Some types of work are heavy and exhausting beyond ready recovery. Frequent periods of unemployment discourage workers and divert their attention from study. Extra-periods of leisure of a regular sort are infrequent. And beyond these facts are certain "questions of the relation of the whole industrial organization to the intellectual æsthetic and spiritual life of the nation."

Every sort of program of progress implies a more effective and more intelligent citizenship. The democratic reorganization of the political life was but the first in a series of probable reorganizations, each one of which puts new demands upon the intelligence of the members of the community. The reorganization of industry along democratic lines will make necessary a very wide diffusion of knowledge of industrial pro-

\* Parliamentary Report of Committee on Adult Education, 1918, p. 3.

cesses, both mechanical and executive. We are in the midst of new conditions; we shall never return to the old stupidities. But it is not lack of good will that stands in our way. We need real intelligence as the basis of bold and clear thinking. The whole life of the community must be concerned in the future of education. Good will without intellectual effort is worse than useless; it becomes a moral opiate. Whatever the social program of the future may be, adult education must be one of the effective methods of its realization.

In the midst of the growing complications of social problems there are some who seek either to solve these problems or to escape from them by retreating into some more simple social condition of the past. Some would do this by direct method, for example, by legislating complicated conditions out of existence. The legislation which attempts to restore competitive conditions in industry and to dissolve great industrial combinations looks to this end. President Wilson's "New Freedom" heralded such a result.

Others would bring about this end by more indirect methods. The originators of the program of single tax had this outcome largely in mind. Henry George felt that his program would bring about conditions in which human nature could develop what is best instead of what is worst in it. He argued that it would permit enormous increase in the production of wealth, that it would secure an equitable distribution of this wealth, that it would solve the labor problem,

that it would make unearned property impossible, that it would check the greed of gain, and that it would open to all, even to the poorest, the advantages of advancing civilization, and thus would really "clear the way for the coming of that Kingdom of right and justice for which the Master told His disciples to pray and work."

The significance of the single tax program has shifted somewhat, however, since the days of Henry George. Land has ceased to be the chief basis of wealth, and therefore a single tax on land would probably not assure the social reconstruction that it once promised. But some such tax program seems necessary in order to end the intolerable exploitations from which our communities now suffer. Tax reform will be a factor in any comprehensive social program. But probably no single measure out of the past will solve the problems of the present and future. The future of our community life does not lie behind us.

We are compelled therefore to accept these social problems as tasks which the social inventiveness of the whole community must face. One of the elements of the community which in recent decades has been attempting to contribute its proper share to the solution of these problems (even to the extent of making more problems) is the "labor group." Practically the trades unions occupy the position of the advocates of "enlightened selfishness." They have organized for the purpose of protecting themselves primarily along

economic lines. At times these organizations have been controlled by certain limited skilled groups and have protected themselves against both the employer and the unskilled laborer. But more recently the feeling of the solidarity of the labor group has grown in some places to overwhelming proportions. And with this growth the labor program has become more definitely social, interesting itself in all phases of the worker's welfare. In certain quarters it has even proposed a political program of social reform.

The question of method to be employed in the achievement of these social-economic ideals has divided labor opinion into three main movements. The more conservative group holds that the welfare of the trades union movement can best be secured through adhering to the principle of collective bargaining and through supporting those political candidates and principles which are not inimical to labor interests. The moderate group holds that the welfare of the labor movement can be secured only through the development of a definite labor party, which will fight for the program of social legislation favored by the best labor intelligence. The radical wing of the labor movement holds that neither collective bargaining nor indirect political action is able to accomplish anything effective for the workers; they emphasize some form of "direct action" as the only effective means of advancing their "cause."

"Collective bargaining" assumes the essential per-

manence of the present industrial system with its conflict of interest between capitalist and laborer. It aims to reduce this conflict to the minimum and to regulate it in the interests of justice.

The method of social progress by legislation is properly designated "indirect action" in distinction from the program of certain economic elements which undertake to bring about social readjustment through direct economic processes. The program of indirect action assumes that while the major problem of readjustment to-day is economic, legislation must furnish the intelligent background of general principles in accordance with which particular cases can be solved. Political action does not attempt, generally speaking, to cure a specific economic ill by some specific act or regulation, but rather to direct the whole economic situation in such a way as to cure a whole class of such ills. This is the basis of the doctrine that a sound democratic government must be "a government of laws and not of men," meaning that the particular personal element must be eliminated from all specific adjustments, leaving a generalized principle to serve as the basis of social organization. These generalized principles promise the development of a great structure of social order; frequently they permit particular injustices, and not infrequently they make necessary long delays in the adjustment of social difficulties. This has given rise to strains of discontent; it has been the cause of much criticism of both the structure of

law and its modes of administration; and it has been the chief reason for the development of the doctrine that there is no hope for real social progress in this indirect or political action.

It is quite evident, therefore, that law as a method of social reform is under the necessity of justifying itself to large elements in the population. To many law seems not so much a means of securing progressive justice as a means of maintaining stagnant and antiquated injustices. Most democrats, however, believe that law is the chief reliance of the people in any continuous program of social progress, and that the difficulty lies not so much in the method as in the antiquated content of legal enactment, the tendency of both legislatures and courts to follow precedent.

There has been, therefore, in recent years, a considerable development in the direction of what has come to be called "social legislation," meaning thereby a type of enactment which deals more directly with particular social situations, making a compromise between the concrete personal element and the old abstract legal element. This social legislation has had a tremendous development in England and America in the past two decades, but it had its greatest development in Germany in a period dating back still earlier. In this movement certain old generalized principles of legality were discarded and laws were made which specified in minute detail conditions of life and work; and in America at least these were so much at vari-



ance with the prevailing legal attitudes of the courts that the first of these laws were almost everywhere declared unconstitutional. For example, a law passed by the legislature of Illinois in 1895 limiting the day's work for women to ten hours was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it interfered with freedom of contract of the individual woman. Fifteen years later the supreme court of Illinois decided that a similar bill limiting the day's work to eight hours was constitutional on the ground that under the clause defining the police powers of the state the constitution granted the legislature full power to protect the health of the people of the state. So by a shift of constitutional ground the courts were finally induced by the incessant labors of a few social minded workers to permit the retention of this social legislation without amendment to the constitution.

But everywhere in America the courts have been suspicious of all such legislative enactments, though the practice seems slowly gaining more general recognition. Some writers are warning us that the tendency towards social legislation carries with it a very great danger. They believe that the tendency which was evident in Germany is growing also in England and America to the extent that under the development of this kind of legislation the common run of people will be compelled to work for capitalistic industries in return for a secure livelihood. Minimum wage laws, employer's liability laws, and other forms

of social legislation, are cited as evidence that this type of social adjustment may result in the legal recognition of the state's right to compel the worker to work under regulations laid down by law, whether he consents or not.\*

The problem of social progress by means of legislation is therefore not so simple as some would have us believe. Newspaper headlines carry the doctrine "The government is absolute." But this is true only within limits. In dealing with a fraction of one per cent of the population the government may exhibit great ardor and show absolute front, but in the presence of a problem involving any considerable percentage of the people the government may well consider whether too great absolutism of attitude may not now as often in the past result in its own destruction.

The third and radical wing of the labor movement has developed the doctrine that the only hope of progress is through some form of direct economic reconstruction. The laggard quality of law and its seeming inability to deal with specific injustices tend to make them look in other directions. For the most part this takes the form, first of an effort to "educate" the employing or so-called "exploiting" class in the community. This education attempts to bring home to the employers the importance of labor's share in production

\* cf. Belloc: *The Servile State*.

The workings of the new Industrial Disputes Law in Kansas will help to determine this question.

by showing how intimate in the process of production the laborer really stands. For example, he slows down on the work intentionally, doing just as little for his wage as he can do. The word "sabot" is the French word for a clumsy wooden shoe worn by French peasants and workers, which seriously impedes action: hence sabotage means slowing down. Of course the word has been expanded to cover a good many other forms of obstruction: for example, in western logging camps the advocates of direct action have been accused of driving spikes into sawlogs for the purpose of putting the saw out of business; of putting fragments of metal into bearings for the purpose of destroying machinery; and of attempting in many other ingenious ways to destroy the efficiency of the tools of industry. This process is primarily for the purpose of making the employer realize that without the full co-operation of labor industry could be put completely out of business. The fuller program seems to assume that when once the employer or "exploiter" understands this fact he will just naturally quit and turn his business over to the laborers.

It is very doubtful whether the psychology of sabotage runs in the direction of success. Men are not much frightened by frightful things. It is likely that that form of sabotage which consists in destroying machinery and tools will necessarily defeat its own purpose; but it is conceivable that a sabotage of mere

slowing down, the so-called "strike on the job," might succeed in forcing considerable economic reconstruction.

Certain students of current economic conditions are saying that the older instincts of workmanship and work habits of the more primitive days are being disintegrated under present economic conditions, and that sabotage is merely an evidence of the failure of current industrial motives to stimulate effective work; that wages, loyalty to employers, subordination to economic conditions, and fear of the police or military, alike fail to motivate productive industry. From this point of view, sabotage is not so much a settled determination of working groups as it is the natural result of the failure of adequate stimulation. Muscles grow flabby, and nerves grow slack, and the will fails, because the personal energies of the individual are not sufficiently released in the task; and they are not sufficiently released because his personal interests are not sufficiently engaged. Sabotage is therefore primarily a negative protest against the conditions of industry, and it is extremely doubtful whether such a negative protest could ever be transformed into a positive program or into a substantial basis for social progress. The hope entertained by some groups, therefore, that sabotage will prove to be an effective social method, seems futile. At the best it can only show the insufficiency of certain present industrial conditions; at the worst it can destroy the morale of the workers practic-

ing it. It can never provide a more adequate organization of industry or a more desirable world.\*

Direct action logically implies the possibility of general revolution. The apparently impenetrable quality of much of our institutional life seems to certain extremists to leave no escape but revolution. When institutions become absolute and impregnable they will likely yield to no simpler remedy than absolutism of reform,—and this may mean revolution. This happened at the close of the mediæval period.

To be sure, history shows us few instances of this sort. But underneath all other modes of social progress or all other methods of achieving social welfare runs this universal groping toward a belief in the ultimate justification of violence in the remaking of institutions. It may be a counsel of despair, but it is certain that many of the brightest names in human history are names of the leaders of successful revolutions. These leaders, however, are not usually associated with the violent aspects of revolution, though they may have accepted the necessity of violence as a means of escape from the iron-clad qualities of institutions.

It may be assumed that the world will correct any evil toward which it can be made to direct its attention. The difficulty in traditional social orders is that

\* Marot: *American Trade Unions*, Ch. on Direct Action.  
Spargo: *Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism and Socialism*.  
Tridon: *The New Unionism*, Ch. 3.  
Pouget: *Sabotage*.

the attention rarely turns toward the evils, which are organized into the very structure of institutions. Violence becomes a means of centering attention towards the evils of the situation, and the great leaders of revolution have been men who have brought forth positive and constructive gains out of the ruins of old institutions destroyed by violence. Revolution is justified in the Declaration of Independence and wrought into fixed institution in the American Constitution. Revolution is of course to be justified only as an extreme recourse. But not all the sophisms of Bourbon fears can destroy the beliefs of men that when a social system has become unendurable they have the right to change it.

But revolution need not be violent. A peaceful revolution is conceivable. Those fundamental changes in our economic and social structure which will complete the democratic reorganization begun on political lines more than a hundred years ago, might be achieved without violent overthrow of existent forms. The outcome, however, might be some distinctively new social order. It might be, for example, some form of socialism.

Many types of doctrine have been included under the general name of socialism. These range all the way from the barest social opportunism to the most extreme absolutism of Marx's economic determinism, and from the most simple co-operation to an extreme state socialism. All these types are agreed in one par-

ticular, namely, that the present production of wealth involves enormous waste and that the whole process of industry must be brought under a more complete intelligence both as to its production and as to its distribution. That is to say, every type of socialism insists that industrial processes shall be administered in the interests of public welfare rather than in the interests of private profit. This involves the substitution for the capitalist wage system of a system of completely socialized industries, owned by all the people and serving all the people democratically. The achievement of this result will be revolution. Whether it shall be the quiet result of revolution or some more violent and sudden overthrow of the existent order, various groups of socialists do not agree. The extreme right assumes that the result will come gradually. The extreme left looks for some historic catastrophe which will precipitate the new system. This was the hope of Marx, and his followers profess to see its fulfillment in the recent developments in Russia.

In all the western democracies the more moderate forms of socialism have gradually achieved a certain standing through demonstrating actual results. These forms are scarcely distinguishable from many of the current programs of individuals and groups who would hesitate to admit that they were socialists. A democratic socialism assumes the possibility of such a universal intelligence as will enable all normal members of the community to share in the understanding

and control of all the activities that affect in any way the common welfare. A state socialism works toward the assumption by the central governmental agencies of the ownership and control of all the activities that affect in any way the common welfare. A guild socialism assumes that each particular organization of industry will own and control its own instrumentalities, and by operating these in the interest of the common welfare, will through co-operation with all other such groups contribute to the common welfare.

All these forms exist or are coming into existence slowly but surely under democratic developments, not avowedly but in substance. Only the more extreme types of socialism are radically revolutionary. The moderate types are largely at one with all the more intelligent liberal groups of the community who are working for social progress through education and legislation. In a sense all intelligent people to-day are socialists and revolutionists,—they are determined to make a social order in which the instrumentalities of the common life shall be redeemed from their traditional devotion to private interests; in which more largely the good of all shall be the concern of all.

But this brings us to the community, with its challenging inadequacy of organization, with its promises of unrealized development.\*

\* Illustrations of various concrete forms of community organizations may be found in the appendix.



## CHAPTER VIII

### OBSTRUCTIONS

As we face the long array of social defects in the average community,—the inefficiencies, the broken lives, decadent institutions, wasted enthusiasms, and spent hopes, on the one hand, and then turn to the array of ideals, expectations, and aspirations of the best spirits of the community, the wonder grows why progress lags and why the better day of community is so slow in coming.

But community progress is a continuous compromise between old levels of ignorant habit and the demands of changing conditions. Mankind is ever prone to bear the evils that exist, fearing to change lest worse evils may come.

In the development of democracy the first general movement was away from organization. Absolute monarchies, despotisms, and even the benevolent governments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all expressed the autocratic over-organization of society. The trend toward democracy was motivated partly by the desire to escape from this over-organization. "That government is best which governs least."

In its extremest form, this movement developed the extraordinary simplicity of the Jeffersonian regime.

But democracy is more than an escape from old mechanisms. Democracy must necessarily construct new institutional forms and new social mechanisms for the satisfying of its own needs and the release of its own still largely unexpressed life. That is to say, democracy is to be achieved not in the freedom of unorganization, but in the working out of new and more completely democratic types of community organization.

There is as yet however little understanding of the essential technique of democratic organization as distinct from autocratic forms. Few realize that democracy must definitely disavow autocratic types of organization and build up its own types. To esteem this task lightly, to assume that the democratic spirit can live and thrive in an order organized along autocratic lines, is to fail to grasp the essentially natural character of the processes of community. This new and splendid spirit cannot live healthily in old shells. Yet that is largely what we are asking it to do, and what we are likely to continue to expect.

Our very loyalties stand in the way of change,—loyalties to our classes and our institutions. We feel the safety of the community resting upon our resistance to disintegrating changes. Vested wrongs of many kinds in the community depend upon and exploit these native loyalties for profit. Old forms of

parasitic industry, business that robs the poor, finance using the "black hand" and covering up its sins with a mantle of gentle charity, intolerant repression of science and thinking in the name of "patriotism," "Americanism," or some other specious phrase—these are illustrations of the endless story. The resultant poverty, low vitality, illiteracy, abnormality, repression, viciousness, discouragement, and the like, are items in the same story. Our wills are weak, our lives are short and careful, and we wait to let the next generation solve its own problems. But we need to notice here some elements that will obstruct any program of community organization,—both passively and actively.

In the first place, we shrink from facing issues. Our institutional attitudes do not favor careful thinking. Most of our social institutions are not only conservative in character, they are pessimistic. That is to say, they feel that their control of the community assures the safety of the world; any escape from this control is likely to be dangerous. Schools distrust learning achieved outside the school. States are frightened by the non-conformist. The church used to burn heretics, and still ostracises them. Competitive industry thinks of the co-operative or the communist as a traitor to economic welfare. The non-conformist is welcomed in the realm of science only; and science has not largely invaded the philosophy of either the school or the state, either the church or competitive industry.

These autocratic social attitudes tend to develop into fixed folkways which are able to carry themselves on from generation to generation without effort. Left to itself human nature easily sinks into habit, custom, and the folkway. For this reason autocracy is more truly "natural" than is democracy,—just as the sour seedling apple is more truly "natural" than the modern juicy variety. And just as the finer breeds of plants and animals must be conserved by intelligent selection, so the finer strains of social organization must be saved by selection, adaptation and development. For example, not every sort of school is to be accepted as democratic; most of our present schools are still highly autocratic, and our democratic aspirations have to overcome the obstacle of an autocracy inculcated in the children. Democracy will some day learn the absurdity and extreme danger of this type of education.

In this connection, we must consider what may be called the "dead-hand" of organization. Old types of method control our leaderships, and old types of emotion control our feelings. The schoolman teaches his languages as if they were dead, and his history as if it had no significance for the present. The churchman hands down unchanged the "faith once delivered to the saints." The politician is devoted to the words, at least, spoken by the fathers of the Constitution. All our institutions tend to be interested in statistics. Churches have been charged with laying large empha-

sis upon tables of memberships, while they neglect the weightier matters such as justice, mercy and truth. The old lady who got much religious inspiration out of hearing her pastor say "Mesopotamia" could scarcely be expected to share largely in more modern democratic emotions.

A strange contradiction appears in the industrial and business leader. In dealing with all physical materials, and in connection with the organization of the productive side of plant or industry, he welcomes all sorts of labor-saving devices and rewards the inventor highly. But on the side of the distribution of the wealth produced and in connection with the problems of human welfare he is intolerant still for the most part. Any working man who can show how production can be speeded up is likely to be looked upon with favor; change is welcomed at this point. But any working man or other individual who seeks to show how wealth can be distributed more equitably is likely to be set down as a dangerous agitator.

Aside from these institutional inertias there are certain more active obstructionist forces in the community. One of these is the so-called "organ of public opinion" in which public opinion has really no initiative. The term "newspaper" is a misnomer. Ferrero, the Italian historian of the early Roman Empire, has pointed out that any so-called organ of public opinion is always an agency for the perpetuation of a particular partisan legend. "Newspapers" fear lest the

people may learn to think for themselves; "newspapers" believe that the people should be protected from themselves; and this leads to deliberate attempts to betray the public by false reports of facts,—at least by false emphasis upon facts or by editorial misinterpretation of fairly accurate reports.

Another of these active obstructionist elements is the superstition that only the so-called "practical man" can be trusted with the affairs of the world. This practical man is the product of fixed traditions, for the most part, and has no patience with theory or science except insofar as they tend to bolster up his narrow practicality.

This practical man is always a natural psychologist. He knows how to manipulate individuals and groups without being suspected. He can play upon human feelings, such as cupidity, fear and social antagonism, with natural skill; but traditionally he manipulates individuals and groups not with a view to the welfare of the community, but in the light of some private interest.

When this practical man turns organizer he is in danger of overlooking essential human elements in the community's life. As a matter of fact, these human elements are difficult to deal with from the standpoint of organization. They will not conform. Individuals are angular; they have initiatives that crop out in the most unexpected and even awkward connections. People who ought to be able to fit in and do

things show no capacity; others who seem to have no natural fitness for sharing in plans may show the most extraordinary capacity for things that are being accomplished. Not infrequently the organizer may find himself confronted by individuals of a more talented character than himself. A whole range of such "lost talent" may be uncovered in any community. The democratic community must make sure that the individual is never lost.

The fact is that the work of the so-called "practical man" and of the traditional organizer has been overdone. We need avenues for the release of the life of the people beyond the control of these traditional forces. We need to get rid of sham forms of political representation, which do not represent; and leaderships which do not express the actual will of the people who are being led. How shall we really enfranchise the people and get their thinking playing into actual political situations until government shall really be "by the people"? At present when agitators urge revolution they are advised that in America we have adequate means of progress in the ballot. When, following this advice, they organize for political adventure in new directions, refusing to align themselves with old political parties, they are denounced as enemies of the people, as un-American, and given whatever other question-begging epithet may be the fashion at the moment. The fact is that vested interests in both politics and economics identify "Americanism" and

"patriotism" with maintenance of the *status quo*; and are as much opposed to political or economic change brought about by the ballot box as by a more violent revolution.

Another of these obstructionist elements is found in the very wide development of all sorts of social distractions and sedatives, more or less intentionally designed to keep the public quiet and to make opinion innocuous. The historic example of this of course is the method of keeping the Roman populace in control by rations of bread and tickets to the circus. Much of our own commercialized amusement like baseball and other games, sports and athletics, occupying as they do a disproportionate part of the space in our newspapers, tend to distract public attention from important matters. This of course does not mean that there is no place in the world for sport. But it does mean that in a democracy there is no such place for commercialized sport as has been developed in America.

A favorite means of wrecking a community program is found in starting an outside demonstration. It is like the old means of breaking up a liberal meeting by starting a dog fight. Opponents of community development are extremely active in starting and accelerating inter-communal rivalries and feuds. Manipulators of special privilege in any particular community, finding their standing threatened by the development of a community program, will throw dust in the air and denounce the evils of some neighboring



community, especially by trying to show how the neighboring community is impinging upon the prerogatives of the home community. Thus attention will be called off from the evils within the community for a time, and the manipulator of these vested evils may even be able to win to himself the reputation of being a good citizen.

The saloon was in its day one of the leading centers of community intelligence and gang exploitation by political and economic agents of invisible government and reaction. Drink was one of the greatest of social sedatives. Some even advocate the return of the saloon to our industrial centers on the ground that multitudes of working men now have no quick means of spending their money, hence they have too much time on their hands and therefore tend to fall into the bad habit of talking politics and reading economics, and so threaten to become socialists, communists, I. W. W.'s, bolshevists, and the like. Certain labor leaders and industrial operators alike agree that men were better controlled in the old days when it was possible for them to get drunk and "blow in" six months' wages in a single night. The abolition of the saloon was one of the most terrific blows that vested wrong ever received.

A fourth of these obstructive elements is to be found in the general fragmentation of social interest. There is a curious but intelligible demand on the part of traditionalists that there shall be no talk about *the*

social question since there is no such thing. The traditionalists insist that there may be many incidental social problems, but each is to be solved by itself and not to be confused with any general social problem. Hence there must not be one big labor union, since, for some insidious reason, that would be revolution. If there are to be labor unions at all they must be weak and small. After the same fashion we must not have too much talk about community, since that seems to be treason to class and institution. A politician asserts that one of the chief objections to woman's suffrage is found in the fact that women are naturally non-partisan; that it is difficult to make them partisan; but that the only safety to our American institutions is in escaping from the evils of non-partisanship into the security of an emphatic partisanship. Finally, there must not be too much talk about internationalism, since that is treason to the particular nation.

That is to say, in all our social efforts we are handicapped by the demand that we shall think only of fragments of the problem, never of the problem as a whole. Now since the human mind inevitably approaches any problem from the standpoint of logical wholeness, the demand that we shall think only of a fragment necessarily converts that fragment into a complete whole. Hence, traditionalists are perfectly sincere in their contention that each fragment of the social problem is a complete problem by itself. But a little knowledge of the community as a whole must convince us that there

is one general social problem of which each of these so-called social problems is but a fragment; while a little knowledge of psychology and logic would show us convincingly how easy it is for us to become stranded in some psychological "blind alley," which naturally converts itself into a sociological "blind alley," which in turn transforms itself into a finished world from which any effort to escape would be of the nature of treason.

A final obstructionist element to which attention should be called is that extreme radicalism which will have nothing at all unless it can have everything. In the practical sense there are many community problems. Community organization does not demand that nothing shall be done unless everything can be done; it merely demands that whatever is done, however small and incidental, shall be done in the view of the whole problem. A reactionaryism that sees nothing but fragments of problems, and a radicalism that sees nothing but one big problem to be solved by revolution, are both alike obstructions to the main task of social progress. That great task is to see the problem as a whole in its infinite variety of special phases; to see it grow larger and more detailed as our acquaintance with theory and fact grows; and to hitch up the many varieties of social effort with the many varieties of social need in such ways that workers will feel their own common fellowship in a common task because they see the part that each particular aspect of the

problem holds to the problem as a whole. In this way social workers would become transformed into community organizers, and their social work would lose its remote, often irrelevant, contradictory and mechanical character, and, being criticized by the needs of the community as a whole, would become human and social.

Every new way of thinking about the world and about human relationships confronts established obstacles. And the fight is not over when these have been overcome. For any movement as it develops confronts within itself some of these same obstacles. The hardening process of traditionalism sets in; the "dead-hand" of organization asserts itself; the leaders become impatient of new suggestions and of wider theory. Obstructions are not overcome once and for all in a democracy. The price of democracy is eternal vigilance.

There are multitudes to-day who feel that the world needs some sort of reconstruction, but who do not care to be reconstructed themselves. They want change without being changed. They want leaders who can tell them how they can advance without making effort or without consenting to change within themselves. These individuals, whether conservative or radical, lack social imagination. Their logic is very faulty. Only in an unreal dream world do such things happen. The hope of community waits upon the willingness and capacity of all to become communal in spirit and in truth.

## CHAPTER IX

### DEVELOPING COMMUNITY DELIBERATION

MOST of our communities have been the result of historic accident modified now and then by incidental thinking, by class and group pressures, or by something in the nature of revolution. What is here proposed, what indeed is of the very genius of democracy, is a program deliberately and definitely thought out and wrought into the structure of habit and institution by the intelligent will of the community.\*

This is not new. It has been accomplished occasionally in specific directions, notably in city planning and health programs. But it is not a universal practice, and it has been adopted as a general program dealing with all the interests of the community nowhere.

There has been in American public life little understanding of the essentially democratic principle that the various parties to a community argument should sit down together and try to come to a conclusion as to what is for the best interests of the community as a whole,—facing the facts and the theories in the case, and accepting the consequences intelligently set forth. Rather, each side to the argument tries to get ahead of

\* Graham Wallas: *The Great Society*, Ch. 11.

the other and "put over" a partisan plan. That is supposed to be the manly and heroic thing. Deliberation is supposed to be effeminate if not childish. In spite of all our talk about "team work" and our supposed adherence to the team spirit in our games, an open fight in which sheer will or pugnacity leads and in which intelligence is at a discount, is looked upon as the proper procedure. And a discussion won by obstinacy is regarded as much more worthy than one won by deliberation.

The main reason for this lies in the fact that the technique of democratic deliberation has not been adequately worked out anywhere. It is folly to assume that a deliberated program will just naturally happen. It is still greater folly perhaps to assume that the community will just naturally produce deliberation and a deliberated program. There is at present no such thing as a community mind definitely set at the task of deliberating upon a community program. Democracy's salvation depends upon the development of such a community organ of intelligence,—a social mind, capable of critical analysis and deliberative synthesis of a program fitted to the needs of the community when those needs are examined democratically. This will involve the working out of a definite plan of democratic deliberation. The importance of this must first be considered.

Any program of community organization must be saved from being identified with any particular fragment or group or interest or institution of the com-

munity.\* This means a number of things: first, it must be saved from being made too completely a municipal function as long as municipal control continues as at the present time in America to be frequently either inefficient through favoritism and bureaucratic methods, or else distinctly undemocratic because the municipal government represents something less than the whole community. Recreation programs, for example, under the control of the municipal authorities have been known to become the private possession of some particular group.

The program must be more than the reiteration of some old custom. It must take into account hitherto ignored needs of the people, especially those underlying instinctive needs and longings which our old-time puritanism has labelled evil.

On the other hand, the program must be something more than a merely temporary exhibition of impulse. The instinctive needs of the community must be definitely included in the working out of the program, but the program itself must go far beyond impulse and the moment and provide for the larger development of the growing future. This means that it must use all available insight that psychology and the social sciences can bring to bear on the problems of the present.†

In other words, the program that is worthy of the

\*Elsie Clews Parsons: *Social Freedom*.

† Whitehead: *The Organization of Thought*—Ch. 6.  
Lankaster: *The Kingdom of Man*.

Russell, B.: *Why Men Fight*—Chs. on Thought and Education.

future of a democratic community must be thoroughly intelligent, rising above every particular group interest and yet co-ordinating all normal and essential group and individual aspirations into a common aspiration. This of course might mean the complete subordination of every particular interest to one common central dominating and narrow aim. This seems to have been the main mistake which Germany made before the war. Such a mistake is, however, not possible in an intelligent program. An intelligent program will see the necessity of making every normal interest important, thereby saving it from over-emphasis on any particular aspect and maintaining a richness and variety of interest. This will mean that always there will be a healthy play of conflicting aspirations among the specialized groups and interests of the community. Now, if this conflict of interests is animated by good will and a common outlook its existence will be extremely wholesome. If it becomes bitter and rancorous it is undesirable. But it is far better that a community should be animated now and then by bitter animosities, even, than that it should be sunk in a spiritual torpor in which some particular materialistic interest domineers over and sneers at all other latent and dormant interests of the community. There is one thing more undesirable than a community feud; and that is community stupor.

How, then, shall this deliberative, analytic, critical organ of social thinking be secured for the com-



munity? It would be encouraging if we could believe that the whole community could be at once interested in its important problems. But that would be a rash assumption. Doubtless thinking can be secured only through the organization of a deliberative group or groups who will be able to bring to the uses of the community all the pertinent knowledge the community needs, together with analytic and critical ability in the handling of that knowledge, and some spirited social imagination in the working out of programs for the future. Such groups should be small enough to enable the members to deliberate truly, and yet large enough to provide actual representation of all the essential interests of the community. This means, first, that the group will probably be limited to not more than twenty, since larger numbers would require a formal sort of parliamentary procedure, which is the surest means of destroying deliberation. Fifteen members would probably be more desirable than twenty. At any rate, the number should be such that informal discussion, without too much "recognition" by the chair, may be carried on.

In the second place, if such a board is to represent the varied interests of the community we shall do well to make some approximate catalogue of those essential interests. Usually when we speak of interests, organizations are understood to be intended. But that is not the present intention. In a certain community a Community Council was made up of delegates from vari-

ous local organizations, fraternal, commercial, religious, and the like. At the first meeting of this board a struggle for prestige began. It was necessary to determine which of these already existent organizations should dominate the Council. The second meeting began in a wrangle, and the third and final meeting broke up in a row. Our present conception of democratic co-operation is not very intelligent. It involves the old primitive fight for prestige; it demonstrates false conceptions of leadership; and it usually involves the general doctrine of "rule or ruin." The community councils of this older type are not brought together to deliberate but to express enthusiasm for some project, or to adopt and act upon a program handed down to them.

A more substantial basis on which to organize such a community group would be somewhat as follows: Instead of having representatives of particularistic organizations, let the board be made of men and women who represent vital functions in the developing intelligence of the community. What are these vital functions? Every community needs the intellectual help of trained social scientists; or, where the community is unable to secure such experts, let it call to the service of this deliberative program the men and women who have the largest possible outlook upon these social science fields. The lack of trained students is not as bad as it might be, because every community must definitely begin where it is, and there would

probably be some danger in having a deliberative group made up of men and women who were so far beyond the common life of the community as to make them unsympathetic with that common life and liable to produce a program largely irrelevant to that common life.

Every community needs the help of the best economic thinking it can secure, though at the present time few communities are prepared to admit the validity of economic thinking. Likewise, every community needs the help of the best political science it can find, the best sociological information and theory, and the best help procurable in the interpretation of common behavior,—that is, psychology. Beyond this, this community deliberative council should include a student of American history; a student of the local community's institutions and organizations; a business man who can bring to the group concrete illustrations of the way in which business men think; a leader of the moral and religious forces of the community; a school man, who can illustrate the way in which teachers think; a working man who can bring the particular point of view of workers; a representative of the æsthetic interests of the community; one who is interested in amusements and recreation; an expert in health and sanitation; a representative of the complicated problems confronting the women of the community; a representative of the young women of the community, and a representative of the young men; and the like.

This is suggestive, only, of the vital functions and

interests which are intimate in the life of the community, and which need to find expression in any deliberation of the community. These men and women should be chosen first of all because they are students. Their duty will not be to put programs into action; their duty will be to think out along the lines of community development and to work out through the long future of democracy the advancing programs which the community will do well to experiment with. It will not be their task to set up dogmatic and ultimate programs for the community. Democracy does not healthily advance that way. It will be their duty to develop hypothetic programs for the purpose of community acceptance or rejection. And they should be prepared to stand many rejections of their programs by the community.

The first task of this group will be to educate itself as to its purpose and as to its methods of procedure. Its second task will be to stimulate the development of an adequate supply of successors, probably young men and women who will want to share in the deliberative life of the community, and who will therefore want to know. Of course, any community needs more than knowledge. But that is no excuse for saying that it does not need knowledge.

More than this, setting up the possibility of having a definite share in the thinking of the community would go a long way toward stimulating some of our boys and girls to have a real interest in intellectual things

and would also help to give the schools some real reason for existence.

These men and women should not be selected because they *represent* organizations or interests. They should not *represent*,—they should *know*; they should not be propagandists or partisans, they should be, just as far as possible, scientists in their fields. They should be helped to come together in the name of the community, for the service of the community. But the community is a very complex matter in these days, and there will be much conflict of opinion. This is, in itself, the healthiest of all possible developments, provided that conflict is sincere, disinterested, and savored of a little humor. Perhaps the community leader must be able to furnish this savor. This group should meet regularly for the consideration of policies, problems, projects. Its free discussion should throw the light of all community interests upon all matters, and its decisions should represent not politics and intrigue but deliberation and sincere belief. Its results should be put freely at the service of the community.

This will be an extraordinary experiment in democracy. In small communities whose interests are still fairly homogeneous, one such group working through a period of years, taking seriously its responsibilities in bringing to the community the best results of world knowledge and broadly reconstructive social theory, with intelligent suggestion as to local applications, would serve the community need. In

larger communities made up of distinctive neighborhoods, any number of such groups might be developed. The main difficulty under our American folkways would lie in escaping from two charges that might be brought against the group. On the one hand, it might be charged with an effort to dominate the community. If any such charge were justified the functions of the group would be lost, for the only domination that can be justified in any democratic community is that of the reasonableness of the program proposed. But of course no program is going to be adopted merely because it is reasonable. On the other hand, it might be charged with being primarily or purely doctrinaire, and therefore useless. Here again the good sense of the group will save it from being so irrelevant and remote in its deliberations and proposals as to warrant the proper suspicion of the common man. The program proposed must be at one and the same time rationally developed out of the actual life of the community, and thrown into the common currents of discussion for acceptance or rejection by the community. But it must not fear to be based on substantial theory. The community must be educated to believe in theory. The so-called "practical man" is a man who is merely boasting of his ignorance of the world's intelligence.

This experiment will involve the working out of the technique of deliberation in such a group. Democratic deliberation is largely non-existent. In the main committees, groups, and meetings have been exploited by

chairmen and leaders of an executive type of mind rather than of a deliberative type. Doubtless, as we shall see in a later chapter, democracy has great need of men of an executive type of mind. But in this discussion we are not concerned with that type; we should rather prefer that they stay out of these deliberative groups. We want men and women who can really deliberate. The man who would control a group for the purposes of propaganda, or for the sake of putting over his own private opinion, or for some more or less dubious group purpose, is not the type of man wanted in this deliberative council.

The technique of a democratic deliberation will involve certain essential elements which are not universally characteristic of Americans, and which have not been as a rule esteemed as the desirable qualities in community leadership. Here again, however, emphasis must be placed upon the fact that this particular type of leadership is not concerned with getting things done but with planning what is to be done,—with the working out of a broad community program which, once it is accepted by the community, can be turned over to the executive type of leader for enactment into the life of the community.

The elements in this type of leadership may be briefly set forth as follows:

1. Patience—and the good humor that keeps patience from becoming a sullen pessimism.

2. Ability to listen to others. Mostly we enjoy listening to ourselves.
3. Determination to help others express themselves even when they have nothing to say. Every member of the democracy must have something to say.
4. Definite effort to understand others. It is far more easy to misunderstand.
5. An effort to appreciate the various individual strengths and weaknesses of one's colleagues and so to take account of extraneous elements in deliberation.
6. A search for a more inclusive common knowledge which shall be put freely at the service of every member of the group for the purpose of securing many personal interpretations of facts and personal statements of programs.
7. A willingness (perhaps secured only in the long course of time) to follow truth for the sake of the community wheresoever it may lead. This will of course introduce continually the element of criticism of the points of view of individual members of the committee. But this will educate them, and compel their continuous readjustment. That is to say, it will require thinking. It will involve a co-operative search for the good, not as something already existing, but as something to be found step by step in the processes of experience. That will mean leav-



ing behind some old vested wrongs, and no one greatly enjoys that sort of thing. It may take many generations to educate the race to the attitude that it is better for our old institutions to perish in the white light of truth than to live on in the moldiness of falsehood.

The magnitude of this task is not to be underestimated. It does not, however, include the "making over of human nature." It involves the thoughtful establishing of the conditions under which more desirable aspects of human nature will have a chance to develop. Of course it will involve eternal vigilance on the part of this democratic thoughtfulness, but democracy is not something that can be achieved once for all, and then depended upon to stand of itself; democracy is a great passion, a moral hunger, a spiritual ideal; and its future must be protected by the deliberate intelligence, the definite resolution, the quiet passion, and the calm will of all those heroic souls of the community who would perhaps in other days have given their lives valorously on some battlefield for some glorious cause. The fight for democracy has largely been transferred from mob battlefields to individual consciences and hearts.

But democracy must go at least one step further: the battle must become the task of the democratic intellect and the results and tools of science must be rescued from their service in the construction of battle-ships and machinery of destruction, and made to serve

the great moral and spiritual longings of the race. The new battle must be fought out in committee rooms and community councils, and in the common meetings of men and women. Deliberation must be redeemed from its present reputation. The task of democracy is the long task of the years. The whole future of civilization is at stake.

And that true future does not now exist anywhere. Customs of the past will attempt to supply it; momentary impulses will offer themselves for it; but it must come to us out of our social imagination and out of the deliberate investigations which broad-minded, intelligent lovers of democracy will institute for its invention. All that can save us from the slavish traditions of the past or the futile impulses of the present is that trained deliberativeness which has been, even in our democracy, but little esteemed.

It is at this point that democracy faces the conditions of its unexplored frontier. Just as the settlers of America left the security and ease of settled communities in Europe for the uncertainties and the freedom of the wilderness, so there must be always, in a democracy, some who will leave the settled and outworn conditions of the past and plunge into the insecurities and freedom of the wilderness of unsettled questions, in search of a new and larger world within which to realize the unescapable longings of their souls. Men must see more than to-day in order to see to-day truly. The wilderness must be explored

by the pioneer before rest can be enjoyed,—not by reason of fear or need so much as just because man's mind cannot rest easily in any limited corner of the wilderness: even a half universe, says Carlyle, will not satisfy the soul of a bootblack.

Hence our question comes to this: Can such a deliberative council, or any fragment of it, be organized in any community to consider the many problems of that community, in accordance with such a program as the following?

1. Ready to meet regularly at stated times for the purposes of deliberation and discussion, making that time a part of the regular routine of each member of the group as a definite personal obligation and privilege not to be missed.
2. Keeping their eyes open in all the ranges of daily experience for illustrative materials, facts, bearing on the subject.
3. Always reading discussions of the subjects for the purpose of securing growing understanding of the practical aspects of their task.
4. Ready to give time and energy to the community and to plan largely, inclusively, to the end that eventually every member of the community, old and young, shall have the chance to express the long-repressed currents of life,—especially that boys and girls shall have the chance to develop their instinctive lives through normal and healthy expression, to enrich their

emotions through actual and real experiences, and so come in their youth to a life that is less at the mercy of repressed instincts and emotions, more controlled, more normal because not altogether unknown.

Such a group must be willing to do this modestly, continuously, thoughtfully, persistently, and even when ridiculed or rejected to go ahead with the great task.

Eventually, if democracy is to secure the advantages of science in all its common living, just such groups or committees will exist everywhere, helping to translate scientific conclusions into terms understandable to the common man and helping to interpret the struggling life of the community in terms that even the scientist will not scorn. It seems likely that only in some such way as this will our under-intelligent, over-institutionalized, over puritanical social order be transformed into a social order which makes room for the discoveries of our evolutionary point of view—the fundamental instincts of the race, the emotional undercurrents of all our intellectual life, the humanity that rises out of our pre-human endowment, and that great democratic common weal that lures us on and that may be one with the spiritual meanings of the universe itself.

Since democracy does not exist at present, since it is a great adventure involving forecasting the future, it seems necessary to suppose that some such program

as the foregoing will be essential. Groups of intelligent people must become interested in the problems of the community until they see how such simple things as inadequate recreation, or inadequate housing, for example, prevent the development of those comprehensive experiences within which the normal life of children and young people can find expression and so come to adequate being. And of course it can be affirmed that democracy will not be real as long as large areas of our personal and social life remain buried under the débris of old institutions. The uncovering of the inner repressed lives of people; the working out of more adequate social programs on the basis of facts and by the light of developing social theory; and the presentation of such programs to the community for its education, its acceptance or rejection: these are aspects of the long struggle for democracy which are absolutely vital to the future. Without deliberation in the light of the most complete fund of fact and theory, democracy will be lost in the eddies of old habit or destroyed in the rapids of impulse. Deliberation is as essential in negotiating the uncertain currents of democracy's future as in constructing safe waterways for the commerce of the world. And leadership must recognize the value of this community deliberation in the development of community mind. Instead of continuously seeking to "get things done" it must seek to develop the community's own capacity to do things, and especially to think out things worth doing.

## CHAPTER X

### THE INCLUSIVE PROGRAM

THE first effect of awakening the deliberative attitude is likely to be negative,—the development of a passive or even cynical pessimism. The welter of passion and emotion, of tangled ambition and aspiration, success and defeat, vanity and ecstasy, disease and vice and crime, comes before us as a terrifying phantasmagoria. In the isolation of the folkway world, ignorant of or ignoring these more poignant facts of life, men could be happy at least after a resigned fashion. But who can be happy when his eyes begin to open upon the haggard facts of life? “In much wisdom is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.”

Historically man has seemed a creature of depraved character: selfish and prejudiced; sensual and weak, except for physical brutalities; intemperate and shackled by vicious habits, cowed by fears, or driven by manias; indolent and drifting with the tides of appetite, save as iron-clad custom has controlled him with taboos, or other sanctions, or as some few choice spirits have risen above the mob and by organizing autocratic mechanisms,—chiefly armies,—have been

able to control the currents of human impulse, and so have saved the very race from destruction. We seem to be victims of conditions, force, energies,—physical, psychological, institutional,—that are beyond modification or control.

Little by little, however, this general pessimism resolves itself into many specific items. The world, outwardly and inwardly, seems beyond the reach of intelligence; note such factors as these:

Physical destruction: by earthquake, storms, floods, fires, and the probable demolition of the planet itself; famines, plagues, epidemics, pestilences, death itself;

Wars: which demand the destruction of the best, and the defeat of all progress by compelling unlimited birth rates, the "rabbit-hutch" policy of maintaining national strength, the sanctioning of polygamy and official illegitimacy,—since war can destroy more rapidly than all other calamities combined;

Poverty and pauperism, dependency and invalidity, insanitary housing and the unspeakable filth through which the race grew up and which still exists unnoticed all about the living conditions of multitudes;

Defect, mental and physical: delinquency, vice and crime, unnatural perversions and the loathsome diseases that ensue, prostitution and the exploitation of the instincts of sex;

Exploitation of the masses of men, women and children, through heartless private manipulation of the wealth of the community: unemployment, occupational

diseases and accidents, preventable deaths, fatigues; work that degrades the worker through long hours; work that destroys the desire and the capacity to work; work that degrades women and children; work that fails to feed and clothe and house the world, which merely produces discouragement and unrest:

Chicanery, gambling, "con," which despises work and exists by shrewd ability to secure a share of the product of other men's labors by the use of "wits."

Belated, ignorant, tyrannical and prejudiced courts, and other tribunals that stand in the way of justice and right;

A citizenship that is ignorant, subject to catch-phrases, easily exploited by venal leaderships,—or else over-sophisticated, cynical, dishonest;

"Public opinion" cleverly organized, cunningly manipulated, at the mercy of shrewd suggestion, refusing to consider any new proposal that might release the community from its defects: "What is good enough for us is good enough for our children."

Family breakdowns and disintegrations; thoughtless marriages; "conspiracies of secrecy" about all sex matters; incompatibilities, disillusionments, divorces; the failures of responsibility; lawless sex relationships; and the whole sordid story of broken faiths, exploited affection, and disappointed lives;

Superficiality of personality of masses of men and women because they grew up in a "soil that had no depth,"—frivolity, insincerity, hypocrisy, sham;



Illiteracy, social unintelligence, unskill; formal and irrelevant information; non-vocational outlooks of the masses of young people; lack of interest in "the job"; lack of interest in any of the important concerns and movements of the age;

Amusements that do not amuse; recreations that do not recreate; sordid, over-competitive, destructive social life; a "night life" that devours the earnings of the day and does not give "value received," but gradually destroys; play that defeats play, burning out nerve centers before their time; the transformation of all that should be beautiful, recreative, and refreshing into the hectic, the feverish, the demoralizing, the deadly;

Ugliness of the community, of streets and buildings and vacant lots; the intrusion of bill boards; the sordid ugliness of houses, inside and out; jerry architecture, jazz music, adventitious literature, extremist art; imitation jewelry, and all the tawdry effort to gloss over cheapness with a vain respectability;

A morality that is ignorant custom and pretense, and that freely sacrifices joy, happiness, sincerity, reality, nature and beauty to conventionality and appearances;

A "religion" that is hard, irrelevant, if not unintelligent dogma; outward conformity to meaningless rituals, the "whited sepulchres" of ancient descriptions; cups "cleansed on the outer side, but inwardly full of extortion and bitterness;" the "devourers of wid-

ows' houses making long prayers in the market place."

Some such pessimistic presentation of the world as this is the first impression aroused in the awakened intelligence by the deliberative attitude. And this is necessary, inevitable. The complacency of the folkway mind must give way to the aroused interest and sense of problem of the alert mind. There is no hope of salvation save in a recognition of the fact of sin.

But a second effect of the deliberative attitude has usually appeared, also; a sort of unlimited and overweening optimism, that here, at last, a new method has been found with which quickly all the problems of the ages will be solved. The Greek sophists held some such superficial view as this,—though some of them went so far as to suggest that, in the light of intelligence, no problem was really worth solving! In the dawn of the modern period a somewhat more serious but quite as thoroughly optimistic opinion prevailed. Bacon felt that his "*Novum Organum*" was that new instrument which would quickly cure all the ancient "distempers of learning," overthrow all the traditional "idols of the mind," and bring in the day of unlimited illumination and control of life. "Knowledge is power,"—and man had only to apply himself, diligently, to compass shortly all knowledge: "I have taken all knowledge to my province!"

Paracelsus is an excellent illustration of this pathetic hope. Browning's poem represents the wild extravagance of his first plans, and the gradual disil-

lusionment and eclipse of an intellect that might have contributed much to the world had it been content to undertake its share in the long task of following "knowledge like a sinking star beyond the utmost bound of human hope." But the age dreamed of a quick clue, a secret of the gods, a philosopher's stone, which would turn base metals into gold, solve all problems by a magic touch, and transform degraded and vicious human nature into fitness for the heavenly mansions in the twinkling of an eye. And the age found none of these; therefore it turned upon those who made such promises, and destroyed them.

Human weariness still longs for such short cuts to peace, and human credulity never fails to respond to the suggestions when any such has been found. Modern "get rich quick," "get healthy quick," "get wise quick" nostrums are the equivalent of the old philosopher's stone.

Now and then, of course, some discovery does seem to precipitate a whole age of progress in a moment,—but it is certain that ages of study have gone before. That which is to be for a moment can, probably, be made in a moment; but that which is to become permanent substance of the structure of the world must, probably, take time for its development. After these three hundred years of scientific effort, we may admit that there is no such single clue, no simple formula, no final answer to the problems of society in a democracy.

A third attitude toward the deliberative method

seems necessary, therefore.\* The complete organization of the community will include the mutual development and interrelating of many programs, dealing with the many aspects of our common life,—each wrought out in the knowledge of the others and in view of the community as a whole. This program will begin where the community actually is, with all its failures and depravities, defeats and limitations, as set forth above; it will be brave enough to call into use all attainable facts, past and present,—since only by knowledge can we escape from fear; it will take into account all the work that has been done by various fragmentary groups, and the methods of that work; it will become acquainted with, and make continuous use of all advancing social sciences, especially of psychology; it will examine and use the advancing standards of achievement which specific departments of the community are developing, and will attempt to relate and co-ordinate these specialized standards into a common aim for the whole community life; it will organize all these factors into a working hypothesis, presenting this hypothesis as a constructive plan of the community's future, for the challenge of the community,—to be criticized, to be endlessly remade, to be attained in the progress of the years.

Such an attitude as this is true deliberation, is truly inclusive. It accepts the future as just the field of human exploration, as that new frontier within which

\* Todd: *The Scientific Spirit in Social Work.*

the still-unrealized hopes and aspirations of the race shall come into being. It is not afraid of the unknown; it faces that unknown as the pioneers of the last three centuries have faced the wilderness of forest and prairie. In this three hundredth anniversary of the landing of the Pilgrims surely no one need apologize for advocating the value of facing the wilderness, or of life on the frontiers!

This sort of deliberation involves the escape from both the outworn habit of the past and the uncertain impulse of the present into the intellectual freedom of ideas and the comparative analysis of competing programs. It involves escape from "patch-work" and "tinkering" into the conception of a program that begins with the community as a whole and appraises every activity, function, interest and institution of that community in terms of its service to the common life. From this more inclusive standpoint, from this revised attitude of mind which Ferguson calls the "revolution absolute"\* , each of these interests, activities, institutions of the community becomes a distinct problem, a challenge to show cause why it should continue to exist, or to exist in just such fashion. The inclusive program of the community will be just the outcome of these critical deliberations,—and nothing but

\* The application of science to the arts of war has transformed warfare from an activity that once permitted a certain "chivalry" into a monstrous organization of all hideous engines of destruction. The only means of upsetting this is by just as complete application of the methods of science to the arts and institutions of peace.

such deliberation can ever assure us an inclusive program. This is the long task of the democratic centuries,—a challenge to the faith and hope and joy of every genuine democrat!

In this deliberate challenge by the community of all that affects the happiness and destiny of the members of the community, doubtless some of these old community functions will be more or less ruthlessly eliminated. This has happened in the past. Slavery, that divinely ordained institution, disappeared; the saloon is passing from our midst; the "divine right of kings" has received its death-blow in all western lands. Belated types of function, like "Czarism" and "Kaiserism," may cling for a while, like "the last leaf upon the tree" in winter; but when the new life of spring surges through the tree and touches its furthest tips, the old leaves must fall.

There is a crude surgery in revolution, which has served the world well at times, though not always:

"This rage was right in the main,—

That acquiescence vain——"

But for the most part it is likely that the older type of revolution has served its term. For the future progress will be made by education, including all forms of "case work," and by legislation which will crystalize the developments of public intelligence into the principles of law and common conduct. Yet in the long run the world will learn that there is but one real escape from the violent revolutions of the past, and

that is by deliberate acceptance of the "revolution absolute"—the control of the destinies of the community by intelligence, an intelligence based in assured facts, organized by vital social theory, and carried out into social organization by trained and expert leaders who believe in the things they are doing.

This will of course be fatal to many evils, many vested wrongs, special privileges, monopolies, and the like; but all such things must go, soon or late. The only question is as to whether they will go decently and in order under the deliberate and calm criticism of facts and assured theory, or whether they will refuse to go and have to be thrown out in the wild excesses of violence "when whirlwinds of rebellion sweep the world." In the democracy of the future, the goods of life are to become more and more the possession of every one. Nothing can prevent this. Institutions of all sorts can delay the coming of that day, but not forever!

It was stated above that this deliberative method implies a transformation of social attitude toward each and all of the distinctive interests, activities, and institutions of the community. The older doctrine assumed that the community was made up of the *sum of its institutions*. This doctrine is a "hangover" from the extreme individualism of the 18th century,—especially from the "social contract" theory of Rousseau. According to this theory, men first lived in an uninstitutionalized individualism, somewhat like the

solitary cats which live alone, not like most animals which live in flocks and herds. But at a rather uncertain time in human history population grew to such an extent that some sort of social organization became necessary. Accordingly individuals came together and made a contract with each other to live under certain conditions, under certain institutions. The *communal* part of man is, therefore, all summed up under the social institutions; what is not in institutions is essentially individualistic and not to be comprised within the common life. Society makes its greatest mistake when it attempts to compel the whole of human nature to come under the control of these artificial and contractual institutions.

But this whole doctrine is based on false history and more false psychology. Historically men never lived solitary lives. Man is by his very nature a gregarious animal; his social instincts are quite as dominant in him as his more individualistic instincts. In fact, it is not at all unlikely that many of the world's grossest evils come now from the inescapable quality of man's social instincts. How else account, for example, for that monstrous crowding of people into close quarters in the city?

Further, the process of evolution involves not adding up a sum of particulars, but differentiating a whole into its parts. Evolution is from within, not from without. A homogeneous whole becomes characterized by inner differences. These differences finally become dis-



tinctive, and the whole breaks up into separate parts, each of which may in turn become a *new whole*.

And not this historical process alone, but the very nature of the mind of man is to approach any problem from an inclusive point of view rather than from a particular angle. The mind does not work from particulars to the whole, but from the whole to its parts. The approach to any social situation is, therefore, logically most easy by first getting a view of the whole situation. and then breaking up that whole into its constituent parts.

The community antedates the individual and the specialized institution. Both are products of a community life. The community is not made by them; they are made by the community. Hence, any program of community reorganization that hopes to contribute a real and lasting progress must approach the problem from the standpoint of the inclusive community life. That is to say, every constructive program for the reorganization of industry, or health, or recreation, or the like, must undertake its work not from the standpoint of its own particular department of the community, or compartment of human nature, but from the standpoint of the community as a whole. All institutions and interests are functions of a common human nature. That human nature may be infinitely complex and varied; yet it has a community of interest running through it, and every function of community differentiation must stand or fall by its abil-

ity to interpret, enrich and serve this common human nature. More than this, there can rightly be no invidious segregation of community functions, by means of which certain groups or classes enjoy special services denied to other groups or classes. Every normal human being needs the contact with, and service of, every essential item of common good if he is to be wholly human.

How shall these novel relationships between the specialized functions of the community and the community as a whole, implied in this "revolution absolute," be set forth? We have been exclusive, narrow, intolerant, and to that extent un-American, in our conceptions of the proper program. We have set up certain fixed tests, certain shibboleths,—and we have declared that whatever could not come within the bounds of these tests was undesirable. Non-conformist groups have been persecuted,—in spite of the fact that America was founded by non-conformists! The Declaration of Independence was a work of revolutionary non-conformists. America has long been the refuge of the victims of hide-bound conformities. Democracy must continue to be just that, or perish.

And so in this deliberate reorganization of the program of our community life for the purposes of democracy, all that is human must be taken into account; the inner life of the community must get its expression. It is not to be a program made "in the mount" and handed down in final form. It is to be the work-

ing out of the repressed and poignant life of the people who make up the community. The conservative, the radical; the alien, the native; the rich, the poor; the learned and the ignorant,—all must come and bring their needs, their hopes, their longings, their imperishable desires to the building of this new structure of the common life. And the “stone which the builders rejected” may once again in the world’s history “become the head of the corner.”

This program will include, for example, not merely an organization of industry to make it more effective within itself,—but such a reorganization of the community as will enable industry to realize all its human functions: not merely the production of goods, but service to the community, the education of the children in vital ways, the chance for joy in one’s handiwork, the sense of creative expression, the fulfillment of the instinct of workmanship, and the actual realization by all men of that old religious conception “*Laborare est orare*,”—“To labor is to pray!” Never again should any community be able thoughtlessly to make profits out of the losses of its workers! The machinery of this reorganization is now in the making; it were well for community leaders to make sure that they share these genuine hopes of community and democracy.\*

\* Veblen: *Instinct of Workmanship*.

Tead: *Instincts in Industry*.

Money: *The Future of Work*.

Gantt: *Organizing for Work*.

Survey, Dec. 20, 1919. *One Way Out. A Symposium*.

Cf. *British Labor Program*.

Again, in the program of health, the end desired will not be mere absence of obvious diseases and the development of individual vitality, but such a reorganization of the whole attitude of the community toward the values of life as will make health contagious and disease a sort of disgrace. The community needs to exhale health to all its constituents; and the whole structure of the community—its industries, and all its interests—must be such as shall be consistent with a program of health. What is the use of health, or life, that is planted amidst filth and vice and crime? Why should the community be concerned about the health of individuals if the industry of the community is so organized as cumulatively to destroy that health? Can health and servile toil go together? Can the individual whose whole outlook on life is “gazing on the ground” in a hopeless and unrelenting way be healthy? Health cannot be “organized” unless industry is organized, and every other vital aspect of the community with it.

Likewise, this program does not anticipate the more complete organization of “recreation” for the purpose of absorbing a few fragments of off-time now wasted,—but such a reorganization of the whole program of community living as will make leisure time a genuine reality in the life of every man, woman and child in the community—their own time, free from any exaction by any control whatever, save their own good democratic sense—and in which normal and natural

opportunity is available to every one for play, recreation, social life, recuperation or regenerative pursuits as will release the emotions, healthfully, heighten the sense of living, and enhance the whole tone of bodily, moral and spiritual well-being. This cannot be organized by itself. It can come only as part of an inclusive community program.

Such a program will not imply a more highly efficient school in which children will be more completely institutionalized and crammed with more deadeningly useful information, but such a reorganization of the whole living of the community as will make possible the attainment, by all members of the community, old and young alike, of a more adequate understanding of the conditions under which they live and work; a more complete participation in the world's achievements of culture and joy; and a more effective organization of active will by means of which the individual's real sharing in the active concerns of the world may be assured. Democracy demands this, and educators are beginning to see that education must move in this direction.\*

Such a program does not imply the occasional suppression of such evils as prostitution, the sneer of a sophisticated understanding that while "good people must have their way once in a while," yet "everyone

\* Dewey: *Education and Democracy*.  
Addams: *Democracy and Social Ethics*—Ch. 6.  
Russell: *Why Men Fight*.  
Hart: *Democracy in Education*.

who knows the world knows that such things always have been and always will be,"—but rather such an organization of the whole life of the community, its industries, its play, its civic aspirations, its love and its worship, as to leave no real place either for vice as a social institution, or for the cultivation of those morbid forms and perversions of instinct which saturate the individual with viciousness.

This program involves, it is plain, a reconstitution of our attitudes toward all the interests of the common life. When we consider from this point of view the long efforts of women to achieve the fullness of human living, the wonder grows why the world has been so stupid so long. Doubtless the actual working out of the machinery of realization of all the values repressed under our old intolerances will take a long time; but the actual acceptance of the doctrine that women are to have utter freedom in the democratic community need take no more than a moment. And the task of making the machinery of this new order can then go on thoughtfully, democratically, effectively, under the direction of those who believe in it, instead of obstructively, under the direction of those who would prefer to see it all fail.

Can there be any doubt about the logic of a reasonable work day, that will leave the worker still a human being at the end of the day, ready to fulfill all his functions as a citizen and with time enough to prepare himself to enjoy and fulfill his life?

If we could accept the proposition that in the ultimate community of the world all races and peoples *must* live together in some way, would we not come nearer to the conditions under which such a problem could really be solved? There is nothing democratic in perpetuating old racial prejudice and in attempting to "solve" racial problems in the atmosphere of intolerance and misunderstanding.

The real study and understanding of "American ideals" is not furthered by the attitudes of bitterness and rancor that leading upholders of "Americanism" exhibit. Hysteria and intolerance are as bad as indolence. America has withstood a century of open discussion of her ideals and her problems; it seems unlikely that she could withstand a decade of espionage and repression.

The deliberate intention to make human life physically, mentally, morally and spiritually fit, by the control of the physical ills, by mental hygiene and the segregation of the defective; by providing those opportunities for responsibility within which moral character can alone develop; and by stimulation of those great community idealisms which rouse the spirit of man like an awakened giant,—these are all parts of the program of community reorganization under the control of democratic deliberation.

There is an almost infinite variety about the common life of our democracy. This discussion cannot hope to include all details within its scope. Nor would

it be warranted in doing so if such a thing were possible. We are not here determining a program; we are simply considering the general outlines and elements that will go to the making of such a program. No such program, let it be said again, can be made outside the community and handed in, or down. Any externally imposed program would be of the nature of most of our traditional programs,—autocratic, absolute, the protector of some sort of vested wrongs. We desire no such program. The program we need for the democratic community of the future must be wrought out of the very life of the community, by the best thinking of that community, made of the facts of that community, criticised by reference to the best social theory and the best programs of other communities. Hence, we may leave the actual working out of the program for any local community to the people of that community under the leadership of such a community council as shall have learned to carry on its work in the spirit of a truly democratic deliberation.

But one or two other items need to be kept in mind. This distinctive conception that the community program of the democratic future will imply this “revolution absolute” in our attitudes toward problems sets before us certain inescapable tasks. First: the life and interest and work of the community are of more importance than the life and interest and work of any particular function or institution of the community. The old doctrine of “enlightend selfishness,” that if



every individual would stand for his own rights to the uttermost we should have an ideal community, has no standing whatever with intelligent students to-day. Instead of having an ideal community, we should have an armed camp, and at the snapping of a match the world would be converted into a shambles. So also, the doctrine that the community is advanced by the unlimited egotism of its particularistic institutions will not stand criticism. No *institution* can be trusted with the fate of the whole community. *Nothing but the community is big enough to determine the fate of the community!* And nothing but an intelligent community is wise enough to escape from the ancient falsehoods which identified the good of the community with some narrowly institutional development.

Again, this re-assertion of the rights of the community, as over against any particularistic institution within the community, involves novel conceptions of leadership, especially the conception that each individual is to have some share in the joys and responsibilities of leadership, and that no individual is to be denied the joy and discipline of being occasionally a follower. But we shall see more of this in a later chapter.

This program of inclusive organization involves also some grave dangers and difficulties, as we shall see in later chapters. But democracy is looking for a larger life. There can be no larger life save as we escape from the narrower life. Change involves chang-

ing something. Old littlenesses will have to make way for something bigger. No one knows just what the bigger thing will be, just as no one in 1776 knew just what would come of the Declaration of Independence. But democracy is the social order within which science can find itself most fully at home. Dangers do not disturb the pioneer; they challenge him; they thrill him; they discipline him; they *make* him: the pioneer is just the man who does not run from them, or deny their existence, or ignore them, but who faces them, questions them, tears them to pieces to see what they are made of, solves them, puts them under his feet, and goes on to the new job and the new day. This is what makes him a pioneer!

Facing the dangers as they come, and the difficulties, and the obstacles, the leader of democracy will modestly, tolerantly, open-mindedly seek to understand the times in which he lives, the community in which he lives, the people with whom he lives,—and in the spirit of a great experiment will undertake to help the community move on to the next stage in its development.

## CHAPTER XI

### FROM DELIBERATION TO ACTION

THE most difficult of tasks confronts us here. We see clearly enough what is to be done in the building of the larger democratic community—at least in its major outlines. But is there not some danger that this desirable program will never be translated into social conduct? Is it not necessary now to build a great bridge between deliberation and action?\*

All too often in the past the "idealist" has had a sort of blind faith in the self-realizing quality of ideals, has felt that idealisms have a magic quality which will make them inevitably prevail, or that Providence is on the side of ideals. For the most part such idealists have suffered endless defeats and disillusionments; but they seem able to recover from every such defeat and shortly to start up again a new orgy of sheer idealism. Such a process has had the effect of making the community as a whole pretty distrustful of too much idealism.

For this reason most of our scientific techniques have fallen into the control and service of pre-scientific purposes. Not only are the older mechanisms of

\* Wallas: *The Great Society*—Ch. XII.

effective action in the control of autocratic interests, but these same interests are quick to appreciate and secure control of any new mechanisms that may be invented. This illustrates one of the lasting conflicts as to the nature of social organization. There are many who advocate the application of force to the control of community life, whether at home or abroad,—such force being mainly in the service of traditional interests. That is to say, alongside of our sheer idealists we can find militarists everywhere who think that the community and the world should be organized primarily in terms of physical expression and under the control of a non-social autocracy.

Over against both these proposals there seems to be room for a more realistic suggestion. Ideals are not self-realizing; force is not merely physical, nor is even physical force forever to be at the service of primitive impulse. Ideals need to be organized into the positive programs of the world, and force needs to be directed by comprehensive intelligence. The idealistic intention looks toward a human world; but such a result will be realized only when its supporters use the realities of the world to put that program into existence. Not merely the physical forces, such as are utilized in battle, but the equally real forces of commerce, industry, world finance, the organization of scientific inquiry, and the development of fundamental neighborliness as an actual program for community life: all these are essential elements in that organization of the

world by which ideals are to be transformed into the realities of social existence.

Of course this will make the upholders of force scoff, for they will say that forces cannot be made to support an idealistic program. And it will make the upholders of ideals scoff, because they will say that it is a surrender of ideals; that if ideals have to rely upon force for their realization they are not of much consequence. As a matter of fact, it simply means that we are escaping from the impossible antagonisms between institutions and ideas, between means and end, and are coming to see human life more realistically as a long struggle for the transformation of primitive group conditions into intelligent social order. It is the wholeness of life that individuals need and that communities need: and that wholeness involves two things: energy to work out intelligent ideals; and energy to make those ideals real.

Such a fusion of executive and deliberative attitudes is constantly taking place in the current of events. Let the demand for the "humanization of industry" suffice for illustration. Current deliberation does play into action in the form of "*suggestion*"\* continually. Multitudes of conservative business men are to-day advocating "guild socialism" and "soviet" forms of industrial and political control without knowing it. Perhaps it were best not to wake them up, for if they advocate these things long enough they may come to

\* Abdul Majid: *The Psychology of Leadership*—Chs. II and III.

believe in them. At any rate, important items of this program, more or less complete and effective, are being advocated and practiced to-day.

Details of this indefinite program are already being worked out by men and women who "know how to get things done." Social workers in increasing numbers are at work, and for the most part they can be counted upon to support the larger developments of this community work. But in addition to these, who have a considerable vocational interest in the matter, are large numbers of other active individuals,—recognized "executives,"—who are not social workers but rather pride themselves upon their "practicality,"—by which they largely mean their ignorance of the world of science and theory. These men are usually not interested in programs of democratic progress. They represent a "hang-over" from the older individualism. They are the autocrats of business, politics, education and religion. But they do get things done!

The men of this "executive" type of mind are usually not very highly intelligent about the social value of what they are doing, nor do they seriously ask why they are doing it. They are, in large measure, the manipulators of traditional mechanisms, and it is their business to see that the wheels go round. Not infrequently, however, one of them wakes up to the actual task he is engaged in and "muttering angrily, 'Someone has been making a fool of me,' he quits." Usually these executives are rather sentimental about some

aspect of the task. Perhaps they like the "game." They enjoy the sense of power, even though it work brutality and hardship. Haeckel says somewhere: "Men are neither just nor merciful, naturally, but they make up for their injustice and their lack of mercy by being extraordinarily sentimental!"

Hence for the most part the man of executive temper will undertake any task that offers him the sort of reward he craves. There is no reason to suppose that he has *a priori* objection to working for the democratic program. In certain modern novels, the old autocratic "boss" does actually save the reform program from failure,—not so much because he is interested in the program, as because the job offers him the chance to "get into the game" on the winning side.

Hence we shall do well to study the psychology and logic of the situation and to consider well whether we should not attempt to enlist the effective energies of the real leaders of action in the community in the task of the more democratic program.

Of course, accepting the help of the impersonal effectiveness of the active man offends our moral scruples; often we would rather see our ideals fail than to have them succeed in any such realistic fashion as this. But we are dealing with the world of social realities. We are trying to get an inclusive democratic program into the actual currents of the life of the community. Such a program has a large place, a large need, for

technique and execution of details. The real forces and energies,—the actual effective agencies of the community,—must be organized into the task. As long as idealists are content to dream their beautiful dreams of “an inclusive program,”—and to let the executive type of man do the things dictated by autocratic tradition, the ideals will remain in the realm of dreams,—a “gleam on a far horizon.” They will come down out of the heaven of dreams to dwell among men in the realities of social organization when they become the program of those forces and energies of the community that “can put things over.” This however does not mean merely business men and “executives.”

But how to secure such co-operation! All too frequently deliberative men scorn the active individual as being ignorant and muddle-headed, while the executive type belittles the thinker as an “impractical theorist.” What means of communication between these extremes can be found? At present this is accomplished, insofar as it occurs at all, chiefly through the medium of persons who do not belong to either of these marked types. Under present conditions the deliberative group in any community is necessarily small; and the executive type is represented by only a few.

Traditional types of education which discount individuality in favor of conformity, and the lack of opportunity for participation in community affairs, combined with hereditary factors, make it inevitable that large numbers of the community shall be found in neither of



these groups. Many of these are ignorant and indolent. But others, perhaps in growing numbers, occupy what may be called a "mediating" position. They know the results of deliberation, and they are in touch with men of action; they understand something of the vocabulary of each, and act, often imperfectly it is true, in the office of interpreter. And in this office they fill an important function in carrying forward a community program.

But we need to go still deeper into the matter. In the exchange of ideas, in the play of effective motives, in the rounding out of individual viewpoints, argument is not the chief factor. Our communities are largely controlled by elements of suggestion that lie far below the surface of the "intellectual."

We are accustomed, for example, to the conventional fallacy that our American institutions were established according to an ultimate pattern, and that change, or even the suggestion of a change, is a sort of treason. We have then a very different basis for our loyalty to these institutions when we admit the fact that the spirit of American institutions has from the beginning been originally distinctively experimental. The period from 1776 to 1789 was a period of extreme uncertainty,—when men literally did not know where they were going, and when many sorts of hypothesis as to the future were presented and discussed. The Constitution itself is a series of compromises; and shortly after its adoption ten amendments were added to it. In the century and a quarter since few changes have come by

amendment; but profound changes have been produced by judicial interpretation.

Again, we are subjected to a type of subtle suggestion in the old "hang-over" of autocracy which still invades our democratic independence: we submit to the domination of all sorts of "vested controls,"—in business, morality, education, social groupings, politics, and religion. We are more or less content to take the "legends" that are paraded by "newspapers" as reports of facts, and to act upon them without the inhibition of intelligent questioning.

In place of these old customary attitudes of subordination, suppression and repression, we must establish genuinely democratic attitudes of political and industrial independence and responsibility for all normal human beings. This will mean, of course, new lines of habit in the common life and the life of individuals, new lines of suggestion and of constructive energy gradually permeating not only the conscious, but the implicit life of the community. Great areas of physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual energies, now dormant, or wasted in non-social or even anti-social activities, must be released into the common life,—into its thinking, its appraisements and judgments, and into the determination of its social program. And the present autocratic arbiters of what is "correct,"—in social forms, political movements, intellectual fashions, moral standards, and the like,—must learn to accept these new energies, ideals and aims, and to share in making the community

over so as to include these democratic values so long denied legitimate place. This will involve the complete acceptance of the doctrines of the Constitution, that the safety of democracy is assured only when discussion is absolutely free, when peaceful assemblage is utterly unhindered, and when the community has full access to all available facts in any controversy so that citizens can make up their minds with assurance and to some purpose.

Another fundamental attitude in determining our action is the doctrine of "the economic interpretation of human conduct," which insists that practically all our actions are determined by economic considerations: we act in every instance in such a way as to protect and further our economic welfare. *Property* is the main element in control of conduct.

Now even though we should refuse to accept this doctrine in all its baldness, we must admit that it has some large elements of reality in it. "Money talks!" Property wields an influence in the community far out of proportion to its intrinsic significance for human welfare; for we have accepted an insidious doctrine that economic welfare is the most important phase of life, that a "job" is the one test of success, and that a gilded fool is a more estimable personage than a poor wise man. Hence,—"money talks!" In the long run, therefore, property is likely to be found on the side of any program that protects the "rights of property" and against any program that threatens those "rights." The

more inclusive program of democracy and community must adjust itself to this fact. It must either "make peace" with "property rights,"—and so win the support of property; or else it must find some more effective social energy with which to oppose the undoubted strength of property in its struggle to be accepted by the community.

Such an effective social energy is perhaps the "guild" or "labor union." Here is energy and to spare, with social programs and enthusiasm unlimited. And for a century this social energy has been gathering until to-day all over the world it stands largely competent to meet the old "rights of property" without flinching.

But the doubt intrudes as to whether the "guild" can escape from its own fragmentariness. Property rights are real and very essential in a limited way. They are disastrous only when they set a part of human good in the place of a more complete human good. Can the "labor union" escape the same difficulty? The goods which the unions support are essential; and while less concrete and obvious are more humane and social than the goods subsumed under "property rights." But can the labor union escape from its own particularism of situation within the common life, break through its own peculiar economic motivations, and organize its program from the standpoint of the community-as-a-whole, and so fulfill the democratic demand for a program that shall approach life organically?

Or will it too, like Property, be content with the iteration of a partial program which it seeks to identify with the common good, or at least to make the *sine qua non* of the ultimate community good? It is this uncertainty that keeps multitudes who have lost all respect for the old "rights of property" from throwing in all their fortunes with the labor movement. Will that movement betray them ultimately just as the doctrine of enlightened selfishness and the supreme right of property has betrayed the world?

Can the state be so captured by the friends of the new program that the gulf between deliberation and action can be cleared and the new program begin to function immediately? There are those who insist that loyalty to the "state" and loyalty to "property" are parts of the same program, if, indeed, they are not identical. Hence multitudes have lost confidence in the "state" as the hope of democracy. And even those who have not lost this confidence are well aware that the "state" must be "captured" by the forces that really believe in democracy before it can be made the instrument of the larger community program. When the mayor of Cincinnati denounced the "Social Unit" as subversive of government, he meant simply that new civic energies and enthusiasms were being released which questioned the indolence of government,—as new wine questions old bottles,—and he was afraid. But if the government were controlled by friends of

democracy these newly released energies would be welcomed into the civic life, and the drab monotony of conventional politics would be brightened up a bit.

In the long run then we come back to the one hope of the community, the one imperishable hope—the community itself. And now we can see that we need more than a release of the deliberative energies of the community; we need as well the release of the energies of action. We fail to get our program into the social life because the race's capacity to act has been so largely lost.\* Democracy and the builder of community must learn how fundamentally the autocracy of the past and even the imperfect democracy of the present have denied to men the chance to act at all. Children are naturally active; they are bundles of impulse and instinct, experimental, scientific, democratic. But they have always been early suppressed. Passivity of conduct has always been a virtue in children. Primitively the adult group was jealous of the energies of childhood and used all the coercive energies of the group to bring childhood under and make it submissive.†

This has been one of the chief functions of our schools. It is true that the future of democracy does depend upon the education of the new generation to a truly democratic outlook on life. This will include the development in all children, in variable and natural degrees, of initiative, independence, appreciative under-

\* Marot, H.: *The Creative Impulse in Industry*.

† Parsons: *Social Freedom*.

standing, critical ability, skill in vocation, discipline and self-control and the sense of responsibility. This does wait upon the schools,—and the schools cannot do this sort of work now because they are still too largely controlled and manned by elements that do not know what democracy is, hence are distrustful of all those elements of genuine democracy which impinge in any critical way upon the existent order. If we *wait* for the new generation to save the world we shall find, when that generation arrives, that while they may exhibit some real increment of democratic desire and capacity, the actual gain will have been dishearteningly small. The present must undertake its proper share in the protection of democracy, in order that the next generation may really be assured that the world moves forward. We cannot put off the task upon the next generation.

Historical accidents have tended to exalt knowledge, obedience, and conformity, and to undervalue activity. Our religion has come to us out of a land where indolence was bliss and where work was so disagreeable that it was conceived of as having been an extraordinary punishment invented by the Creator for the purpose of disciplining sinful man. Our intellectual traditions have come to us out of other lands where invidious distinctions between slaves and free men made work disgraceful and deliberation the only honorable thing. Democracy must escape from both these invidious attitudes! Religion and deliberation alike must be redeemed in order that the more complete human per-

sonality may find welcome in a democratic social order.

The old creative impulses once prized in hand work but useless in a factory must find room once more in industry. The deep-lying civic impulses and loyalties denied expression in active form under autocratic governments must be given large scope in the democratic community. The fundamental social impulses frightened into quiescence under espionage systems must be given full chance to express themselves in the congenial fellowship of unrestricted democratic intercourse. Recreational impulses that were compelled to find outlets in furtive ways under puritanical repression must be given opportunity to fill the whole community with a new sense of freedom and joy, and release of emotion. Ethical impulses conventionalized and dehumanized under repressive social conditions must have a chance to express themselves in all the ranges of generous action; and the old primitive religious impulses which bound the whole community together in a common fellowship, but which have been broken into fragments in the bickering sectarianisms of the modern world, must have a chance once more to express themselves in a real service to the ideals of community and a true spiritual fellowship. Such release of the deeper impulsive elements of human nature will provide eventually the active energies necessary to the carrying out of any social program which deliberation may devise.

Out of this larger release of active energy in the community will appear an abundant supply of those execu-



tive types of men who will at the same time be trained to a fundamental sympathy with the deliberative programs of the community and who will be efficient in leading the community from the mere deliberation about its future to the actual realization of that future in social conduct, in effective social action, and in reorganized institutions.

## CHAPTER XII

### KEEPING THE PROGRAM HUMAN

No merely negative program can satisfy. Warnings and punishments were too obvious in the old social and moral programs; the democratic ideal of to-day is not expressed in warnings against certain obvious evils. Its true genius is found in the adventure toward the unrealized good. Democracy conceives of humanity as on a long trail, and the true democrat is he who can hopefully say "I don't know fully where this trail leads, but it's fine climbing!"

We have already seen how all organized programs tend to close in on life, to suppress, repress and destroy the natural spontaneities. Our inherited puritanism has been particularly persistent in emphasizing this tendency. The famous "blue laws" of New England illustrate the capacity of the puritan to "take all the joy out of life."\*

This extreme denial of human joy is rooted deep in certain old religious attitudes which date from that primitive period when the larger part of the life of individuals and groups was devoted to ceremonials of cleansing and purification for the purpose of placating

\*Cf. Hawthorne's "Maypole of Merrymount."

angry deities.\* This experience was intensified in the development of monastic practices in the Middle Ages, when men and women spent their lives in gloomy efforts to defeat all the native instincts in the hope of winning a brighter crown.†

On the educational side the same gloomy atmosphere has prevailed for ages. The schoolroom seems to be a sort of natural antithesis to the vital life of childhood. Mr. Dooley, the American philosopher, says that our American educational philosophy is to this effect: "It's no great matter what it is you study, just so you don't like it!" Which is, after all, simply a free paraphrase of Locke's educational philosophy.‡ The current cynicism of the world with reference to education may be illustrated also by the somewhat flippant remark of the newspaper paragrapher: "The boy who likes to go to school ought to be investigated."

With the industrial revolution and the passing of the era of handiwork there has been a gradual elimination of the joy of the individual worker in his work. The development of standardized products has substituted more and more mechanical processes for individual play of feeling and instinct; and in more recent times the development of exact statistical and quantitative accounting has tended not only to the complete elimination of the creative element but even to the rejection of all facts that will not admit of statement in statisti-

\* Gilbert Murray: *Four Stages in Greek Religion*, Lecture I.

† James: *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

‡ Cf. Dickens's "Hard Times."

cal form.\* The development of modern scientific management of industry, which has as its ideal the stating of the worker in terms of work-units per hour, tends to destroy the humanity of the worker,—an end considered indispensable by the management but rapidly becoming insupportable to the worker himself, and has set the American Federation of Labor squarely against the whole movement in a way that angers and amazes those employers whose sole economic interest is in units of production so standardized as to increase output at the minimum cost.

So, through all the interests and activities of our customary social life, this ignoring of the normal human desire for beauty and joy goes on at the expense of social welfare in the long run, since it denies the possibility of the emergence of a complete humanity in the organization of community life. As a compensation for this, society has for ages winked at the methods of exploiting the suppressed hungers. The saloon was protected for decades by being called "The Poor Man's Club." The brothel was accepted because it was supposed to "protect the home." Even the disreputable dance hall is held more desirable than a supervised municipal dance hall by conventional moralists and religionists because they can keep a few of their own "circle" at least away from the "wickedness of the world" as it flaunts itself in the former.

\* Veblen: *Instinct of Workmanship*, p. 245.

The result of all this has been in large measure an actual dislocation of the world's ideals of human satisfaction. This was definitely expressed by Carlyle in his famous statement, "Man can afford to give up happiness, if thereby he can achieve blessedness."

It is difficult to know just what such a change of ideal means. It is possible that the term "happiness" as used by Carlyle here has primary reference to all those genuinely human satisfactions which free men should get out of their work, and play, and love, and worship, which large numbers of men and women released from economic or personal subordination, do actually achieve in life; but which were completely denied under mediæval social organizations to the rank and file of men and women, and which are still held to be not essential to the masses of men. This doctrine seems to give unquestioning religious sanction to the perpetuation of economic and social injustices for which the only excuse can be that economic overlords have decreed that it shall be so, and we are too indolent to will it otherwise. Hence we accept and feed our hungry souls upon ultimate "blessings" instead of genuine present satisfactions.

We have noted, then, that all intellectual programs tend to become artificial and repressive, with the inevitable result that they defeat the life they were intended to serve. So programs of action frequently lead into blind alleys and become intolerant. Professor Santayana has pointed out that action may become

doubly active when it has lost its direction. It tends to make up in energy what it has lost of vision. So, from the standpoint both of organized deliberation and of effective action, the vital creative reality of the future community may be menaced. How then shall any existent or proposed program be properly tested?

It has already been intimated that human happiness will be involved in this test. No program either of deliberation or of action can long be justified which either deliberately or thoughtlessly ignores the happiness of the individual or the community, or that tends in any real measure to obstruct that happiness. Moreover, a negative attitude is not sufficient. Both deliberation and action must definitely and positively aim at the production and distribution of a higher average of happiness within the whole life of the community.

This does not mean that happiness can be easily defined or that it can be secured by direct search, or that it is the only item to be taken into account. The elements that make up happiness are doubtless very variable, ranging all the way from profound moral and spiritual satisfactions which last a lifetime to the simple sense of physical well-being which comes with the sunshine of a spring morning. It may well be, too, that happiness is a by-product of living; but even as such, the conditions under which this by-product appears can be more or less determined and provided

for. It may be we should use a more inclusive term, such as community well-being, in place of happiness. Such a term might make room for intelligence and action alongside of happiness; but it might also mean that happiness would be crowded out. Whatever else may be included, happiness, in the sense of the realization of the lasting and genuine satisfactions of life, must be assured.

Of course, satisfactions are of many sorts; and about them there is not much use disputing. They include the calculating bloodless avarice of the money-mad monster; the wild frenzy of the fanatic; the maudlin gloatings of bestiality and obscenity; the calm joys of the scholar; the unspeakable blessedness of the mother; the thrilling ecstasies of youth and maiden in their first social awakening; and the bitter-sweetnesses of childhood.

But of whatever sort, satisfaction is primarily a function of instinctive expression, and since our instincts are natural, some at least of our satisfactions rise out of those strata of our natures which antedate the "fall of man." Therefore, for the sake of these satisfactions, which even the most conventional moralists sometimes feel, and covertly enjoy, some sort of unity must be secured to human life, and our intellectual efforts must be saved from becoming too unnatural. The test of any community program must somehow appear in the happiness and wholeness of

individual and community life; and the individual and community program, must, therefore, include these natural satisfactions.

Meanwhile, without reference to any kind of a program, the hunger of the world for joy and beauty is in evidence on every hand. Nowhere perhaps does this hunger for happiness and the world's failure to understand appear more definitely and more dangerously than in its dealing with the instinctive needs of childhood. If we should accept wholeheartedly the general doctrine of the instinctive basis of life, together with the doctrine that these instinctive endowments need expression and exercise both for their development and for their discipline, we might still make the fatal mistake made by some of the earlier psychologists of instinct in assuming a play instinct as one of the normal instincts of child life. Segregating all the play interest and capacity of childhood under a definite play instinct, which may or may not, like any other instinct, be present in any particular child, we get a description of child life which makes it possible to dissociate play activities from all other childish developments. Would it not be more normal and natural to consider that all the native instincts go through a play period? That is to say, should we not speak of the "play of instincts" rather than of an "instinct of play"? Should we not make sure that all the native capacity of childhood shall have its years of free irresponsible activity, exercise, development, preparation for the more serious



activities of later life? Instead of devoting one little corner of childhood to play and joy under the control of a play instinct, should we not determine to preserve all of childhood against the demoralizing interests of adult life, until childish capacities have achieved development sufficient to enter with vigor their adult tasks?

"Axes may bite in the forest; science harness the streams,  
Railway and dock be builded,—all in a land of dreams!  
Sunk in spiritual torpor, ye flout these words of the wise:  
'Only to music of children's songs shall the walls of a nation  
rise.'"

When we turn to the period of adolescence we enter upon a land that has been mutilated by ignorance and brutality since the world began. In recent years, however, a saner psychology has enabled us to realize something of this poignant hunger for beauty. Jane Addam's *Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* is a prose poem describing her explorations in this land of adolescence. With skilled hand she touches the facts with reference to both boys and girls, and she sees in the experiences of adolescence the raw materials out of which a world of wondrous beauty or a world of sordid shame or some intermediate between these extremes is being made.

She helps us to see the young over-worked girl of the city streets and the exploited boy and young man in an altogether new light. We had thought that the young working girl, for example, ought to be content to dress in calico and gingham, to live economically

in a small hall bedroom, to save her money for good books and uplifting entertainments and to be much concerned with the salvation of her soul. But looking at her in this more sympathetic light we see that she is a unit in the long story of the generations, and that more important perhaps than her own individual soul is the deep fact that she must play her part in the generations of men. For this reason the finer the quality of her being and the more fit she is for motherhood the more surely must she attend to all those elements of appearance, clothing and hats, and the like, which will assure her that in her competitions with other girls of lesser quality she shall never be at a disadvantage. It is not her own prestige that is at stake, nor even her own happiness; rather it is the future of the race, and for that future she gives herself such beauty as she can.

We do not see this as an expression of the hunger for life and beauty,—we see only “the self-conscious walk, the giggling speech, the preposterous clothing.” Anna Hempstead Branch’s poem “To a New York Shop Girl Dressed for Sunday” carries the same deep insight into that hunger for beauty which can make even the most sordid surroundings endurable:

“Conspicuous, splendid, conscious, sweet,  
She spread abroad and took the street.

And all that niceness would forbid,  
Superb, she smiled upon and did. . . .

She half perceives, half understands,  
Snatching her gifts with both her hands. . . .

Innocent! vulgar—that's the truth!  
Yet with the darling wiles of youth! . .

And judgment, wearily sad, may see  
No grace in such frivolity.

Yet which of us was ever bold  
To worship Beauty, hungry and cold!

Scorn famine down, proudly expressed  
Apostle to what things are best.

Let him who starves to buy the food  
For his soul's comfort find her good."

We may see all these aspects of the life of boys and girls in our communities in a sympathetic way and so help them in their stumbling struggling efforts to find themselves and express themselves, and so bring new beauty into being; or we may look upon all these displays as vulgar and pretentious, we may criticise and condemn, we may summarily decide that what such giddy young people need is to have more work to do and less money to spend and less time to waste, until they come to their senses. And so we may send them to the mills or to the mines or to any other situation in which childish labor power can be converted into wealth. We may forget that the world needs beauty and joy and freshness of life and reassurance of the worth of life, and of the dominance of the spiritual. In these days we should have much help in forgetting these things and little help in remembering them. But if ever the adult life of our communities is to have any other significance than that sordid round of "getting and spending which lays waste our powers" that sig-

nificance will be found in the renewal of youth which comes when parents and friends re-live in the lives of the children of the community the lives they had themselves once hoped to live.

Finally, adult life must be released from many of its old puritanical repressions and fears. The grind of life, the fear of poverty and of impending disasters, the very fear of hell itself, absorbs too much of the world's energy in the form of worry. In these reconstruction years, when science and industry are making over the deliberate and active programs of the world, should we not at the same time make over the world's program of joy and beauty and set up new resolutions and standards as to what constitutes a genuinely human program of individual and community good? The world has been destroyed by too much old habit and custom, on the one hand, and by too much deliberately developed engineery of destruction on the other. The world is glutted with horror, bestiality and hate. Millions of men and women will carry all their lives hideous memories and gnawing hungers to escape from grief and sorrow and the isolation of wartime attitudes. Much of the world's heritage of beauty as well as of joy and happiness has been destroyed. Europe knows the revolting ugliness of vast devastated areas; but all the world feels something of the revolting ugliness of vast devastated areas of our common human nature, where all the old loyalties and

neighborlinesses have been destroyed and their places taken by suspicion and hate.

The world faces, therefore, the long task of bringing back the sense of reality to individuals and whole communities, and the restoration of that tranquility of mind which can organize deliberation, happiness and activity, into a common social program. In such a program music and poetry and beauty of home and community will have their proper share. The democratic arts of pageantry and drama, folk songs, folk tales, folk music and folk dancing, so reminiscent of the long struggles of the race to escape from the shackles of uninteresting toil, from the horrors of destructive warfare, and from the oppression of superstitious religions, must all come back to us. The latent talent for making the world beautiful must be developed wherever it is found. In the long run we shall probably find it true that the hunger for beauty, the hunger for some sort of complete freedom and participation, is the most vital hunger of the human heart, and the satisfaction of that hunger in terms of individual and community happiness made possible through the socialization of science and industry, may prove to be the final word in individual and social salvation. Certainly no community program can justify itself that does not largely include just such an ultimate outcome as this.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP

AMONG the many "hang-overs" from autocratic régimes of the past is the legend that certain individuals have a peculiar endowment which is called "executive ability." This "ability" is supposed to be essential to the equipment of any man or woman who is to occupy the position of leadership or administration. Psychologically it is supposed to provide quick appreciation of certain fundamental elements of what is called "human nature,"—elements which are supposed to appear in men wherever they work, together with a more or less uncanny capacity to make up one's mind decisively yet more or less judicially, and to stand on the decision though the heavens fall.

Socially, and in the economic sense, this legend suggests an invidious comparison between the executive and the ordinary individual. It helps to perpetuate old social and industrial subordinations, since if executive ability is a special endowment from the Creator it were blasphemy for ordinary individuals to presume to hold themselves of equal rank or importance. Big salaries help to perpetuate this legend and to bolster up this invidious prestige also.

Undoubtedly men and women of peculiar ability in administrative lines do exist; but that fact does not support the old legend, for that old legend holds more or less consciously that a man of trained executive ability in any one line can be transferred to any other type of activity and administer it quite as effectively. There may be an occasional individual who has this tremendous capacity to take on the essential elements of any new situation quickly and to relate himself effectively to the essential lines of effort in that new position. But executive ability in the long run depends upon knowledge of the elements that enter into a situation; upon ability and willingness to give conscientious attention to details; upon some sort of comprehensive theory of the work being carried on, and of the significant factors that must be co-ordinated and adapted to each other in order that the most effective results may be achieved.

Democracy needs a completely new organization of the technique of administration, which will be consistent with the factors and the aims which a democratic community seeks to achieve. Democracy requires leadership. Autocratic bossing of the job is not real leadership. It may be "executive ability" but if so it is an ability to "execute" the aspirations of democracy, to suppress them, and discourage and destroy them, rather than to lead them. All too long democracy has had to fight against these unsympathetic attitudes of the typical administrator. One phase of the work of

the deliberative community council should be the more complete analysis of the kind of leadership and administration which the democratic community must have.

The most real difficulty in our present world-unrest arises out of the fact that our community interests, international, national and local, are still largely dominated by "executives" who have not the slightest comprehension of the suppressed energies they are dealing with or the ideal demands toward which those energies are aspiring. The industrial leader, the political boss, the typical educator, the traditional theologian all bear the taint of this undemocracy. They are all impatient of deliberation, and of the vague longings of the suppressed multitudes. The more definitely they urge their programs upon present conditions, however, the more they alienate and disaffect those whom they are supposed to lead.

The industrial leader wants increased production, but he does not know how to get it under conditions that will make increased production permanent. The politician wants votes, but he is rapidly losing his power to control them, and he will soon be mouthing that old lament about the "traditional ingratitude of republics." The theologian wants "the kingdom,"—some kingdom, most any kingdom,—and he wants it so badly that he is frequently convinced that he would be justified in bringing it in by any means,—force, falsehood, or hypocrisy. The educator still falls back upon the original maxim of teaching, that "lickin'



and larnin' go together." These and their kind are all good men gone wrong. Democracy needs executive leadership quite as much as does autocracy, but that leadership must be democratic.

The first task of the democratic leader should be to become really acquainted with the forces and energies that he is to lead. This involves going far below the conventional surface of things. Democracy demands that every normal individual shall be taken into account and the community leader must be one who can do this democratic accounting. He must be able to help those long-lost forces and energies recover from their old repressions and discover their capacity to express themselves in order that a program or policy for the community shall actually come out of the vital life of that community. That is to say, the democratic leader will be thoroughly sympathetic with the deliberative mood of the community. He will want the policy which he administers to be the policy of the community. Of course if he is still tainted with traditional administrative attitudes he will value efficiency too much to bother with the feelings of the community.

The story is told of a well-known university president that during the war he heard that a certain member of the university faculty had been guilty of making pro-German statements. Calling the man into his office, he inquired as to the facts, "Oh, nothing like that," the teacher is reported to have replied, "all that I said was that an autocratic executive is more efficient

than a democratic one." "Oh well, if that's all you said, go on about your business," was the reply. This president was the executive of the state university in one of our more democratic commonwealths. Democracy will have to succeed in spite of its executives, it seems.

In administering the community policy the democratic executive will seek to release in positive and advantageous ways more and more of the hidden resources of the community life. He will be no more frightened by these hidden resources than is the prospector frightened by discovering gold. Even the prospector gets a sort of stage fever at the sudden realization of wealth. Our communities are poverty stricken, not because they are without wealth, but because the wealth is hidden and unrealized. Community leadership of the future must go endlessly on the assumption that the welfare of the community will be continuously furthered and conserved by the discovery of more and more of this hidden wealth—these "lost talents."

But, now, in such a release and development of the hidden inner life the democratic community will awake to the fact that every human being needs some real experience of leadership. This is not only necessary; it is becoming definitely possible. Our democratic life exhibits a continuous growth in the division of labor and of social interest. This differentiation of interest and vocation calls for continuous development of special abilities and for specific leaderships. Statistics

show that more than 13,000 specialized vocations are in existence. Each of these requires some peculiar skill; each gives room for the emergence of qualities of leadership; each such vocation might develop its own particular type of ethics, and each will involve genuine thoughtfulness in working out its vital relationship to other vocations and to the common welfare of the community. Democracy cannot abide the mere isolated worker, lost in the routine of his vocation. Every member of the democratic community ought to be a worker, and every worker ought to be a real member of the community.

The full development of the many implications of this doctrine would give to our democratic communities what the enemies of democracy have long declared to be impossible, that is, color and variety. Enraptured by memories of the colorful glory of the conspicuous wastes of autocratic ages, when mannikins established their individuality by distinctive types of ceremonial dress and when, for example, kings met on fields carpeted with gold, the enemies of democracy have uniformly charged that the inevitable fate of any democratic social order must be monotonous mediocrity,—dull, drab, lifeless. But the real fact seems to be that this monotonous mediocrity which has at times existed is the result not of a real democracy, but of the effort of the enemies of democracy to prevent the emergence of a real democratic variety. It must be apparent that true development of all the native indi-

viduality of our democratic communities would be quite as colorful as any autocratic community ever could boast,—with this advantage: that the variety would come from the inner resources of individuals, not from the outer resources and arts of the tailor, the dressmaker, and the fashionplate.

This promise of infinite variety and color of life as the expression of native resources is integral in the faith of democracy. Childhood demonstrates the reality of this infinite variety; but wholesale systems of discipline and autocratic methods of inculcating uniform masses of uninteresting facts destroy this individuality early. "There emerges from our school system," says Benson, "a stream of uniformly stupid boys and girls, —nice, quiet and respectable, but knowing almost nothing, without intellectual interests, and indeed honestly despising such interests."

Corresponding to this fact of the infinite variety of childhood is this other fact which we have already noted, the growing range of social vocations and community interests. These two demand each other. But between them stands that narrow pedantry of the schools, that moral fearfulness of religion, that intolerant littleness of politics, and that traditional cupidity of business, which are fearful of new patterns of individual initiative, of variety and color, and which seek in every possible way to prevent the natural development of these democratic realities. Assuming the finality of old institutions, conventional leaders oppose any

reorganization of institutions or community programs that would provide for the emergence of these new patterns in natural ways.

But it is certain that this infinite variety of life will find its way out into the open life of the world as surely as the living seed sends its shoots into the sunshine of the spring. Buried under the débris of ages of ignorance and intolerance, this life is bursting through at last. Out of this more varied life will come that more varied chance for leadership which is of the genius of democracy, while at the same time, the more completely organized community life will give opportunity to every individual to share in the experiences of following. Democracy can tolerate *no* individual who can do nothing but "lead,"—such a person is probably insane, just as the individual who can do nothing but follow is likely to be below par mentally.

Such differentiation of the community will make room for two types of leaders: (1) the specialist, who will be particularly concerned with the minutiae of understanding and organization in some limited field; and (2) the "generalist," whose concern will be with the maintenance of the integral community program, in spite of all divisions and differentiations within. There will be no social conflict between these two types; but there will be an endless logical conflict. The specialist will intensify, define, enrich and make endlessly more varied the particular corners of community interest and life; the "generalist" will criticise all

such developments from the standpoint of their meaning for the community as a whole. Both are needed.

A final consideration brings in the question of that non-conformist leadership that introduces new patterns of living into the community. Autocracy of course could not endure this. In the old Russia, originality was a crime punishable by exile in Siberia. Democracy must take exactly the opposite view. The new pattern and the non-conformist are both essential to the vitality of our democratic life. Professional, pedantic, dull leaderships are produced in plenty in the life of institutions; but those magnetic leaderships which strike out new lines of adventure beyond the limits of the commonplace come largely from outside institutions. Institutional prestige and jealousy refuse to admit this fact, or to accept it; but it remains true and must be admitted even for the sake of the community itself. It is this recognition that community,—in his phrase, "Nationality"—is dependent upon new patterns, new movements, that makes Walt Whitman's poetry of democracy so vital.

"Still though the one I sing," he says, is Nationality, yet that Nationality is made of contradictions and its hope is in the everlasting revolt against the dead levels of conventionality:

"Oh latent right of insurrection! Oh quenchless, indispensable fire!"

Democracy must realize its need of these democratic types of leadership: the specialist, the "generalist," the

non-conformist,—and make provision for them insofar as provision can be made. It is likely that no provision can be made for the non-conformist, for he is a prophet and he cometh not by observation. But democracy can at least listen to him when he comes.

As for the specialist and the “generalist,” the elements of their training grow more obvious in these reconstructive years. They must both be rooted deep in the social sciences: that psychology which appreciates the mechanisms and motives of human behavior; that sociology which illuminates the mechanisms and motives of group and community conduct; that economics and politics which penetrate to the inner substance of the instincts of workmanship, service, loyalty, subordination and cupidity; and that ethics which illustrates the ways in which individuals and groups co-operate for the achievement of any desirable end. The community is a reality even though vaguely apprehended and understood; he who would lead in the community effectively and constructively must have some realistic grasp of the mechanisms with which he deals. As the physician envisages the intricate inner mechanisms of the body in order that he may assuredly deal with their pathological development, so the community leader must envisage the intricate structure of the community. That structure is the most complicated in the universe. To understand it is at present perhaps largely impossible, because the contributory sciences are still largely incomplete; but one who would

work in the life of the community must give himself to the long task of mastering so much of the understanding that is now possible as his time will permit; and in the practical work of his career he may then be in a position to add some item of illuminating knowledge to the world's understanding of the community.

At any rate, here is the greatest task that now faces the imagination of the world. The destiny of civilization is wrapped up in the future of community life. If that life becomes intelligent, richly developed, democratically organized, socially controlled,—the future of civilization is secure. If it remains indolent, thoughtless, careless of human goods, laggard; or if it is organized in such ways as to subordinate all individual vitality, originality and initiative to some purely mechanical principle of organization,—in either case, the future of civilization may well be questioned. The determination is largely one of leadership. If the community can secure deliberative leaders whose very instincts are democratic, and administrative leaders whom no temptations of power of haste or "efficiency" can turn from the democratic ideal, the future of the community is securely democratic. But if these fail, civilization may have to lay its foundations in some new community soil, in some new and future age, after it has recovered from the shock of the failure of the democratic hopes of this age. The fate of democracy and community is not with extrinsic powers and agencies; but with the calm, scientific deliberation, the



serene yet serious aspiration, and the whole-souled democratic administration that are determined from within the community itself. The destiny of the community is in the keeping of—the community.

## APPENDIX

### ILLUSTRATIONS OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

IN these unquiet times the call for new forms of community organization is the most healthful of all social demands. And the response to that demand shows that democratic intelligence is not altogether laggard. To be sure, conservative intelligence will not permit of a general orgy of experimentation—and that is well. We have not been much used to social experimentation in America since 1789. (The years from 1776 to 1789 were the most constructively experimental in our history). Hence we have not developed a technique for our control in the matter. We are rather too much like children in a laboratory.

Certain experiments are well under way in various parts of the world. It were well, if adequate information were available, to present the facts of that most stupendous experiment, the Soviet organization of Russia. But that must wait until events have cleared. A number of less ambitious experiments in America may be set forth as indicating the direction of practical experience, and as showing the experimental temper of the people.

#### 1. *The Community Center Movement:*

Men require the companionship of their fellows.

Happiness is largely dependent on social approval. Hence we must have something to take the place of the vanishing cross-roads meeting, post-office corner, saloon, and the like. The public schoolhouse seems most available as a neighborhood club, where the people can meet again on terms of common friendship. The community center is limited only by the size of the community. "It seeks to broaden the basis of unity among men, to multiply their points of contact, to consider those interests which all have in common."\*

This movement seems to be very valuable as a means of transforming mere residents in a given location into neighbors. This is necessary; but it is not enough. We need understanding of the complex problems of community and inter-community life; interest in the development of community and inter-community relationships; and the will to share in all the concerns that affect the common welfare. For these things a more closely knit organization seems necessary.

## 2. *The Central Council of Social Agencies:*

A rather different type of experiment has developed in a number of American cities.† This functions through the *representation* of the various community groups

\*Jackson: A Community Center.

cf. also Clarke, I. C.: The Little Democracy.

Hanifan, L. J.: The Community Center.

Perry, C. A.: Community Center Activities.

†cf. pamphlet on The Central Council of Social Agencies by F. H. McLean published by American Association for Organizing Family Social Work.

in one central body. Usually it has included only those agencies devoted to "social work," but efforts are being made to have it include all the agencies of: (1) Education, Vocation, Culture and Recreation; (2) Relief and Remedy; (3) Industrial, Commercial, Social and Religious Interests. The aim of such a council is to keep the various groups in close friendly contact, to act as a clearing house of information for the general public, and to increase efficiency in all lines of community work by eliminating duplications of effort and supplementing in fields which have not been covered.

### 3. *The Community Council Movement:*

As a direct outgrowth of the work of the National Council of Defense in wartime, a number of communities are organized into community councils. All citizens within a given council area may become members, membership being based on service rendered by the individual to the community. The community council should be self-governing and self-supporting. It should have an advisory board made up of the representatives of departments of government and social institutions. These representatives should be, whenever possible, local workers of the department or agency whose task lies in the council district, and who therefore need the people's co-operation and could provide the leadership required. The advisory committee should exist for service, not for control.

When enough councils have been developed a City Congress or Parliament made up of delegates of these Councils should be formed. And any control over local Councils, if allocated to any outside agency, should be allocated to this City Congress.

The purposes of such a Council are: to serve as a forum; to provide machinery for initiating neighborhood enterprises (such as co-operative markets, block parties, and the like); to make the residents of the community real members of the community through participation and responsibility.\*

#### 5. *The Community Service Movement:*

Community organization on the basis of social and recreational activities is developing widely over the country, and is being stimulated nationally by "Community Service Incorporated," the successor of War Camp Community Service. The program includes such activities as the following:

City and Neighborhood Service,—fostering a spirit of neighborliness which will include all nationalities, all homeless men and women, all residents in the locality; mobilizing the neighborhood resources for leisure time activities which will secure community participation, will operate through volunteers, and will utilize the semi-idle facilities of the neighborhood, such as school buildings, other public buildings, vacant lots, etc.

\*Community Councils of New York City,—Statement of Work and Problems, July 12, 1919. For information address U. S. Bureau of Education, Washington, D. C.

Community Recreation,—including playgrounds, block parties, twilight athletic leagues, neighborhood picnics, festivals, etc.

Community Drama and Pageantry,—drawing together in this interest all volunteer and professional service.

Community Music,—to make music, vocal and instrumental, available to every man woman and child; to encourage mass singing, community choruses and orchestras, etc.

Department of Information,—to insure to new and old members of the community current knowledge of the institutions and activities of the city which can serve them; to collect information with a view to greater efficiency and broader vision in community work.\*

#### 6. *The Home Service Movement:*

Following along somewhat similar lines, the American Red Cross has also developed a community service organization. This "Home Service" work includes:

1. Public Health Nursing, Educational Classes in Dietetics, Home Care of the Sick and First Aid.
2. Home Service to Civilian Families, Information Service and Community Projects.
3. Children's Activities Through Junior Membership.

\*Particulars concerning this program and its development in various American cities and rural communities can be secured from Community Service Incorporated, 1 Madison Ave., New York City.

4. Disaster Relief.

5. Establishing Health Centers for the preservation, promotion and improvement of the public health in: (a) conservation of child life; (b) promotion of rural hygiene; (c) prevention of mental diseases, industrial diseases, venereal diseases and tuberculosis; (d) education of the people in matters of health and prevention of disease.\*

The Red Cross has encountered considerable criticism for undertaking this extended home service work in peace times. But insofar as it undertakes tasks, especially in the field of rural health conservation, not at present the concern of any social agency, it can well afford to ignore these criticisms and permit time to justify or condemn its program.

7. *The "Social Unit" Movement:*

The "Cincinnati experiment" is, perhaps, the most famous effort at community organization. The four features of the Social Unit Organization are as follows:

1. The Citizens' Council of thirty-one members, chosen by local Block Councils, which are in turn elected by residents of the blocks, every one of either sex over eighteen years of age residing in the block having the right to vote for the Block Councils. It is estimated that each of the thirty-one blocks includes

\*Full information can be secured from National Headquarters, the American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.

a population of approximately one hundred families or five hundred people.

2. The Occupational Council, composed at present of the elected representatives of seven skilled groups serving, although not necessarily resident in the district. The Occupational Council is elected by group councils organized in the following skilled groups: physicians, nurses, recreational workers, teachers, social workers, ministers and trade unionists.

3. The General Council, which has full control over all neighborhood programs, is made up of the members of the Citizens Council and the Occupational Council sitting together.

4. The Council of Executives, consists of the three executives of the three councils above named.

Investigations show that the movement is free from machine control. The leaders, workers and supporters seem to be intensely interested in the development of a completely democratic community organization. They want the people to do their own thinking and to participate fully in the activities by which that thinking becomes organized into community habit. It is an effort to escape from the "representative government" which does not represent into the essential democracy of our earlier American experiences. The movement has been quite successful in Cincinnati, where the funds were provided from outside sources. It remains to be seen whether it will be as completely



successful in any other community which must provide its own funds for financing its program.\*

8. Interesting programs with many admirable community features are proposed by the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A., the National Catholic War Council, and various of the church organizations. Full particulars of these may be secured from their respective national headquarters.

\*Devine, E. T.: The Survey for November 15, 1919. For information address The National Social Unit Organization, 117 West 46th Street, New York City.

# INDEX

	PAGE
Addams .....	44, 48
Adolescence .....	201f
Adult Education .....	87, 115
America .....	41, 97
American Doctrine .....	12
American Institutions .....	138, 185
"Americanism" .....	23, 131, 135
Amusements .....	18, 42-45
Aristocracy .....	51
Attitudes .....	26
Autocracy, Naturalness of .....	132
Bacon .....	79, 162
Beauty .....	88
Benson .....	212
Bentham .....	54
Brotherhood of Man .....	55f
Browning .....	162
British Labor Party .....	57
Business .....	95, 107
Carlyle .....	14, 155, 197
Case Work .....	110f
Catholic .....	42
Centers of Instinct .....	3
Central Council of Social Agencies .....	219f
Change .....	177f
Child Labor .....	83, 99
Child Welfare .....	84, 86
Choice .....	37
Church .....	28, 40f, 96, 111, 131f
Christianity .....	40
Cincinnati Experiment .....	223f
Citizenship .....	84, 115
Civilization .....	22
Class Struggle .....	14
Collective Bargaining .....	118f
Colonists .....	6f
Communal Nature of Man .....	167f
Color in Democracy .....	211f
Community .....	4, 6, 9f, 16, 38, 46, 55, 59f, 63, 93, 101ff, 169f
Community Center Movement .....	218f

	PAGE
Community Councils Movement .....	220f
Community Deliberative Council .....	115f, 146
Community Service Incorporated .....	221f
Competition .....	10
Congeniality .....	19
Control .....	97
Consciousness of Kind .....	56f
Co-operation .....	21, 113
Courtship .....	38
Crevice .....	6
Cromwell .....	69
Defectives .....	46
Defects (Social) .....	93ff
Democracy .....	19, 35, 52, 67, 76ff, 97, 153
Direct Action .....	118, 125
Economics .....	63, 71ff
Economic Interpretation of Conduct .....	187
Education .....	33, 63, 79, 86, 96, 102, 113f, 190f, 195, 212
Educational Tests .....	25
Emotion .....	58
England .....	41f
Enlightened Selfishness .....	176f
Ephebic Oath .....	61
Ethics .....	63, 75, 89
Evolution .....	51
Exclusions .....	46f
Executive Ability .....	182f, 206f
Experimentation .....	149, 185, 218f
Fact .....	73
Family .....	36, 83
Fatherland .....	10
Fear .....	34, 54, 57, 74, 104
Ferguson .....	165
Force .....	13, 32, 180f
Fragmentation of the Community .....	137
Frontiers, the New .....	154, 164f
Germany .....	19, 41, 54
Good Will .....	55f, 58, 116
Government .....	4, 31, 129, 143, 189
Government by Injunction .....	13
Gregariousness .....	168
Group Thinking .....	145
Group Work .....	105f
Habit .....	15, 50ff, 58, 79ff

	PAGE
Happiness .....	197f
Health Program .....	25, 81, 172
Home .....	28, 95
Housing .....	82
Human Nature .....	78ff, 169f
Hypothesis .....	67ff, 148, 164f
Idealism .....	23, 64, 179, 184
Ideals .....	180
Impulse .....	30
Indirect Action .....	119
Individual .....	3, 50ff, 59
Individualistic .....	7, 107
Industry .....	27, 82f, 85, 133, 181, 195f
Intellectual .....	34
Instincts .....	18, 24, 31, 75, 124, 199f
Institutions .....	4, 6, 9, 31f, 67, 167, 177, 214
Internationalism .....	17
Jefferson .....	68
Jesus .....	78
Jewish .....	42
Justice .....	85
Labor Union .....	13, 117ff, 137f, 188f
Laissez Faire .....	10, 107
Law .....	73, 120
Leadership .....	19, 35, 134, 213f, 216
Leisure .....	43, 88
Liberalism .....	112
Literacy .....	25
Lost Talents of the Community .....	210
Loyalty .....	12ff, 17, 31f
Marriage .....	37
Method .....	105, 118
Middle Ages .....	51, 53
Motives .....	30
National Catholic War Council .....	225
Needs .....	3
Nervous System .....	16
Newspapers .....	133
Non-Conformist .....	170f, 214
Normal Living .....	92
Optimism .....	162f
Organic Growth .....	15
Organization .....	130, 132

	PAGE
Partisanship .....	5
Pessimism .....	158f
Philosopher's Stone .....	163
Philosophy .....	64
Physical Ability .....	25
Pioneers .....	7f, 102
Plato .....	53
Play .....	42-45, 87, 200f
Pleasure and Pain .....	55, 57, 199f
Political Science .....	63, 71
Political State .....	12, 28, 32ff, 97, 189
Poverty .....	99
Practical Man .....	134, 182
Pragmatism .....	64, 65ff, 68
Primitive Community .....	9, 62
Program .....	143, 155, 175f
Progress .....	129, 163
Property .....	11, 187f
Prostitution .....	173f
Protestant .....	42
Psychology .....	31, 52, 65, 71, 74, 78
Puritanism .....	194
Radicalism .....	128, 139
Reaction .....	139
Realism .....	64
Reconstruction .....	91ff, 104, 139
Recreation .....	87, 143, 172ff, 200f, 204f
Red Cross Home Service .....	222f
Religion .....	40, 191, 197
Repression .....	157
Revolution .....	81, 126
Revolution Absolute .....	165f, 176
Roman Circus .....	136
Rousseau .....	167f
Rural Life .....	25
Sabotage .....	30, 123f
Saloon .....	137
Salvation .....	105
School .....	4, 28, 34
Science .....	19, 27, 34, 62f, 71ff, 149, 156
Sex .....	18, 37, 44f
Single Tax .....	116f
Smith, Adam .....	72
Sociability .....	18
Social Contract Theory .....	167f
Socialism .....	41, 126ff, 128

	PAGE
Social Legislation .....	120
Social Scientist .....	146
Social Sedatives .....	136
Social Unit .....	223f
Social Workers .....	20, 91, 100
Socrates .....	53
Sophistic Attitude .....	162
Soviet Russia .....	218
Standards .....	81f
Standards of Living .....	89
Strikes .....	29ff
Suggestion .....	181, 185
Synthesis .....	142
Taxation .....	116f
Technique of Administration .....	207f
Technique of Deliberation .....	151
Tests .....	24ff
Tradition .....	26, 50ff
Treason .....	24
Unemployment .....	99
Unrest .....	99
Utilitarianism .....	54f
Wage System .....	82
Wallas .....	17
War Camp Community Service .....	221
Whitman .....	214
Wilson, President .....	68, 76f
Women .....	38f, 99
Woman's Suffrage .....	138
Words .....	80
Work .....	29



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